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ABSTRACT
Stealthy Attacks and Defense Strategies in Competing Sensor Networks.
(August 2008)
Aleksandra Czarlinska, B.A.Sc., University of Toronto
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Deepa Kundur
The fundamental objective of sensor networks underpinning a variety of appli-
cations is the collection of reliable information from the surrounding environment.
The correctness of the collected data is especially important in applications involv-
ing societal welfare and safety, in which the acquired information may be utilized by
end-users for decision-making. The distributed nature of sensor networks and their
deployment in unattended and potentially hostile environments, however, renders this
collection task challenging for both scalar and visual data.
In this work we propose and address the twin problem of carrying out and de-
fending against a stealthy attack on the information gathered by a sensor network at
the physical sensing layer as perpetrated by a competing hostile network. A stealthy
attack in this context is an intelligent attempt to disinform a sensor network in a
manner that mitigates attack discovery. In comparison with previous sensor network
security studies, we explicitly model the attack scenario as an active competition be-
tween two networks where diﬃculties arise from the pervasive nature of the attack,
the possibility of tampering during data acquisition prior to encryption, and the lack
of prior knowledge regarding the characteristics of the attack.
We examine the problem from the perspective of both the hostile and the legit-
imate network. The interaction between the networks is modeled as a game where
a stealth utility is derived and shown to be consistent for both players in the case
iv
of stealthy direct attacks and stealthy cross attacks. Based on the stealth utility,
the optimal attack and defense strategies are obtained for each network. For the
legitimate network, minimization of the attacker’s stealth results in the possibility of
attack detection through established paradigms and the ability to mitigate the power
of the attack. For the hostile network, maximization of the stealth utility translates
into the optimal attack avoidance. This attack avoidance does not require active
communication among the hostile nodes but rather relies on a level of coordination
which we quantify. We demonstrate the signiﬁcance and eﬀectiveness of the solution
for sensor networks acquiring scalar and multidimensional data such as surveillance
sequences and relate the results to existing image sensor networks. Finally we discuss
the implications of these results for achieving secure event acquisition in unattended
environments.
vTo My Loving Family
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Foremost I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Deepa Kundur for her sup-
port, advice and encouragement and the experience that she shares with her students.
Dr. Kundur is an excellent teacher and a strong supporter of her students, providing
them with many opportunities for academic and professional growth.
I would like to thank Professors Karen L. Butler-Purry, Don. R. Halverson
and Eun Jung Kim for their participation on my committee, their advice and their
valuable teaching. I would also like to thank Dr. Alexander Sprintson and Dr. A.
L. Narasimha Reddy for their feedback. Dr. Takis Zourntos has been a source of
positivity and I would like to express my gratitude for his perspective and teaching.
Special thanks to Dr. Costas N. Georghiades and Dr. Scott Miller for their support
and their contributions to a great department for faculty and students.
I would also like to thank my peers in the wireless communications lab for their
friendship and advice. Special thanks to William Luh for being a tremendous source
of support and friendship.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER Page
I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Competing Sensor Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
C. Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
II PRELIMINARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Characteristics of Sensor Networks for Data Acquisition . . 10
B. The Secure Data Acquisition and Stealthy Attack Problems 13
C. System Models and Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Competing Sensor Networks Model . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
D. Literature Review and Classiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Relationship of Literature to Our Work . . . . . . . . 22
2. Game Approach to Sensor Network Security . . . . . . 25
3. Data Content Security in Sensor Networks . . . . . . . 27
a. Attacks on Collection and Processing . . . . . . . 28
b. Physical Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
c. Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
d. Trust Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
e. Byzantine Generals’ Problem . . . . . . . . . . . 32
III STEALTHY DIRECT COMPETITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A. Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
B. System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C. Stealthy Attack Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1. Attack Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2. Attack Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3. Attack Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
D. Secure Data Acquisition Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1. Defense Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2. Defense Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3. Defense Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
E. Stealthy Direct Attack Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
viii
CHAPTER Page
1. Comparison with Uncoordinated Attack . . . . . . . . 69
2. Comparison with Active Communication Attack . . . 77
F. Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
IV STEALTHY CROSS COMPETITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A. Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
B. System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
C. Stealthy Attack Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
1. Attack Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2. Attack Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3. Attack Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
D. Secure Data Acquisition Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
1. Defense Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2. Defense Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3. Defense Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
E. Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
1. Comparison with Stealthy Direct Attack and Com-
munication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
2. Comparison with Uncoordinated Attacks . . . . . . . 134
F. Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
V STEALTHY IMAGE NETWORK COMPETITION . . . . . . . 138
A. Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
B. Literature and Recent Advances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
C. System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
D. Analysis for Event Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
1. Image Sequence Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
2. Lightweight Image Processing for Event Acquisition . 153
3. Lightweight Event Acquisition Properties . . . . . . . 154
4. Lightweight Event Acquisition Performance . . . . . . 157
E. Performance and Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
1. Direct Sensor Decisions Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 159
2. Cluster Head Aided Event Acquisition . . . . . . . . . 163
F. Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
VI CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
B. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
ix
Page
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
APPENDIX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
APPENDIX C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
xLIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
I Optimal q∗ Value for Cluster Size n and Probability of Event p . . . 57
II Comparison of Stealth Condition for Strategy Types . . . . . . . . . 101
III Comparison of the Expected Power of Attack E[Pa] for Strategy
Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
IV Output of Algorithm 4 for Example 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
V Output of Algorithm 5 for Example 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
VI Output of Algorithm 6 for Example 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
VII Sample Priority List for PCD Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
VIII Ordering of Stealth Condition by Strategy Type . . . . . . . . . . . 121
IX PCD Metric for Direct vs. Cross and Comm. vs. No Comm. for
n = 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
X Methods for Marking a Frame As an “Event” at Camera Node . . . 147
XI Event Detection Based on Lightweight Image Processing (LIP)
Organized in Order of Decreasing Detection Performance PD . . . . 158
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
1 Dual stealthy attack and defense problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Applications of the stealthy attack mechanism and the dual attack
defense mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 Approaches for secure collection (our focus) and dissemination of
sensor data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4 General challenges in sensor networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 Information ﬂow during the sensor data collection and dissemina-
tion process showing protected and vulnerable parts of the process. . 13
6 Data gathering in the competing networks scenario. . . . . . . . . . . 14
7 Based on deployment and goals, a hostile node H may attack one
or more or none of its neighboring legitimate nodes L. This ab-
straction depicts a subset of two hostile nodes with the possibility
of cross-attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8 Classiﬁcation of the stealthy hostile attack with respect to existing
work in terms of attack, defense and aﬀected data. . . . . . . . . . . 22
9 Classiﬁcation of the stealthy hostile attack with respect to existing
attacks based on their eﬀect on the network and its data. . . . . . . . 24
10 Sensor network security goals aﬀected by the hostile attack (*). . . . 25
11 Direct stealthy attack model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12 (a) Binary sensor model with sensing threshold Th and resulting
probability of witnessing an event 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. (b) Basic bit
error model due to fault or unstealthy attack where 0 ≤ q ≤
1 is typically small for faults but may be arbitrarily large for
unstealthy attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
xii
FIGURE Page
13 Visualization of Lemma 1: when 1-positions do not overlap (in-
tersect) the result is a bit 1, otherwise a bit 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
14 Visualization of Lemma 3: choosing exactly m of y’s 1s to overlap
with x’s 1s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
15 Theoretical vs. simulated ϕ(q), probability of stealthy attack suc-
cess, for n = 60 nodes, p = 0.495 (probability bit 1 is sent by
legitimate node). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
16 Probability of stealthy attack success, ϕ(q), for p = 0.3 (proba-
bility bit 1 is sent by legitimate node) over various network sizes
n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
17 Probability of stealthy attack failure, 1− ϕ(q), for n = 55 nodes,
p = 0.2 (probability bit 1 is sent by legitimate node) over various
 uncertainty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
18 Probability of stealthy attack success, ψ(p, q), for n = 60 nodes. . . . 56
19 (a) n = 50, p = 0.01 and q = 0.1. (b) n = 50, p = 0.1 and q = 0.1. . . 64
20 n = 50, p = 0.47 and q = 0.47. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
21 The PD-PFA performance curves for various values of n and the
optimal value of q∗ corresponding to that n for (a) p = 0.05 and
(b) p = 0.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
22 Two hostile nodes deployed against two legitimate nodes. Each
hostile node may actuate with a diﬀerent probability qi. . . . . . . . 69
23 Stealth utility manifold for a hostile node i versus the full set of
actions q1 and q2 for the case where p = 0.5. The two Nash equi-
libria for this game occur at (0, 0) and (1, 1) and the Tp threshold
is the saddle point. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
24 Best response functions of hostile nodes h1 and h2 showing the
two Nash equilibria at the intersection points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
xiii
FIGURE Page
25 A mixed-action game with mixing probabilities x and y. The
(u1, u2) numbers inside each cell represent the utility of player 1
and 2 respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
26 Comparison of the power of the attack Pa for various cluster sizes
n and probabilities p for the direct stealth attack (no communi-
cations) and the active communications attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
27 Comparison of the PCD metric for various cluster sizes n and
probabilities p for the direct stealth attack (no communications)
and the active communications attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
28 To maintain stealth, the follower must match the leader. . . . . . . . 84
29 Stealthy cross attack model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
30 (a) Best response functions of h1 and h2 showing the emergence
of two (out of the possible four) pure equilibria. (b) Comparison
of stealth Sc for various strategy types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
31 Comparison of the average power-communication-detection PCD
metric for various strategy types over the range of probability p
of an event for the cross attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
32 (a) Implementation of triplet (a, b, c) and (a˜, b˜, c˜). (b) Implemen-
tation of quadruplet (a, b, c, d) and (a˜, b˜, c˜, d˜). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
33 Comparison of the PD-PFA performance among pure strategies,
doublets, triplets and quadruplets for (a) p = 0.01. (b) p = 0.1. . . . 122
34 Comparison of the PD-PFA performance among pure strategies,
doublets, triplets and quadruplets for (a) p = 0.03. (b) p = 0.4. . . . 123
35 Comparison of the PD-PFA performance for p = 0.01 and p = 0.4
for (a) diﬀerent pure strategies. (b) diﬀerent triplets strategies. . . . 124
36 Optimal vs. sub-optimal detectors for representative doublet mix
(a) p = 0.1. (b) p = 0.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
37 Optimal vs. sub-optimal detectors for p = 0.3 and (a) triplet mix
(b, c, d). (b) quadruplet mix (a, b, c, d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
xiv
FIGURE Page
38 Optimal vs. sub-optimal detectors for p = 0.1 and (a) triplet mix
(a, b, c). (b) quadruplet mix (a, b, c, d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
39 (a) Cross attack non-equilibrium: h1 plays c and h2 plays b. (b)
Possible locations of h2 to enact strategy c to match h1’s strategy c. . 130
40 Comparison of the direct and cross attacks for doublet (b, c) for
(a) p = 0.1. (b) p = 0.45. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
41 Comparison of the direct and cross attacks for triplet (a, b, c) for
p = 0.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
42 PD-PFA when h2 deviates from optimal doublet mixing strategy
for (a) p = 0.1. (b) p = 0.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
43 Each camera node may employ lightweight image processing (LIP)
to determine if an event of interest has occurred in a collected
frame or it may rely on decisions from the sensor(s)/cluster head
(CH) or a combination of both (CH & LIP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
44 Frame Seq. 1: indoor test conditions with constant lighting and
no background changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
45 Frame Seq. 2: outdoor variable lighting due to clouds. The light
intensity changes by 70% between frames. Additional background
movement due to shrub.
150
46 Frame Seq. 3: changing outdoor light and background (swaying
trees). The subject temporarily disappears behind a tree. . . . . . . . 150
47 (a) Frame Seq. 4a showing Seq. 2 modiﬁed to remove the shrub.
(b) Frame Seq. 4b showing Seq. 3 modiﬁed to remove the swaying
trees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
48 For event acquisition, each camera node may utilize lightweight
image processing (LIP), a sensor decision (SN), or rely on both to
determine the presence or absence of an event. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
xv
FIGURE Page
49 Probability of detection PD vs. probability of sensor error q for
the LIP, SN and SN & LIP approaches for sequence (a) walk with
trees from Figure 46. (b) walk without trees from Figure 47b. . . . . 161
50 Probability of detection PD vs. probability of sensor error q for
the LIP, SN and SN & LIP approaches for sequence (a) car with
trees from Figure 45. (b) car without trees from Figure 47a. . . . . . 162
51 PD v.s. q for walking with trees from Figure 46. (a) ps = 0.01.
(b) ps = 0.1. (c) ps = 0.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
52 PD v.s. q for walking without trees from Figure 47b. (a) ps = 0.01.
(b) ps = 0.1. (c) ps = 0.33. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
53 PD v.s. q for car with trees from Figure 45 (a) ps = 0.01. (b)
ps = 0.1. (c) ps = 0.44. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
54 PD v.s. q for car without trees from Figure 47a (a) ps = 0.01. (b)
ps = 0.1. (c) ps = 0.44. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
55 (a) PD v.s. q for walking sequence with tree from Figure 46 for
ps = 0.01. (b) PD v.s. q for walking sequence without tree from
Figure 47b for ps = 0.33. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
56 PD v.s. q for car sequence with tree from Figure 45 for (a) ps =
0.01. (b) ps = 0.44. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
57 Test for normality of diﬀerence images or q-q plot (car sequence)
under (a) H0. (b) H1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
58 Diﬀerence image histogram (car sequence) under (a) H0. (b) H1. . . 203
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Competing Sensor Networks
Since the early days of the Internet, researchers and users alike have experienced an
unprecedented level of connectivity to remote digital information as well as to other
distant users. In more recent years, the appeal of connectivity to remote resources
has evolved into the fascinating concept of a network capable of reporting information
about a distant physical environment. This new type of sensor network is generally
comprised of a large number of networked nodes with sensing, actuation, data pro-
cessing and communication abilities for the acquisition of scalar or multidimensional
data. The wide applicability of sensor networks to the scientiﬁc enterprise as well as
to industrial and government endeavors is expected to result in the proliferation and
ownership of these networks by numerous and often competing entities.
Deployment of a sensor network in a remote environment bestows upon an entity
the ability to gather valuable data that may otherwise be unaccessible. To harness
the power of such distributed and autonomous acquisition, the data collected by the
network must necessarily be reliable and accurate. The authenticity and correctness
of the collected data is indeed a core requirement of sensor networks irrespective
of the application. This requirement however becomes particularly signiﬁcant in
applications involving societal welfare and safety, as well as in systems where the
acquired information is utilized by an end-user for critical decision-making.
In this work we propose and address the twin problem of carrying out and de-
fending against a stealthy attack on the information gathered by a sensor network. A
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
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Fig. 1. Dual stealthy attack and defense problem.
stealthy attack in this context is an intelligent attempt to disinform a sensor network
in a manner that minimizes the chance of the attack being uncovered. In response,
a stealthy attack detection mechanism is an approach to maximize the chance of de-
tecting the attack and to mitigate its impact on the accuracy of the collected data.
In examining this mirror problem, we refer to the entities that perpetrate the attack
as hostile (H) and label the entities defending against the attack as legitimate (L) as
shown in Figure 1.
In investigating this novel problem, we introduce the framework of two competing
networks and thus extend the notion of a sensor network attacker. Prior considera-
tions restricted the attacker to a single entity that injects false data into a network
by physically capturing a small subset of nodes or breaking their encryption keys to
render them malicious [1]. The current formulation enables the study of a potentially
large set of distributed hostile nodes that form an allied network. Such distributed
hostile nodes cause disinformation at the legitimate sensors by interfering with their
local readings in a manner that preserves the hostile nodes’ stealth. This form of
distributed denial of service on sensing is also referred to as an actuation attack to
emphasize its active nature and occurrence at the sensing level prior to encryption.
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Fig. 2. Applications of the stealthy attack mechanism and the dual attack defense
mechanisms.
By attacking at the sensing level, a hostile opponent thus gains entrance into an
information gathering system for the purposes of manipulation.
The mitigation and detection of stealthy sensor network attacks is thus of interest
to entities that wish to gather information in the presence of competitors. This arises
in the case of both scalar and image networks deployed over large and potentially
hostile areas to detect an event of interest in the environment such as the passing
of an object or an individual. A stealthy attack in this case can result in an event
of interest being unnoticed with potentially signiﬁcant consequences. As shown in
Figure 2, defense mechanisms against stealthy attacks are also required for informa-
tion gathering systems that rely on sleep/wake-up cycles, event triggers or multi-tier
architectures [2]. In such systems, stealthy attacks can falsely trigger or mistrigger
the network to drain its limited energy reserves and misinform the network regarding
the presence or absence of an event. Defense mechanisms against these attacks are
thus beneﬁcial for systems that must be reliable, autonomous and distributed (RAD)
while operating in physically exposed or accessible environments.
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Fig. 3. Approaches for secure collection (our focus) and dissemination of sensor data.
Currently the primary defense mechanisms for the secure collection and dis-
semination of sensor data are chieﬂy based on cryptographic tools and associated
protocols, as well as on the use of sensor redundancy with suﬃciently dense de-
ployments. Cryptographic techniques tailored to the low power and computation
paradigm of sensor networks are especially vital for safeguarding the data during its
wireless transit towards the sink. Redundancy with topology control helps to achieve
the desired physical coverage and also mitigate the eﬀects of sporadic sensor errors
due to faults or harsh environmental conditions. Other complimentary approaches
include physically secure sensor hardware to prevent tampering and key extraction,
signal processing approaches for trust monitoring and coding theory approaches to
protect against transmission errors.
In the case of competing networks however, these techniques alone no longer
guarantee the authenticity, integrity and availability of the collected sensor data. In
particular, the distributed nature and actuation abilities of the hostile nodes enable
5them to inject false readings into arbitrarily many sensors prior to the encryption
stage. Attack detection and mitigation in this scenario are further complicated by the
lack of a priori knowledge regarding the attacker’s strategies. In contrast with systems
containing noise disturbances, attack parameters cannot generally be obtained or
estimated from the system. Indeed an organized attacker wishing to disinform a data
collection network may judiciously select and vary the attack parameters to avoid
detection and to maintain stealth. To address the stealthy attack problem, we thus
propose the use of game theoretic analysis to characterize the optimal strategies of
the attacker under various attack models. Such characterization enables the design of
detection and mitigation strategies based on statistical signal processing and sensor
redundancy as shown in Figure 3. Thus to secure sensor data, we expand the array
of toolsets to ensure that the information is protected not only during its transit but
also during the collection process.
B. Contributions
In this work we present the novel problem of securing sensor data for the case of
competing sensor networks. We explicitly consider the interplay between the two
networks in terms of attack and defense strategies. This is achieved via a dual frame-
work that addresses the problem from the perspectives of both networks. From the
perspective of the hostile network, we present strategies to carry out an attack that is
stealthy and minimizes the chance of detection. From the perspective of the defend-
ing network, we present strategies that maximize attack detection and also mitigate
the attack.
The main contribution to sensor network security is a framework for analyzing
attacks that may be widespread and carried out in an informed manner. This is
6in contrast with existing models which assume that attacks are limited to a small
number of nodes and that the attacker’s exposure is limited speciﬁcally through this
small-scale injection and the use of stolen cryptographic materials. As part of the
framework, we develop a stealth condition for the attacker and apply it to various
attack models. We show that use of game theoretic tools is possible in this problem
to obtain meaningful information regarding the active attack and that it facilitates
the use of established statistical signal processing tools. We demonstrate the impor-
tance of this problem to scalar and image-acquiring sensor networks and show the
eﬀectiveness of the proposed solution techniques.
The main diﬃculties of the proposed problem stem from the distributed na-
ture of the attacker, the possibility of tampering during the sensing process prior to
encryption, and a lack of estimates for the attack parameters in contrast with the con-
ventional case of disturbances due to noise. We overcome these challenges for scalar
and multidimensional sensor networks for the following three cases of inter-network
competition.
1. Stealthy Direct Competition. We formulate the stealthy direct competition
problem where each hostile node may attack one legitimate node in a one-to-
one attack. We develop a stealth condition metric and show its consistency
and relevance for both networks in terms of attack mitigation and detection
such as through the Neyman-Pearson paradigm. We show how the concept
of Nash equilibria allows the hostile network to determine the optimal attack
parameter based on the stealth condition without knowing the defense actions
of the legitimate network. This optimal attack parameter for each hostile node
allows the H network as a whole to minimize the chance of being detected.
This attack avoidance does not require active communication among the hostile
7nodes but rather a level of coordination which we quantify. For the hostile
network H, the direct stealthy attack yields a favorable level of stealth S, power
of attack Pa and power-communication-detection PCD metric compared with
other stealth approaches. We thus show how the stealth condition metric allows
the hostile network to perpetrate the attack in a distributed manner. The main
result for H is the ability to determine a speciﬁc value of the attack parameter
without the knowledge of the legitimate network defense.
For the legitimate network L, we employ the developed stealth condition to
determine the optimal defense strategies. This analysis has implications for
the selection of a local sensor decision threshold as well as for the number of
sensor nodes in the legitimate network. Importantly, we show how the defense
strategies can be selected without knowledge of the attack parameter utilized by
H. We demonstrate how attack analysis enables use of an optimal detector based
on the Neyman-Pearson approach and show its eﬀectiveness in detecting and
mitigating the attack. Based on these results we discuss the role of forward and
feedback encryption between L and the sink in ensuring secure data collection.
2. Stealthy Cross Competition. We formulate the stealthy cross competition prob-
lem where each hostile node H may attack more than one neighboring legitimate
node. Importantly two hostile nodes H may attack the same neighboring le-
gitimate L node for a two-to-one cross attack. At the conceptual level for H,
this problem resembles cross interference which is typically undesirable. We
develop the stealth condition for this case of attack and determine the optimal
attack parameters for each hostile node. Surprisingly we show that there exist
strategies for the cross attack that achieve superior stealth for H than the direct
attack without the need for hostile node communication. Finally we discuss im-
8plications for the common knowledge that must be possessed by each hostile
node in order to satisfy the game theoretic equilibria for attack stealth.
For the legitimate network, we employ the derived stealth condition to ob-
tain the best defense strategies. We show how the cross attack presents a
greater challenge for L than the direct attack in terms of attack detection in the
Neyman-Pearson paradigm. We show that both the optimal and sub-optimal
detectors in the cross attack beneﬁt from analysis of the optimal strategies of
H. Importantly we show that the optimal detection and mitigation strategies
obtained for the stealthy direct attack apply to the stealthy cross attack and
are thus consistent.
3. Stealthy Image Network Competition. We formulate the stealthy image network
competition where the hostile network H wishes to disinform and mistrigger a
legitimate network L that consists of both (scalar) sensors and camera nodes
capturing potentially valuable visual content. The hostile network may utilize a
direct or a cross attack strategy to misguide the sensors. The legitimate network
may rely on a combination of detection and mitigation strategies developed for
the direct and cross attacks, as well as on image processing techniques at the
camera nodes.
For the legitimate network, the inclusion of image processing introduces a new
source of information but also a new source of variability in the decision mak-
ing process. This variability is a result of varying (outdoor) conditions and
of the image processing limitations caused by restricted camera resources. We
show how a desired event acquisition performance can be achieved at the camera
nodes despite these limitations and the presence of stealthy attacks. We demon-
strate the performance of the solution using surveillance sequences and relate
9it to existing prototype image networks. Finally we discuss the implications of
these results for achieving secure event acquisition in unattended environments.
C. Organization
This work focuses on the competition between two sensor networks in the context of
sensor data security. To reﬂect this framework, the chapters are organized in terms of
an increasing level of attack diﬃculty and correspondingly more challenging defense
solutions. Chapter II provides the background literature as well as the models and
measures that are critical to the competing sensor networks problem. Chapter III
presents the direct stealthy attack and defense solutions with its implications for
scalar data networks. Chapter IV presents the cross stealthy attack and defense
strategies for scalar data networks and its implications for hostile sensor deployment.
Chapter V presents the attack and defense strategies for multidimensional sensor
networks that collect visual surveillance data. Finally Chapter VI summarizes our
ﬁndings and discusses future work.
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CHAPTER II
PRELIMINARIES
A. Characteristics of Sensor Networks for Data Acquisition
In this work we consider two competing sensor networks co-deployed in a common en-
vironment with opposing goals regarding the secure collection of data. To explore this
problem, we begin with a brief overview of the general characteristics and challenges
of sensor networks as they pertain to reliable and secure data gathering.
Sensor networks are comprised of a collection of sensor nodes for scalar or mul-
tidimensional data gathering. Such data may include sensor readings regarding the
ambient conditions or the presence, absence or change in observed motion, temper-
ature, magnetic activity, acoustic activity, seismic activity, toxin levels, as well as
visual information regarding a target of interest [3]–[11].1 Sensor nodes also possess
storage, processing, communication and actuation capabilities to facilitate and en-
able the collection and transmission of sensor data to a sink such as an intermediate
cluster head or a base station.
Despite these capabilities, the data collection and dissemination process in sensor
networks is made challenging by the nodes’ resource limitations as overviewed in
Figure 4. Achieving the level of data reliability required by an application thus
necessitates the design of algorithms and technologies that are tailored to the low cost-
power-computation paradigm [14], [15]. These designs often favor the use of sensor
redundancy in lieu of expensive hardware or algorithms to attain the desired data
1Though typically envisioned for ground applications, sensor nodes have also been
developed for aerial [12], [13] and aquatic applications. The latter was originally
prototyped in a much larger version during the cold war for the detection of foreign
submarines.
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Fig. 4. General challenges in sensor networks.
collection and dissemination performance. Furthermore, sensor networks that are
required to remain operational for long periods of time in unattended environments
often employ sleep/wake-up, trigger-based and multi-tier methodologies [16], [17].
In such approaches, only a few sensors remain awake during any period of time and
trigger the other sensors within a cluster or within a higher tier when a potential event
has been detected. Such approaches have shown signiﬁcant potential in real-world
prototype testbeds [7], [3], [16] in applications ranging from intelligent infrastructure
monitoring and target tracking to image-based distributed surveillance.
In the case of scalar sensor nodes, further economy in the data collection and
dissemination process is often achieved by requiring the sensors to make local deci-
sions about events in the environment instead of transmitting raw sensor data to the
sink (with the noteworthy exception of scientiﬁc applications that require the precise
phenomena readings) [18]. Indeed it has been shown that under many power and
bandwidth constraints, such strategies are asymptotically optimal for the detection
of events [19], [20]. In the case of multidimensional sensor networks, this economi-
cal approach often translates into the use of lightweight image processing techniques
for the collection and transmission of lower resolution images to the end-user unless
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otherwise requested [7], [21], [22].
In addition to resource limitations, the deployment of sensors in physically acces-
sible, unattended and potentially hostile environments presents further challenges for
reliable data collection and dissemination as shown in Figure 4. Gaps in sensing cov-
erage may result if nodes in a certain area become depleted or suﬀer a fault [23]–[25].
This situation is typically remedied through dense deployments and coverage repair
such as through limited mobility [26]–[29]. Sensing ﬁdelity may also be compromised
due to the presence of an attacker. The attacker may physically capture a subset of
the nodes and their encryption keys to render the nodes malicious and inject false
readings into the network. In such cases, node re-keying and redundancy, as well as
tamper-proof hardware may be utilized [30]. The latter approach however may be
too expensive for certain applications where nodes need to be low-cost and poten-
tially disposable. Node redundancy and re-keying on the other hand may not protect
against a distributed hostile network attacking at the physical level of sensing or the
physical layer of communication. The latter attack belongs to a broader category of
attacks referred to as (distributed) denial of service attacks with a rich literature of
defenses [31]–[34]. The former is referred to as a distributed denial on sensing and is
the focus of this work [35], [36].
In summary, to achieve reliable data collection and distribution, sensor network
design must overcome the numerous resource limitations, communication challenges
and operational challenges outlined in Figure 4. While some of these challenges are
also present in other networks, it is the simultaneous presence of all these issues in
sensor networks that distinguishes them from other networks. These challenges also
in part characterize the type of vulnerabilities that may be exploited by opponents if
no defense mechanisms are in place.
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Fig. 5. Information ﬂow during the sensor data collection and dissemination process
showing protected and vulnerable parts of the process.
B. The Secure Data Acquisition and Stealthy Attack Problems
In this work we investigate the data collection process at the physical layer in the
case of competing networks deployed in a common environment. In comparison with
previous studies, we focus on attacks that occur during the data gathering process
prior to encryption and prior to the data’s travel through the network towards the
sink as shown in Figure 5.
For this case of competing networks, we extend the attacker model to that of a
distributed hostile network. This is in contrast with previous studies that focused on
a small number of captured nodes that are subverted to behave maliciously within
the legitimate network. This competing network scenario is shown in Figure 6. The
legitimate nodes L and the hostile nodes H are deployed in a common environment
where they collect readings regarding a source of interest. The L nodes wish to
determine if an event of interest has occurred in the environment based on readings
obtained from the source. The decision of each L node may be utilized directly for
network applications. It may also be considered collectively with the decisions of
other L nodes at a cluster head as shown in Figure 6. Both approaches have proven
of particular interest to trigger-based applications and tracking based applications
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Fig. 6. Data gathering in the competing networks scenario.
that operate in large or unattended areas over prolonged periods of time. In such
applications, the individual sensors and/or the cluster head trigger a set of higher-tier
nodes such as cameras [3], [7], [16].
Based on its deployment in the environment, a hostile node may utilize actua-
tion to disrupt the readings collected by a legitimate node L. The actuation may be
performed using a variety of methods depending on the underlying sensor technol-
ogy and the application (Appendix C). Land-based actuation for example includes
magnetometer, acoustic, laser and mobility based technologies while aquatic versions
include sonar and diﬀusion-based technologies. The eﬀect of the actuation is a pertur-
bation of the readings collected by a legitimate node L such that an incorrect decision
regarding the presence or absence of an event may be made by the node. Based on the
distributed nature of the attacker, each L sensor may be aﬀected with some non-zero
probability. Thus node redundancy without attack detection may not be suﬃcient to
avoid incorrect sensor and collective decisions. In the competing networks scenario
shown in Figure 6, the goals of each network are thus as follows:
• Goals of the Legitimate Network. The legitimate network wishes to collect both
individual and collective sensor decisions that are correct regarding the presence
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or absence of an event. In the case of an attack, the legitimate network wishes
to maximize the chance of uncovering the attack at the cluster head.
• Goals of the Hostile Network. The hostile network wishes to cause as many
incorrect individual sensor decisions as possible among the n sensors in a cluster.
The hostile network H also wishes to cause an incorrect collective decision at
the cluster while minimizing the chance of the attack being uncovered. The
hostile network thus wishes to select attack strategies that are stealthy.
C. System Models and Metrics
In this section we expand on the goals of each network by presenting the associ-
ated models and measures utilized to evaluate the success of each network in this
competitive scenario.
1. Competing Sensor Networks Model
To study the twin problem of stealthy attacks and defense strategies for the gathering
of sensor network data, we model the competition between the two networks for
sensing ﬁdelity as a static game. The static game model enables study of situations
where one player’s outcome depends not only on his/her actions, but also on the
choices of the other players. This is crucial in the competing networks scenario where
the hostile nodes’ optimal attack parameters depend on the legitimate nodes’ defense
strategies and vice versa.
A static game G consists of a triplet 〈Γ, A, U〉 that speciﬁes the game. Γ is the
set of players Γ = {1, ..., k, ..., n} in the game and A = {A1, ..., Ak, ..., An} where Ak is
the set of actions available to player k. U = {u1, ..., uk, ..., un} where uk is the utility
for player k and speciﬁes player k’s preferences for every action proﬁle of the game.
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Fig. 7. Based on deployment and goals, a hostile node H may attack one or more or
none of its neighboring legitimate nodes L. This abstraction depicts a subset
of two hostile nodes with the possibility of cross-attack.
In modeling G, we must thus specify the players, the action set of each player and the
associated utilities as they pertain to the secure data acquisition and stealthy attack
problem.
The general model of the secure data acquisition and stealthy attack problem
is depicted in Figure 7. Based on its deployment and goals, each hostile node may
attack one or more (or none) of the legitimate nodes. As shown in Figure 7, the direct
attack which is examined in Chapter III refers to the case of one hostile node attacking
one legitimate node with some probability. The cross attack which is examined in
Chapter IV refers to one hostile node attacking more than one legitimate node with
the possibility of cross-over among hostile nodes. In this context, an attack strategy
for hostile node hi from its set of possible actions Ahi is a probability of attacking a
given legitimate node based on the direct or cross attack model.
For the legitimate network, each sensor makes a decision regarding the presence
or absence of an event in the environment as shown in Figure 7. This process of
data acquisition at each sensor is modeled via Eq. (3.1), where oi is an observation
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made by sensor i regarding the source O and γi is the mapping used by sensor i to
produce the decision xi ∈ {0, 1} regarding the presence or absence of the event. Each
sensor makes the decision by comparing its reading to a threshold Thi, where IP is an
indicator function which is equal to 1 if P is true and is equal to 0 otherwise. Based
on the probability density function f0i of the observation oi, a sensor reports an even
with probability pi.
xi = γi(oi) = I{oi≥Thi} s.t pi =
∫ ∞
Thi
f0i(α)dα (2.1)
In the context of energy-constrained sensor networks, this data acquisition model
plays an important role. In the works of [20], [37]–[39] for instance, the distributed de-
tection of phenomena via sensor networks is explored. One of the general conclusions
is that for networks with channel bandwidth and power constraints, a large number
of sensors with binary decisions is asymptotically optimal [20]. That is, increasing
node redundancy produces a better result than obtaining more detailed information
from each sensor. Speciﬁcally, the binary sensor setup is not generally asymptotically
optimal for arbitrary sensor correlations and distributions f0i , but rather it is optimal
for the i.i.d Gaussian or exponential case. It is noted however that in practice the
simplicity of using binary decisions may outweigh the small gain in bit performance
achieved by using more complicated schemes. Thus in this work we assume that each
sensor utilizes the same threshold Th and that the readings are i.i.d. This results in
a probability p that a sensor registers an event.
Based on the data acquisition and attack models, the hostile network wishes to
maximize the probability of an undetected attack while the legitimate network wishes
to minimize this probability. From the perspective of a game G, any utility can be used
to represent the preferences of each player as long as it represents these preferences in
a consistent manner [40]. This signiﬁes that if a player prefers action a1 to action a2
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and action a2 to action a3, then he/she must prefer action a1 over action a3 and the
utility must preserve this consistency2. For the stealthy attack and defense game, we
develop a utility referred to as the stealth condition S and show that it is consistent
for both H and L in terms of attack detection (such as through the Neyman-Pearson
detection paradigm). Based on the stealth condition S, the optimal action a∗k of each
player k is determined where a∗k ∈ Ak : Sk(a∗k, a−k) ≥ Sk(a′k, a−k) ∀a′k ∈ Ak where
the notation −k denotes all the players other than player k. The optimal actions
of the players in G reveal the best attack and defense approaches for the case of
competing sensor networks.
2. Performance Metrics
In investigating the competing sensor networks problem, we examine the data col-
lection process from the perspective of the hostile network and from the perspective
of the legitimate network. The success of each network in competing with the other
is thus examined in terms of that network’s speciﬁc goals from Section B. We now
brieﬂy re-state the goals of each network and present the measures of success for each.
The goal of the hostile network H is to disinform and misguide the legitimate
network during the data gathering process. To this eﬀect, H wishes to cause as many
incorrect individual sensor decisions among the n sensors within a cluster as possible.
H also wishes to cause an error in the collaborative decision at the cluster head while
minimizing the chance of attack detection. From the perspective of H, the following
measures are thus of relevance in the stealthy attack problem.
2Strictly, given a set of actions A and a consequence function g : A → C that
maps A to the set C of possible consequences, all we require is a preference relation
(a complete transitive reﬂexive binary relation)  on the set C. However we may
use a utility function u : C → R which deﬁnes the preference relation a  b by the
condition u(a) ≥ u(b).
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1. Power Pa of the attack. This is the number of sensors among the n sensors
in the cluster that report an incorrect decision (a 1 instead of a 0, or vice
versa) as a result of the attack. From the attacker’s point of view, Pa ∈ {0, n}
should be as large as possible (subject to the condition that the attack stealth
is maximized). The power of the attack thus measures the number of incorrect
individual decisions that H is able to cause.
2. Stealth S of the attack. The relative stealth of one attack strategy over another
is measured through the stealth condition S. Alternatively, the absolute stealth
of an attack strategy is measured through the pair PD-PFA, where PD is the
probability of detecting the attack at the cluster head and PFA is the probability
of raising a false alarm about the attack. From the point of view of H in the
Neyman-Pearson paradigm for instance, PD should ideally be small for a given
PFA in order to evade detection.
3. Power-Communication-Detection PCD of the attack. Instead of measuring the
power Pa and the stealth S of the attack individually, a joint measure can
be considered given that both Pa and S are simultaneously important to the
attacker. Furthermore, such a joint measure facilitates comparisons among
attacks. Of particular interest in the stealth scenario is a comparison of the
number of communications required among the hostile nodes to coordinate the
stealthy attack. Thus we generalize the joint comparison measure to include the
concept of inter-node communication C. In this context, PCD = Pa/(C · S).
More precisely, PCD is given by Eq. (2.2).
PCD =
No. attacked nodes
(1 + No. communications) · (1 + PD) (2.2)
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The deﬁnition of PCD oﬀsets each of the denominator terms by 1 to account
for cases where C = 0 and/or PD = 0. As can be seen from Eq. (2.2), it is
beneﬁcial for the hostile network to increase the number of aﬀected sensors while
maintaining a low level of inter-node communication and a small probability of
attack detection.
For the legitimate network, the goal is to collect as many correct individual sensor
and collective decisions as possible while maximizing the chance of attack detection.
Thus the legitimate network L is interested in the following measures of success:
1. Power Pd of the defense. The power of the defense is the number of sensors
among the n sensors in the cluster that report a correct decision (a 1 given that
an event occurred, and a 0 given that no event occurred) in the presence of an
attack. Thus the power of the defense is the complement of the power of the
attack where Pd = n − Pa. From the defense’s point of view, Pa ∈ {0, . . . , n}
should be as small as possible (subject to the condition that the attack stealth
is minimized). The power of the defense thus measures the number of correct
individual decisions that L gathers from the source in the presence of attack.
2. Stealth S of the attack. Based on the competition between the two networks
for stealth and detection, the absolute stealth of an attack strategy from the
point of view of L is also measured through the pair PD-PFA. From the point
of view of L in the Neyman-Pearson paradigm for instance, PD should ideally
be as large as possible for a given PFA in order to detect the attack.
3. Redundancy R of the defense. The redundancy R of the defense is the number
of sensors n required within a cluster to minimize the stealth S while achieve
a given power of defense Pd. From the perspective of L, the requisite level of
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sensor redundancy R ≥ 1 should be small enough to limit unnecessarily dense
deployments while achieving detection goals.
In the sensor network scenario, a variety of other measures can be utilized to
track a network’s performance such as the energy consumption and the lifetime of
the network (deﬁned variously depending on the application). Such measures are
commonly utilized to study the performance of individual networks in ad hoc and
harsh environments. In this work we wish to focus exclusively on the previously un-
explored concept of sensor network competition. As such we focus on metrics that
assess the level of success in this competition as deﬁned in this section. Importantly,
the fundamental metrics deﬁned in this work might be combined with speciﬁc experi-
mental or theoretical energy consumption models to derive other valuable information
in the context of competition.
D. Literature Review and Classiﬁcation
This work examines the competition between two sensor networks one of which is hos-
tile with the intent of disinforming the second network regarding events of interest in
the environment. From the legitimate network’s perspective, the central focus of this
work is thus the development of mechanisms for the secure collection of sensor data
in the case of competition. From the hostile network’s perspective, the focus of this
work is on perpetrating an attack that successfully disinforms the network. In relat-
ing this work to existing sensor network research, we thus examine the relationship
from both the attack and defense perspectives. Appendix C provides a somewhat
orthogonal overview of other ﬁelds of relevance to sensor networks such as coverage,
deployment and actuation.
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Fig. 8. Classiﬁcation of the stealthy hostile attack with respect to existing work in
terms of attack, defense and aﬀected data.
1. Relationship of Literature to Our Work
The competing sensor networks problem as it relates to existing research is depicted in
Figure 8 where the relationship is initially shown broadly in terms of attacks, defenses
and aﬀected data.
As shown in Figure 8, sensor network attacks are often subdivided into the
categories of insider and outsider attacks depending on whether the attacker has pos-
session of secret keys belonging to the legitimate network. Interestingly, the stealthy
attack perpetrated by a distributed hostile network appears to straddle these two
traditional categories by exhibiting characteristics of both. In the new attack, the
hostile opponent does not have “insider” access to the legitimate network’s secret
keys thus qualifying as an outsider attack. On the other hand, the attack enables
the injection of false data into the legitimate network as though the attacker had
by-passed the network’s encryption, thus qualifying as an insider attack. This latter
feature is made possible by the attack occurring at the vulnerable physical layer of
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sensing as depicted in Figure 5. Finally we make an important observation regard-
ing the distributed hostile attack. We note that use of cryptography at the sensors
typically forces an attacker to physically compromise nodes to obtain keying informa-
tion. Given the distribution of the legitimate sensors over an area, the procurement
of a given number of keys may be too laborious for the attacker and thus imposes
limits on the degree of possible compromise. In the hostile attack, this restriction
no longer applies given the distributed nature of the attacker and the physical layer
at which the attack is perpetrated. Figure 9 depicts a ﬁner-grained comparison of
the new attack with existing attacks in terms of their eﬀect of the network and its
data. The hostile attack is listed both under the physical attacks category as a DDoS
(distributed denial on sensing) and as an attack on data. The arrow in Figure 9 illus-
trates that attacking the network at one layer may facilitate attacks on other layers.
For instance, a Sybil attack may be carried out ﬁrst such that the “Sybil node” has
several supposedly valid identities that it uses to communicate with the rest of the
network. In such a scenario the extra identities of the node can collude to report false
data. In other words, the Sybil attack allows one compromised node to have greater
impact on the aggregation result [15]. The attacker may also skew the aggregation
result by ﬁrst carrying out a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. In this scenario the
blocked nodes are not reporting their local values and are hence excluded from the
overall aggregation [32].
The competing sensor networks scenario is also compared to existing schemes in
terms of defense strategies as shown in Figure 8. In the context of sensor networks, it
is typically assumed that to perpetrate an insider attack an opponent must compro-
mise secret keys. It is thus assumed that only a small number of nodes and keys will
be compromised [41]–[45]. Typical defense mechanisms against insider attacks there-
fore include the use of sensor redundancy, signal processing schemes (such as data
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Fig. 9. Classiﬁcation of the stealthy hostile attack with respect to existing attacks
based on their eﬀect on the network and its data.
aggregation) and the use of trust models [46], [47]. In the case of a hostile distributed
network however, node redundancy along with data aggregation are no longer suﬃ-
cient due to the number of aﬀected nodes at the sensing level. Therefore as shown
in Figure 3, in this work we consider defense mechanisms against the hostile attack
that are based on a combination of attack analysis (through game theory), statistical
signal processing (through attack detection) and sensor redundancy [48]–[51].
Sensor network attacks may also be considered in terms of the data that they
aﬀect as shown in Figure 8. Due to its occurrence at the physical layer of sensing, the
new hostile attack aﬀects the raw collected data and therefore the aggregated data
that is derived from it. The attack does aﬀect data during its transmit through the
network. An interesting observation is that the new attack may also be viewed as one
that compromises multiple security goals simultaneously. Figure 10 shows that the
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attack compromises the sensor data integrity by altering the collected measurements.
With a slight stretch of the traditional deﬁnition, we may also conclude that the attack
compromises data authentication since the measurements do not purely originate from
the source as expected. Furthermore the hostile attack aﬀects data availability since
characteristics of the source are no longer available to the end-user.
2. Game Approach to Sensor Network Security
The theory of games has been used extensively in the study of problems with mul-
tiple cooperative or non-cooperative players where the preferences of each player in
the game can be deﬁned consistently [52]. The model of a game is utilized in situ-
ations where the outcome experienced by a player depends not only on his/her own
actions but also on the unknown actions of others. Game theory may be viewed as
a form of “optimization of an entity’s actions” given that all problem variables are
not centralized at the entity but rather distributed among several entities [53], [54].
Importantly, though many problems can be modeled as a game or optimization, such
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modeling need not always yield a tractable formulation or a meaningful solution [55],
[56].
In this work we focus on two-player, non-cooperative, zero-sum, static games and
show that the models yield meaningful solutions for both the hostile and the legitimate
networks. Generally, a two-player game is non-cooperative if each player attempts
to achieve his/her own goals (which may or may not conﬂict with the goals of the
other players) and where there is no mechanism to enforce contracts (cooperation)
between the players. Games in which players can enforce contracts through outside
parties are termed cooperative games [40], [57]. The game is said to be zero-sum if
the sum of the payoﬀs of the two players must always add to zero. Hence if player
one wins a payoﬀ of 4 units, player two must loose 4 units. A game is said to be
static if both players make a move simultaneously without knowing a priori what
their opponent is choosing. A static game is only played once (one move per player)
but can be extended by repeated play. An important concept in non-cooperative
static games is that of a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium point (at least one such
point is guaranteed to exist). A Nash equilibrium point is simply a “solution” to
the game predicting the players’ moves (assuming the players are always rational and
choose the highest payoﬀ possible). The equilibrium occurs when neither player has
any payoﬀ incentive to deviate from the strategy if their opponent does not deviate
from it (i.e. deviating from this strategy will not increase the payoﬀ unless the other
player changes his/her moves) [40].
In recent years game theoretic approaches to various aspects of sensor network
security have been presented. In [58] the authors describe how to disrupt the cover-
age of an opponent’s network by modeling node removal as a two-stage game. In [59]
the authors model secure key distribution schemes in a probabilistic way. They show
how the game theoretic model can be formally translated into properties that would
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render the distribution schemes more secure. In [60] the authors employ game the-
ory to study medium access control. Using this approach they provide a protocol
that achieves short-term fairness within a window size of 3-4 packets per node, in
comparison with existing MAC protocols which require 80-140 packets per node to
achieve fairness. In [61] the authors adapt existing game theoretic approaches to the
particular challenges associated with secure routing in sensor networks. Speciﬁcally,
the authors develop a game theoretic model that accounts for non-simultaneous de-
cision making and incorporates history information into the decision making process.
In [62] the authors develop an analytical model of data-centric information routing
in sensor networks under the constraints of trading oﬀ individual node energy versus
the overall network’s goals. These recent advances demonstrate the potential of game
theoretic modeling for sensor network security analysis and design.
3. Data Content Security in Sensor Networks
The body of literature on sensor network security is vast, with numerous attack models
and proposed solutions. Attack countermeasures exist at various network levels and
are aimed at protecting the data during various stages of the collection, processing and
distribution process. This section overviews a subset of the speciﬁc attacks shown in
Figure 9 along with their mitigation strategies. We focus the discussion on the subset
of attacks most directly related to our proposed work at the physical sensing layer as
shown in Figure 9. As such, we focus the review on attacks that aﬀect the collection
of data such as through denial of service (DoS) attacks, trust model violations and
a special attack referred to as the “Byzantine Generals’ Problem.” We also examine
tampering at the physical layer such as through node capture, and attacks on the
node processing level such as during the aggregation process.
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a. Attacks on Collection and Processing
In [63], sensor decision redundancy allows the fusion center to select the correct
hypothesis regarding a source within some probability while channel coding protects
against the binary decisions being ﬂipped during transmission. This methodology
however does not protect against a hostile attack where sensor errors may not be rare
but pervasive throughout the network and where the attack hypotheses are not known.
Due to the large amount of information collected by sensors, it is often necessary and
useful to perform data aggregation [64]–[66]. However if the aggregation function is
performed by a designated subset of nodes that become compromised by an attacker,
then the resulting data may be misleading [67].
Compromising a single aggregator is often suﬃcient to skew the data from dozens
or hundreds of nodes. In [68], [69] the authors propose a statistical en-route ﬁltering
mechanisms that relies on the assumption that multiple neighboring nodes witness
the same original event and can conﬁrm this event by using MACs along the path
from the aggregator to the base station. Any packet that fails any of the MAC tests is
discarded. In [70], the authors describe LEAP+. The proposed Localized Encryption
and Authentication Protocol is a key management protocol for sensor networks that is
designed to support in-network processing. The protocol restricts the security impact
of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised
node. In [71] the authors propose an SQL like language called TAG (Tiny Aggrega-
tion Service). In this approach the base station generates queries. The sensors then
route data back to the base station according to a routing tree. At each point in the
tree, data is aggregated according to the routing tree and the aggregation function
demanded by the query.
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In [72] the authors propose mechanisms that enable more complex aggregation
functions to be computed approximately and prove strict guarantees on the approxi-
mation of the queries. In [73] the author analyzes the robustness of various aggrega-
tion functions to the capture of k nodes (with k 	 N where N is the total number
of nodes). It is concluded that most functions are not robust to such tampering with
the exception of the count statistic and of any other statistic meeting the proposed
(k, α) deﬁnition of functions. In [44] the authors present a three-stage technique called
aggregate-commit-prove to protect against false data injection at k 	 N nodes as
well as a take over of the aggregator. To achieve this the authors make use of Merkle
hash-trees and interactive proofs. In [74] the authors propose a secure aggregation
technique that protects against at most 1 compromised node. Their approach bor-
rows the µTESLA protocol for symmetric key management to generate and validate
the MACs of individual nodes for multihop message authentication. Most recently,
in [75] the authors extend the methodology found in [44] to include a hierarchy of
aggregators (several aggregators send data to a higher level aggregator that aggre-
gates their result). Their approach guarantees that the attacker does not gain more
by attacking the intermediate aggregators than he/she would by compromising the
individual nodes that report to the aggregators.
b. Physical Attacks
The category of physical attacks encompasses activities where a malicious entity tam-
pers with the physical components and hardware of the node. Physical attacks pose
a large threat to sensor networks due to their unattended operation in open and pos-
sibly hostile environments. One way of coping with this attack is to tamper-proof the
node’s physical package or hardware [76]–[78]. Since sensors need to be low-cost and
numerous, the extra cost of such hardware may be prohibitive [32], [76].
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In [79] the authors introduce the concept of a secure localization scheme called
the ECHO protocol to prevent attackers from eavesdropping the physical location of
sensor nodes. Their work relies on the physical properties of sound and RF signal
propagation. In [80] the authors introduce the use of directional antennas to defend
against wormhole attacks. As such they propose “turning the table” on the attackers
by using physical characteristics of the sensor network against the attackers. In
[81] the authors study the modeling and defense of sensor networks against search-
based physical attacks where an opponent walks through the sensor ﬁeld with signal
detecting equipment. Their solution strategy relies on a subset of nodes detecting the
attack and transmitting this warning to other nodes. The nodes that detect such an
attack or receive such a warning shut oﬀ their power and hence become undetectable.
c. Denial of Service Attacks
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack in sensor networks and networks in general is deﬁned
as any event that diminishes or eliminates the network’s capacity to perform its
expected function [32], [34]. DoS attacks in sensor networks may be carried out at
the physical, link, routing and transport layers. At the physical layer an attacker may
simply jam a sensor’s radio transmissions, either constantly or intermittently [32].
Solutions to this attack include spread spectrum communications, priority messages,
lower duty cycling, and node mobility. To attack at the link layer an attacker may
simply intentionally violate a communication protocol, attempting to cause collisions.
Solutions to this level of attack include error-correction codes, rate limitation and
small frames. At the routing layer a malicious node may take advantage of a multihop
network by refusing to route messages. Protection mechanisms at this layer include
encryption, egress ﬁltering, authorization monitoring and redundancy. Finally at the
transport layer a DoS may consist of packet ﬂooding which drains resources. At this
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layer solutions include issuing client puzzles and using authentication mechanisms.
In [82] the authors present an eﬃcient mechanism called message-speciﬁc puzzle to
mitigate DoS attacks for broadcast authentication. In addition to signature-based
or µ-Tesla-based authentication, the approach adds a weak authenticator in each
broadcast packet which is computationally diﬃcult for an attacker to forge. In [83] the
authors employ cooperative game theory between the nodes of the legitimate network.
This game between the legitimate sensor nodes is based on three factors: cooperation,
reputation and quality of security. Nodes form clusters with other nodes that have
similar payoﬀ functions. Misbehaving nodes that drop traﬃc may thus be detected.
In [84] the authors formulate the attack-defense problem as a two-player, nonzero-
sum, non-cooperative game between an attacker and a sensor network. Using this
formulation they propose two schemes for preventing DoS attacks. The ﬁrst approach
is Utility based Dynamic Source Routing (UDSR). It incorporates the total utility
of each route in data packets, where utility is a value that the legitimate network is
trying to maximize. The second approach is based on a watch-list, where each node
earns a rating from its neighbors based on its previous cooperation in the network.
d. Trust Models
Given the likelihood of sensor node compromise in a sensor network, the associated
trust model cannot blindly include all network nodes. In [85] the authors propose a
trust evaluation scheme where nodes evaluate other nodes based on factors such as
experience statistics, data value, intrusion detection results and references from other
nodes. In [86] the authors describe a probabilistic solution based on a distributed trust
model with an initial secret dealer. In [87] the authors propose a reputation-based
framework for high integrity in sensor networks.
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e. Byzantine Generals’ Problem
The original version of the Byzantine Generals’ Problem is presented in [88]. The
Byzantine Generals Problem involves a group of generals, each commanding a division
of the Byzantine army. In its simplest form, each general independently makes a one
bit binary decision to attack (bit 1) or to retreat (bit 0) based on his/her local
observations of the enemy. Importantly, we require that all the generals agree on a
common decision to attack or retreat (their combined resources are required in order
to succeed should they choose to attack). To achieve this consensus, each general
sends his/her decision to every other general. Each general then makes his/her ﬁnal
decision based on applying a majority rule to the incoming decisions.
The diﬃculty of this original formulation stems from the fact that some of the
generals are allowed to be corrupt. This means that they are allowed to recommend
bad strategies (recommend 1 when 0 should have been recommended and vice versa)
and furthermore, they are allowed to recommend diﬀerent strategies to diﬀerent gen-
erals. In other words, a corrupt general may recommend decision bit 1 to one of its
neighbors and decision bit 0 to another neighbor. The corrupt generals hence behave
not only erroneously but also inconsistently. It has been shown that the Byzantine
Generals’ Problem can be reduced to a “Commander and Lieutenants” problem [88].
If message authentication (encryption) is allowed, then it is possible in many cases
to reach a consensus when an arbitrary number of traitorous generals is present. If
message authentication is not available, in general we can only protect the system if
the number of traitors is less than a third of the total number of generals [89].
As extended to general systems, a Byzantine fault is one in which a component of
some system not only behaves erroneously, but also fails to behave consistently when
interacting with multiple other components. For instance, a sensor node taken over
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by an attacker may report a certain decision about its environment to one neighbor
(for instance it transmits “enemy present”), but sends a diﬀerent message to another
neighbor (“enemy absent”) [90]. Correctly functioning components of a Byzantine
fault tolerant system will be able to reach the same group decisions regardless of
Byzantine faulty components [91]. It is also insightful to examine the connection
between the Byzantine Generals’ Problem and the stealthy hostile attack model. In
the original form of the Byzantine Generals’ Problem, we require that all non-corrupt
generals reach a consensus in the presence of a number of corrupt generals that send
erroneous and inconsistent decisions. If we have access to message authentication
then under many situations we are able to achieve Byzantine fault tolerance in the
presence of an arbitrary number of corrupt generals [88].
In contrast with this setup, in the stealthy attack problem we do not require
that all the sensor nodes reach a consensus. Rather, only one select entity (the
cluster head) is required to reach a correct decision about the presence or absence
of an attacker. The connection between the two problems may be better understood
with the following analogy. In the stealth attack formulation, each sensor may be
thought of as a general. Each general makes a local decision about the presence or
absence of an event. However, each general also has his/her own advisor (the hostile
node that interferes with the readings). Each advisor may be corrupt with some
probability and change the general’s decision. Once the general ﬁnalizes his/her local
decision based on his/her observation and the advisor’s input, the decision is sent
to an overall commander (the cluster head) through encrypted means. Hence the
decisions (messages) cannot be forged during the communication process. It is the
commander (the cluster head) that ultimately decides whether at least one general has
sent an incorrect decision under the inﬂuence of a hostile advisor but the commander
does not know which generals may have been ill-advised by a hostile advisor.
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CHAPTER III
STEALTHY DIRECT COMPETITION∗
A. Introduction and Motivation
In this chapter we wish to investigate the competing sensor networks scenario for the
case of a direct stealthy attack. In a direct stealthy attack, each hostile node may
attack a legitimate node with some probability, causing an incorrect decision at the
sensor. Unlike occasional errors, decision errors due to a distributed stealthy attack
may be persistent over time and pervasive throughout the cluster. Such errors can
corrupt the data acquisition process and cause misinformation regarding events of
interest in the environment.
We examine the problem from the perspective of both the hostile and the legit-
imate network. The interaction between the networks is modeled as a game where
a stealth utility is derived and shown to be consistent for both players. Based on
the stealth utility, the optimal attack and defense strategies are obtained for each
network. For the legitimate network, minimization of the attacker’s stealth results
in the possibility of attack detection through the Neyman-Pearson paradigm and the
capability of mitigating the power Pa of the attack. For the hostile network, max-
imization of the stealth utility translates into the optimal attack avoidance. This
attack avoidance does not require active communication among the hostile nodes but
rather a level of coordination which we quantify. The direct stealthy attack yields a
favorable level of stealth S, power of attack Pa and power-communication-detection
*Part of the material in this chapter is reprinted with permission from A. Czarlin-
ska and D. Kundur, “Event-Detection in Wireless Visual Sensor Networks through
Scalar Collaboration and Game Theoretic Consideration,” IEEE Transactions on
Multimedia, Special Issue on Multimedia Applications in Mobile/Wireless Contexts,
August 2008, to appear. c© 2008 IEEE.
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Fig. 11. Direct stealthy attack model.
PCD compared with other stealth approaches.
B. System Model
We consider a legitimate network L and a hostile network H deployed in a common
environment by competing entities. Based on deployment and goals, each hostile
node may attack a legitimate node with some probability in a direct “one-to-one”
attack as shown in Figure 11.
A legitimate node li where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} obtains an observation oi from the
environment regarding the source of interest O. Each node utilizes a local decision
threshold Th to decide whether an event of interest has occurred in the environment
based on Eq. (3.1) where f0 is the probability density function of the source O and
xi is the realization of a decision made by node i. This scenario is depicted in Figure
12a. The decision of each node can thus be modeled as a Bernoulli random variable
Xi as given by Eq. (3.2).
xi = γ(oi) = I{oi≥Th} s.t p =
∫ ∞
Th
f0(α)dα (3.1)
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Xi =


1 w.p. p
0 w.p. 1− p
(3.2)
Each hostile node hi where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} performs local actuation yi upon a
legitimate node with a probability 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 as shown in Figure 12b. Based on this
binary symmetric error model, a hostile node may interfere with the local readings of
a sensor with probability q such that an incorrect decision is made. Importantly in
the case of attack, the probability q may take on any value based on the actions of
the attacker and is thus generally unknown. This is in contrast with decision errors
caused by occasional sensor faults where the value of q is generally known through
quality testing and is typically assumed to be small. The actuation attack of node hi
can thus be modeled as a Bernoulli random variable Yi as given by Eq. (3.3) where
the eﬀect of the attack is given by Eq. (3.4) where ⊕ denotes modulo 2 addition and
corresponds to the binary symmetric error model of Figure 12b. Thus as shown in
Figure 12b, the decision of a legitimate sensor node li under the attack model is given
by a Bernoulli random variable Zi as given by Eq. (3.5).
Yi =


1 w.p. q
0 w.p. 1− q
(3.3)
Zi = Xi ⊕ Yi (3.4)
Zi =


1 w.p. r
0 w.p. 1− r where r = q + p− 2pq
(3.5)
Importantly in the general case without constraints, the attack probability q may
take on any value in the permissible range. In the scenario of competing networks
however, this is no longer the case. In particular, the legitimate network employs
redundancy in the form of n sensor decisions that are sent to the cluster head as shown
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Fig. 12. (a) Binary sensor model with sensing threshold Th and resulting probability
of witnessing an event 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. (b) Basic bit error model due to fault or
unstealthy attack where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 is typically small for faults but may be
arbitrarily large for unstealthy attacks.
in Figure 11. A competing hostile network must therefore select attack strategies that
are informed and competitive in this scenario rather than arbitrary. Speciﬁcally H
faces a situation where under no attack, the cluster head receives a vector x of n sensor
decisions where each decision comes from a distribution Bern(p). To achieve stealth
and minimize the probability of attack detection, the hostile network wishes to attack
such that the attacked vector z from distribution Bern(r) statistically resembles the
prestine vector x. The attacker thus wishes to satisfy the stealth condition S given
in Deﬁnition 1.
Definition 1 The stealth condition S of the hostile sensor network H for the direct
attack is given by Eq. (3.6) where w is the weight of a vector which is the number of
1’s contained in the vector and deﬁned as w(ξ)
.
=
∑n
i=1 ξi for a vector ξ of length n.
S = Pr{w(Zpq) = w(Xp)} (3.6)
We now provide the intuition behind the stealth condition and formally show its
consistency and eﬀectiveness for the attacker in Section C. Informally, the stealth
condition allows the hostile network to ﬂip individual sensor readings (from 1 to 0
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and vice versa) to achieve a power of attack Pa while maintaining the appearance of
a statistically legitimate decision vector as received by the cluster head on average.
By altering individual sensor decisions within the stealth constraint, H can also cause
the cluster head to make the wrong collective decision about an event. The cluster
head typically requires that a speciﬁed number of sensors c report an event before
deciding that an event has most likely occurred [3], [7], [92]. The requisite number of
sensors c (also known as the “weight” [6] or the degree of aggregation DoA [3]) may
be determined experimentally, approximated based on expectations or obtained via
detection mechanisms such as based on the Neyman-Pearson paradigm (Section D).
For instance to perform an approximation, if there are n sensors and each sensor has
a probability p of witnessing an event (based on its threshold Th), then the average
expected number of sensors that report an event is c ≈ np ±  where  may be
determined experimentally. In this context, the stealth condition S as deﬁned in
Eq. (3.6) is a more general and strict condition on the attack such that the attacker
is able to minimize the chance of detection at the cluster head without knowledge of
the speciﬁc cluster head mechanism.
Thus in the game between the two networks, the attacker wishes to choose an
optimal value of attack parameter q∗ such that the weight of the attacked data (which
depends on probabilities p and q) generally matches (in terms of the probability of
occurrence) the weight of the unaltered data (which depends on the probability p
alone). In general the attacker need not know the probability p since the sensor
threshold Th may not be known to the attacker. In that case the selection of the attack
parameter is performed through game theoretic optimization where the sensors with
unknown parameter p are treated as an opponent and where the attacker is treated
as the other player with unknown parameter q. The direct stealthy game G between
H and L is thus given formally by deﬁnition 2.
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Definition 2 The direct stealthy game is given by:
G = 〈Γ, A, U〉 = 〈{L,H}, {A1, A2}, {u1, u2}〉 (3.7)
A1 = {p : p ∈ [0, 1]} A2 = {q : q ∈ [0, 1]} (3.8)
u1(p, q) = 1− Pr{w(Xp) = w(Zpq)}, u2(p, q) = Pr{w(Xp) = w(Zpq)} (3.9)
To solve the game and obtain the optimal actions of each player, we are looking
for best response functions 1 B1(q
∗) and B2(p∗) where the notation Ba(b) denotes the
best response B of player a to the opponents best strategy b as given by Eqs. (4.21)
and (4.22) respectively.
B1(q
∗) = arg min 0≤p≤1 Pr{w(Xp) = w(Zpq)} (3.10)
B2(p
∗) = arg max 0≤q≤1 Pr{w(Xp) = w(Zpq)} (3.11)
C. Stealthy Attack Results
In this section we analyze and solve the direct stealthy attack game G from deﬁnition
2. We begin by deriving the stealth condition S from Eq. (3.6) through Problem 1
which we also refer to as the overlap problem.
Problem 1 (OVERLAP)
GIVEN: w(X) ∼ Binomial(n, p)
w(Y) ∼ Binomial(n, q)
FIND: S = Pr{w(X) = w(X⊕Y)}.
A more general relaxed version of the stealth condition that allows the attacker
to deviate from the optimal weight by a factor of  is derived via Problem 2.
1In general the best response can be a functional [56].
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Problem 2 (OVERLAP-2)
GIVEN:  a ﬁxed integer
w(X) ∼ Binomial(n, p)
w(Y) ∼ Binomial(n, q)
FIND: S ′ = Pr{|w(X)− w(X⊕Y)| ≤ }.
Problem 3 focuses speciﬁcally on the best strategies of the attacker and ﬁnally
Problem 4 presents the solution to the entire game including the strategies of the
legitimate network L.
Problem 3 (OPTIMAL-q)
GIVEN: w(X) ∼ Binomial(n, p),
w(Y) ∼ Binomial(n, q)
FIND: argmaxq∈[0,1] Pr{w(X) = w(X⊕Y)}.
Problem 4 (STATIC-GAME)
GIVEN: w(X) ∼ Binomial(n, p),
w(Y) ∼ Binomial(n, q)
FIND: B1(q
∗) and B2(p∗) from Eqs. (4.21) and (4.22).
In addressing the problems in this chapter, we make use of the following notation.
We make extensive use of the binomial coeﬃcient
(
a
b
)
where
(
a
b
)
= a!/(b!(a − b)!) for
a positive integer a and non-negative integer b ≤ a, and 0 otherwise (negative and
fractional a and b, deﬁned using Gamma functions, have no physical meaning in our
problem) [93]. Here the factorial of a, written as a! is equal to a× (a− 1)× (a− 2)×
· · · × 2× 1. We also use the notation x ↓ 0 to indicate the limit from above, or more
intuitively, x approaching 0 from the right-side. The absolute value | · | when applied
to a ﬁnite set, denotes the cardinality of that set, while when applied to non-sets it
denotes the real absolute value as will be clear from the context.
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1. Attack Analysis
First we set out to solve Problem 1 also referred to as the overlap problem. The aim
of Lemma 1 is to outline the necessary and suﬃcient condition of the legitimate and
attacker’s bit vectors overlapping, such that x⊕y has the same weight as the pristine
x. The goal is to ﬁrst determine the weight of x⊕y, which is illustrated in Figure 13.
The idea is that whenever the 1s in x and y do not overlap, these positions contribute
to the overall weight of x⊕ y, since 1⊕ 0 = 0⊕ 1 = 1.
Lemma 1 w(x) = w(x⊕ y) if and only if the number of 1s in x and y coincide in
exactly m = w(y)/2 positions.
Proof 1 Let k = w(x), l = w(y), and let A be the set of positions in x that have
a value of 1, i.e. A = {i : xi = 1} and let B be the set of positions in y that
have a value of 1, i.e. B = {i : yi = 1}. Then k = |A| and l = |B|. The set
of positions in both A and B that coincide is A ∩ B so by deﬁnition m = |A ∩ B|.
The set of positions that do not coincide is (A ∪ B) − (A ∩ B). In binary addition,
bits that match always add to 0, and bits that do not match always add to 1, hence
w(x⊕y) = |(A∪B)−(A∩B)|(a)= |(A∪B)|−|(A∩B)|(b)= |A|+|B|−2|A∩B| = k+l−2m,
where (a) results because A∩B ⊂ A∪B, and (b) follows from the principle of inclusion
and exclusion. If w(x) = w(x ⊕ y), then k = k + l − 2m, which implies m = 1/2.
Conversely, if m = 1/2, then w(x⊕ y) = k + l − 2(1/2) = k = w(x).
Lemma 2 Suppose x and y have exactly m overlapping 1s. Then w(x) ≥ m and
w(y) ≥ m must satisfy:
n− w(x) ≥ w(y)−m (3.12)
Proof 2 Deﬁne k, l, A, and B as in the proof of Lemma 1. The distinct 1-positions
over both x and y are given by the set A ∪ B. Since the total number of distinct
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A = 1-positions for x B = 1-positions for y
Result x + y: 1 + 0 = 1 1 + 1 = 0 0 + 1 = 1
Fig. 13. Visualization of Lemma 1: when 1-positions do not overlap (intersect) the
result is a bit 1, otherwise a bit 0.
1-positions cannot exceed n (for either x or y would be of length greater than n), we
have n ≥ |A ∪ B| = |A|+ |B| − |A ∩B| = k + l −m.
The following deﬁnition is based on Lemma 2 and will be used in subsequent proofs.
Definition 3 Given a number m, the pair (k, l) is said to be well-deﬁned if it satisﬁes
n− k ≥ l −m, and n ≥ k ≥ m, n ≥ l ≥ m.
In Lemma 3 we look at the conditional probability of x and y overlapping in
exactly m positions. The technique used in the proof is to ﬁx one of the vectors, i.e.
x, as shown in Figure 14, and then choose ys so that only m of their 1s overlap with
any of the x’s 1s. This probability turns out to be a hypergeometric distribution.
Lemma 3 Let E be the event that the number of 1s in X and Y overlap in exactly
m positions. Then
Pr(E|{w(X) = k and w(Y) = l}) =
(
k
m
)(
n−k
l−m
)
(
n
l
) (3.13)
=
(
l
m
)(
n−l
k−m
)
(
n
k
) (3.14)
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Fixed x:     1 1 1  … 1      0 0 0 … 0 0 0
k 1s n-k 0s
Sample y:    0 0 1 … 1 0     0 … 0 1 …  1
m 1s l-m 1s
Fig. 14. Visualization of Lemma 3: choosing exactly m of y’s 1s to overlap with x’s
1s.
when k and l are well-deﬁned (as in Deﬁnition 3), otherwise the probability is 0.
Proof 3 We prove Eq. (3.13), and let the reader verify Eq. (3.14). We ﬁx x, and
think of y as the binary string that we vary so that we may look at the event E ′ =
{y|exactly m of y’s l 1s overlap with x’s k 1s}. We can count the number of y that
satisﬁes E ′ by choosing m 1s in y from positions out of the k 1-positions in x, which is(
k
m
)
, and then choosing the remainder l−m 1s in y from positions out of the n−k 0-
positions in x, which is
(
n−k
l−m
)
. The multiplication counting rule gives |E ′| = ( k
m
)(
n−k
l−m
)
.
Now if we vary x, by the multiplication rule we have |E| = (n
k
)(
k
m
)(
n−k
l−m
)
. There are
a total of
(
n
k
)(
n
l
)
pairs of (x,y) of speciﬁed weights. Since all such pairs have the
same probability, we can take the ratio of |E| over the total number of pairs, giving
us Eq. (3.13).
Theorem 1 Let E be the event that the number of 1s in X and Y overlap in exactly
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m positions. Deﬁne:
a(k,m) =


(
k
m
)
if k ≥ m
0 o.w
(3.15)
b(k, l,m) =


(
n−k
l−m
)
if n− k ≥ l −m
0 o.w
(3.16)
c(k) =


(
n
k
)
if n ≥ k
0 o.w
(3.17)
In addition, we deﬁne
(
a
b
)
to be equal to 0 if either a or b are not integers. Then:
Pr(E) =
n∑
k=1
n∑
l=1
a(k,m)b(k, l,m)c(k)pk(1− p)n−kql(1− q)n−l (3.18)
Proof 4
Pr({w(X) = k and w(Y) = l and} ∩ E)
= Pr(E|{w(X) = k and w(Y) = l})
·Pr{w(X) = k}Pr{w(Y) = l} (3.19)
=
(
k
m
)(
n−k
l−m
)
(
n
l
) (n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
(
n
l
)
ql(1− q)n−l (3.20)
Eq. (3.20) follows from Lemma 3, where again we assume k and l are well-deﬁned,
or the probability is 0. Finally we can extract the desired marginal distribution:
Pr(E) =
n∑
k=1
n∑
l=1
Pr({w(X) = k and w(Y) = l and} ∩E) (3.21)
Corollary 1
Pr{w(X) = w(X⊕Y)}
=
n∑
k=1
n∑
l is even
a
(
k,
l
2
)
b
(
k, l,
l
2
)
c(k)
·pk(1− p)n−kql(1− q)n−l (3.22)
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where a(k,m), b(k, l,m), c(k) are as deﬁned in Theorem 1.
Proof 5 Apply Lemma 1 to Theorem 1.
We are ready to state our ﬁrst result as the solution to Problem 1.
Solution 1 The stealth condition S = Pr{w(X) = w(X⊕Y)} is given by
S =
n∑
k=1
n∑
l is even
a
(
k,
l
2
)
b
(
k, l,
l
2
)
c(k)
·pk(1− p)n−kql(1− q)n−l (3.23)
where a(k,m), b(k, l,m), c(k) are as deﬁned by
a(k,m) =


(
k
m
)
if k ≥ m
0 o.w
(3.24)
b(k, l,m) =


(
n−k
l−m
)
if n− k ≥ l −m
0 o.w
(3.25)
c(k) =


(
n
k
)
if n ≥ k
0 o.w
(3.26)
Before investigating the implications of solution 1, we proceed to the relaxed
version of the stealth condition via the study of Problem 2.
Corollary 2 Let  be a positive integer. Then:
Pr{|w(X)− w(X⊕Y)| < }
=
 l+
2
∑
m=	 l−
2


n∑
k=1
n∑
l=1
a (k,m) b (k, l,m) c(k)
·pk(1− p)n−kql(1− q)n−l (3.27)
where a(k,m), b(k, l,m), c(k) are as deﬁned in Theorem 1.
46
Proof 6 Given realizations x and y, let k = w(x) and l = w(y).
|w(x)− w(x⊕ y)| <  (3.28)
⇒


k < k + l − 2m + 
k > k + l − 2m− 
(3.29)
The second line relies on the proof for Lemma 1. Since the events of strings having 1s
overlapping in exactly m′ and m′′ positions are disjoint, the probability of the union
of the events is the sum of the probabilities of the individual events.
The solution to Problem 2 readily follows from Corollary 2.
Solution 2 The relaxed form of the stealth condition S ′ for the direct stealthy attack
game is given by:
S ′ = Pr{|w(X)− w(X⊕Y)| < }
=
 l+
2
∑
m=	 l−
2


n∑
k=1
n∑
l=1
a (k,m) b (k, l,m) c(k)
·pk(1− p)n−kql(1− q)n−l (3.30)
where  is an integer and a(k,m), b(k, l,m), c(k) are as deﬁned in Theorem 1.
We are now in a position to address Problem 3 where the goal is the determination
of the best probability q that a hostile sensor network should employ given that the
probability p (based on local sensor threshold Th) is not known. We answer this
question for suﬃciently large sensor densities in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 For n suﬃciently large, q∗ ↓ 0 as n →∞, where q∗ = argmaxq∈[0,1] S,
that is, q∗ = argmaxq∈[0,1] Pr{w(X) = w(X⊕Y)}.
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Proof 7 Let ϕ(q) = Pr{w(X) = w(X⊕Y)} where p is treated as a ﬁxed constant.2
As n → ∞, w(X)/na.s.→ p and similarly w(Y)/na.s.→ q. Using this idea (which could
also be strengthened using strong typicality), it can be shown that w(x) ≈ np and
w(y) ≈ nq for all realizations x and y for suﬃciently large n. Hence substituting
k = np and l = nq into Eq. (3.23), we obtain:
ϕ(q) ≈
(
np
nq/2
)(
n(1− p)
nq/2
)(
n
np
)
pnp(1− p)n(1−p)qnq(1− q)n(1−q) (3.31)
when n is suﬃciently large. The conditions for being well-deﬁned imply q ≤ min{2p, 2(1−
p)}, which can readily be veriﬁed. Again for suﬃciently large n, we apply Stirling’s
approximation (n! ≈ (n/e)n) to Eq. (3.31).
ϕ(q) ∝ (1− q)
n(1−q)(
n
2
)nq
[n(p− q/2)]n(p−q/2)[n(1− p− q/2)]n(1−p−q/2) (3.32)
In Eq. (3.32), we have removed the non-negative constants (independent of q). Next
we examine the derivative of ϕ(q).
∂ϕ(q)
∂q
∝ 2nq−1n1−nq(1− q)n(1−q)
·[n(1− p− q/2)]−n(1−p−q/2)[n(p− q/2)]−n(p−q/2)
· ln
(
4(p− q/2)(1− p− q/2)
(1− q)2
)
(3.33)
We can verify that the point q = 0 is a salient point (i.e. a “corner” since ϕ(q) “turns
on” at q = 0) so the derivative does not exist at this point. Hence our discussion of
the derivative is restricted to 0 < q ≤ min{2p, 2(1− p)}. Under the implications for
being well-deﬁned, it can be veriﬁed that the terms outside ln are always non-negative
2The diﬃculty in this proof lies not in taking the derivative of ϕ(q), but rather
in solving the ﬁrst order condition ∂ϕ(q)/∂q = 0; hence we resort to the asymptotic
case as well as approximations. We also note that although q∗ approaches 0, setting
q∗ = 0 is incorrect, as this results in ϕ(0) = 0.
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(Appendix A). However, the ln term can be shown to be non-positive by showing that
the argument inside ln is always ≤ 1 (Appendix A). Therefore ∂ϕ(q)/∂q ≤ 0 over the
interval of q ∈ (0,min{2p, 2(1− p)}] implies ϕ(q) is monotonically decreasing in this
interval. The maximum q∗ must then be the left boundary, i.e q∗ ↓ 0.
Theorem 2 suggests that when n is large, the hostile sensor network should be
looking for an optimal q that is quite small. This result is important since ϕ(q) is
not concave and hence utilization of numerical methods to ﬁnd the optimal q beneﬁts
from a good initialization.
Solution 3 In a stealthy direct attack, each hostile node hi should attack with q
∗ = ζ
where ζ is closer to 0 than to 0.5 when n is suﬃciently large. This ensures the
maximization of the stealth condition S and hence of the probability that the attack is
undetected for this choice of q∗.
Theorem 2 also provides general information regarding the power of the attack Pa
under the strict stealth S condition as speciﬁed in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3 Suppose that the hostile sensor network plays q∗ according to Theo-
rem 2. Let l = E[w(Y)] be the average expected number of legitimate bits that are
ﬂipped. Then l 	 n.
Proof 8 Since l = nq∗, therefore l/n = (nq∗)/n = q∗ 	 1, which implies E[w(Y)]	
n.
For the static stealthy direct attack game G, the pure strategy Nash equilibria
are the strategy vectors (p∗, q∗) (p∗ ∈ [0, 1], q∗ ∈ [0, 1]) such that Player 1 would not
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to deviate from p∗ given Player 2 plays q∗, and vice versa. This
problem is generally diﬃcult, but if we look at the asymptotic case again, that is for
n suﬃciently large, it can be shown that p∗ and q∗ are again close to some boundary.
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Theorem 3 Suppose that Player 1 can select p∗ from a closed subinterval [0, 1] de-
noted P = [a, b], a < b, while q∗ ∈ [0, 1]. For n suﬃciently large, the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium is given by:
p∗ =


a if a < |1− b|
b if a > |1− b|
(3.34)
and q∗ = ζ, where ζ ↓ 0. If a = |1 − b|, then there are two equilibria at (a, ζ) and
(b, ζ).
Remark 1 The expression in Eq. (3.34) refers to choosing the left-most boundary if
it is closer to 0 than the right-most boundary is closer to 1, and choosing the right-
most boundary if it is closer to 1 than the left-most boundary is closer to 0.
Proof 9 First we ﬁnd the best response of Player 2 to Player 1’s p. We have already
shown in Theorem 2 that q∗ ↓ 0 as n →∞. For q∗ suﬃciently small, we can assume
it is irrespective of p. Next we examine the best response of Player 1 to Player 2’s
q, where we know that q will always be approaching 0. With this in mind, we deﬁne
φ(p) for q ﬁxed at q∗:
φ(p) =
n∑
k=1
n∑
l is even
(
l
l/2
)(
n− l
k − l/2
)(
n
l
)
ql(1− q)n−lpk(1− p)n−k (3.35)
where we have used Eq. (3.14) instead of Eq. (3.13). Now since q∗ is small, nq∗ 	 n so(
n
l
)
ql(1−q)n−l can be approximated by a Poisson distribution λl/l!e−λ, where λ = nq∗.
φ(p) ≈
n∑
k=1
n∑
l is even
(
l
l
2
)(
n− l
k − l
2
)
λl
l!
e−λpk(1− p)n−k (3.36)
≈
n−1∑
k=1
(
2
1
)(
n− 2
k − 1
)
λ2
2!
e−λpk(1− p)n−k (3.37)
where we have kept only the smallest l = 2 in the series, as λl for l ≥ 4 is insigniﬁcant
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[94]. Next we use the identity:
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
+
(
n− 2
k
)
=
(
n− 1
k
)
(3.38)
φ(p) ≈ λ2e−λ
{
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k−1(1− p)
−
n−2∑
k=1
(
n− 2
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k−2(1− p)2
}
(3.39)
= λ2e−λ
{
(1− p)
[
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)(n−1)−k
]
− (1− p)n
− (1− p)2
[
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)
pk(1− p)(n−2)−k
]
+ (1− p)n
}
(3.40)
where in the last line we have extended k to start at 0 in the series, and hence must
subtract/add the k = 0 term to maintain equality. We have chosen to do this be-
cause each of the series sum to 1 as both series represent the total sum of a binomial
distribution. The expression then simpliﬁes to:
φ(p) ≈ λ2e−λ {(1− p)− (1− p)2} (3.41)
= λ2e−λ(p− p2) (3.42)
This shows that φ(p) is approximated as a concave function with peak at p = 1/2
when n is suﬃciently large. If p can be chosen from the entire interval [0, 1], then the
minima of φ(p) would be at p∗ = 0 and p∗ = 1. If instead we have to choose p from
the closed subinterval P ⊂ [0, 1], then we would take either the left or right boundary,
whichever is closer to 0 or 1 respectively.
The result of Theorem 3 is an approximation for suﬃciently large n, so it does not
predict games involving average-sized sensor networks. Again we only have some
guidelines as to where to search for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium or equilibria.
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If the left and right boundary of P are equally close to 0 and 1 respectively, then
there are two equilibria. This suggests a symmetry in p, which is stated in Theorem 4
Theorem 4 Deﬁne ψ(p, q) = Pr{w(X) = w(X⊕Y)}, where both p and q are now
variable. Let p¯ = 1− p, then ψ(p, q) = ψ(p¯, q).
Proof 10 Write:
ψ(p¯, q)
=
n∑
k=1
n∑
l is even
(
k
l/2
)(
n− k
l/2
)(
n
k
)
p¯k(1− p¯)n−kQ(l) (3.43)
=
n∑
x=1
n∑
l is even
(
n− x
l/2
)(
x
l/2
)(
n
n− x
)
·(1− p)n−xpxQ(l) (3.44)
=
n∑
x=1
n∑
l is even
(
n− x
l/2
)(
x
l/2
)(
n
x
)
(1− p)n−xpxQ(l) (3.45)
= ψ(p, q) (3.46)
where Q(l) = ql(1 − q)n−l. In Eq. (3.45) we used the substitution x = n − k, and
in Eq. (3.45) we used the identity
(
a
b
)
=
(
a
a−b
)
. One can also easily verify that the
conditions for being well-deﬁned hold by substituting k = n− x.
Solution 4 Two competing sensor networks L and H should play relatively small p
(or large p¯) and relatively small q in the static game when n is suﬃciently large in
order to minimize and maximize the stealth condition S respectively.
In the next section we discuss the results derived above for the hostile network
H as well as their implications for sensor networks of varying cluster size n.
2. Attack Performance
In the above section we derived theoretical predictions of how two competing sensor
networks aﬀect each other. The results were mainly of existence and asymptotic
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Fig. 15. Theoretical vs. simulated ϕ(q), probability of stealthy attack success, for
n = 60 nodes, p = 0.495 (probability bit 1 is sent by legitimate node).
nature. In this section we examine realistic ﬁnite sized networks and discuss some
trends not explicitly stated by the theorems to assess the performance of the attack
under the stealth condition in the case of direct stealthy attacks.
We ﬁrst examine a plot of ϕ(q) which corresponds to the probability of attack
success or more precisely to the stealth condition S for a given value of probability p.
As seen in Figure 15, the theoretical curve from Eq. (3.23) and the simulated curve
based on 105 experiments match closely. Furthermore for sensor networks of size
n = 60 and p = 0.495, it is seen that the optimal attack probability q is q∗ ≈ 0.05,
which is closer to 0 than to 0.5 and thus in agreement with both Solutions 3 and
4. Importantly we note that the probability of attack success ϕ(q) (i.e. the stealth
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Fig. 16. Probability of stealthy attack success, ϕ(q), for p = 0.3 (probability bit 1 is
sent by legitimate node) over various network sizes n.
condition) is a relative measure of stealth as described in Chapter II. Thus a higher
value of ϕ(q) is advantageous for the hostile network while a lower value of ϕ(q) is
advantageous for the legitimate network. As will be shown in Section D, this relative
measure corresponds to the probability of attack detection such that higher values
of ϕ(q) (corresponding to greater stealth) correspond to a lower probability of the
attack being detected. As such, the stealth metric is consistent for both H and L.
The dynamics of the optimal q∗ which vary with varying n can be seen in Fig-
ure 16. We note that as n becomes larger, the peak q∗ approaches 0 as indicated by
Solution 3. Most importantly, this is not generally the case for arbitrarily small n.
Indeed for certain values of n based on the underlying combinatorics, the peak may
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Fig. 17. Probability of stealthy attack failure, 1 − ϕ(q), for n = 55 nodes, p = 0.2
(probability bit 1 is sent by legitimate node) over various  uncertainty.
arise closer to q = 1. This indicates that the hostile network should attack with high
probability while obtaining a comparably high level of (relative) stealth. This does
not contradict the theoretical predictions of Solution 3 since the latter were obtained
for suﬃciently large n. Intuitively this can also be understood from the fact that ϕ(q)
is a positive weighted sum of semi-concave functions in q (i.e. ql(1 − q)n−l) where
such a sum need not be semi-concave [95] as is demonstrated in Figure 16. The ob-
servations regarding the cluster size n have implications for the defense strategies of
the legitimate network L which we will discuss.
In solution 2 the stealth condition S was relaxed by a factor of  to produce a new
modiﬁed stealth condition S ′ which is given by Eq. (3.30). Figure 17 shows the eﬀect
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of varying  on the relative probability that the attack will be detected, that is, the
vertical axis depicts the probability of anti-stealth 1−ϕ(q) for a given value of p. We
note that as  is increased, the peak of the anti-stealth (i.e. relative detection) curve
increases, thus decreasing H’s stealth and increasing the chance of attack detection.
Importantly, relaxing the stealth condition by even the small factor of  = 1 (shown
in Figure 17 for the case of n = 55 and p = 0.2) increases the relative probability
of attack detection signiﬁcantly. For the case shown in Figure 17, the probability
of attack failure (i.e. the attack is detected) increases from approximately 0.1 to
0.5. This result is very intuitive in that relaxing the average statistical similarity of
the x and z vectors by even a small factor can cause the count at the cluster head
to depart from the count expected by the cluster head under the case of no attack.
Thus we conclude that the stealth condition is a very strict condition as previously
stipulated. Satisfying this strict condition is important for the hostile network given
a lack of knowledge regarding the speciﬁc attack detection mechanisms utilized by
the legitimate network.
Next we examine the overall game G via the ψ(p, q) manifold for the two sensor
networks of size n = 60 as shown in Figure 18. The legitimate network L (Player
1) wishes to minimize the probability of attack success (i.e. the stealth condition S)
while the hostile network (Player 2) wishes to maximize it. If Player 1 can choose
from the entire interval then Player 1 will choose p = 0 or p = 1 on the p-axis of
Figure 18 as predicted by Theorem 3. Player 2 chooses a probability q that maximizes
Figure 18. As can be seen from Figure 18, any choice of q given Player 1’s choice
of p = 0, 1 will result in an attack success probability of 0. This result agrees with
the expectation that if the cluster head always expects z = 0 (the all-zero vector) or
z = 1 (the all-one vector), then no attack can misguide the cluster head. In the proof
of Theorem 3 we showed that the peak on the p-ψ plane is always at p = 0.5 and in
56
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Probabili
ty of attac
k q 
Probability p
 
Pr
ob
. o
f A
tta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
Fig. 18. Probability of stealthy attack success, ψ(p, q), for n = 60 nodes.
Theorem 4 we showed that this trace is symmetrical in p. These features are readily
veriﬁed in Figure 18 and carry implications for the defense strategies of L in terms of
local threshold Th selection which yields the probability p of witnessing an event.
3. Attack Implications
Having examined the salient features of the game for both networks, we now expand
upon the signiﬁcance of these results for both attack and defense strategies. The
stealth condition of Eq. (3.23) (or more generally (3.30)) is unfortunately cumbersome
to inspect. Plotting Eq. (3.23) for diﬀerent values of cluster size n and probability
of an event p nevertheless yields a unique value of probability q that maximizes the
stealth condition (i.e. it is the global peak of Eq. (3.23)). The results of such plotting
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Table I. Optimal q∗ Value for Cluster Size n and Probability of Event p
n p = 0.01 p = 0.05 p = 0.1 p = 0.2 p = 0.3 p = 0.4 p = 0.5
2 0.9990 0.9990 0.9990 0.9990 0.9990 0.9990 0.9990
5 0.4050 0.4050 0.4050 0.4550 0.5050 0.5050 0.5050
10 0.2050 0.2050 0.2050 0.2550 0.2550 0.9990 0.9990
20 0.1010 0.1050 0.1100 0.1220 0.1350 0.1470 0.1520
30 0.0670 0.0700 0.0740 0.0820 0.0910 0.0990 0.1030
40 0.0500 0.0530 0.0550 0.0620 0.0680 0.0750 0.0780
50 0.0400 0.0420 0.0440 0.0490 0.0550 0.0600 0.0620
100 0.0200 0.0210 0.0220 0.0250 0.0280 0.0300 0.0310
are summarized in Table I which shows the optimal value of attack probability q∗ for
each pair (n, p) (the stealth condition is symmetric in p and thus the eﬀect of p is
the same as the eﬀect of 1− p and we only consider p ∈ [0, 0.5]). We make a few key
observations regarding this result. For a given value of cluster size n (i.e. a row in
Table I), q∗ is almost constant to within one signiﬁcant digit irrespective of the value
of probability p. Thus if the attacker knows the cluster size n, he can determine the
optimal value of attack without having to know the probability p. This is signiﬁcant
since the value of p depends in part on a sensor’s threshold selection Th and may not
always be available to the attacker [6].
Examination of Table I also yields important insights regarding the dynamic
relationship between the cluster size n and the optimal attack parameter q∗. We
observe that as n increases, q∗ decreases for all values of p. This result can be
understood in the context of typical sets if we consider the n sensor decisions as a
string of length n. The typical set is usually a small set but with probability of
occurrence close to 1. When n is small, the typical set is small but relatively large
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compared to the set of all possible strings of length n. When n increases, the set of
all possible strings of length n grows to be very large and the size of the typical set is
relatively much smaller. Thus it becomes more diﬃcult for the attacker to attack the
“string” and still remain in the typical set. This implies that the chance of attack on
the sensors decreases but this decrease may also carry ramiﬁcations for the detection
of such an attack as we will explore in Section D.
The results of Table I also support the analytical results from solution 4 for
the legitimate network. Such analysis reveals that the optimal value of p for p ∈
[0, 0.5] is p∗ small (the optimal value of p for p ∈ [0.5, 1] is p∗ large). This suggests
that to improve the attack detection, the sensors should be calibrated to have a
small (or large) value of p through threshold Th selection if such selection is possible
(depending on the underlying technology of the sensor). Indeed if we examine more
of the signiﬁcant digits in the results of Table I, the optimal value of q∗ does indeed
decrease with decreasing p with ramiﬁcations for attack detection which is examined
in Section D. The implications of these results for the hostile network in terms of
carrying out a stealthy direct attack are summarized in Algorithm 1.
D. Secure Data Acquisition Results
In this section we investigate attack detection and mitigation strategies at the cluster
head in the case of direct stealthy attacks. As modeled in Section B, the cluster head
receives decisions regarding an event from n sensors that may be attacked by hostile
nodes deployed in the area. Importantly we show how game theoretic analysis of the
optimal attack strategies from Section D-C enables the use of established detection
techniques to uncover the attack and mitigate its eﬀects.
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Algorithm 1 Stealthy Direct Attack Algorithm for Hostile Network
Ensure: Min attack detection and power of defense given legitimate network whose
detection paradigm and defense mechanisms are not known.
1: if legitimate cluster size n is not known: then
2: Select a large cluster size where large signiﬁes n ≥ 30
3: end if
4: if p is not known then
5: Select a small value of p where small signiﬁes p ≤ 0.1
6: end if
7: Find the value of q∗ based on (n, p) and Eq. (3.23).
8: if both (n, p) are known then
9: The value of q∗ is optimal and exact.
10: else if only n is known then
11: The value of q∗ is approximate to within one signiﬁcant digit.
12: else
13: The value of q∗ is a worst case scenario approximation.
14: end if
15: Find the relative stealth S based on q∗ and Eq. (3.23).
16: Find the expected power of the attack E[Pa] = nq
∗.
17: if the relative stealth S is desirable then
18: The optimal q∗ has been found.
19: else
20: Decrease the value of q∗. Return to step 15.
21: end if
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1. Defense Analysis
In detection problems we are generally faced with the task of deciding between two or
more hypotheses based on received data. The Neyman-Pearson (NP) detector is an
optimal detector appropriate for cases where a priori probabilities of the hypotheses
are not available, and for cases where the probability of detection PD and the proba-
bility of false alarm PFA may not be of equal signiﬁcance to the application (otherwise
a Bayesian detector may be appropriate). According to the NP approach, we obtain
a detector by maximizing PD for a desired false alarm rate PFA = α. The resulting
optimal detector is a likelihood ratio detector Λ(z) given by Eq. (3.47), where z is
the received data vector, where the comparison threshold T is chosen according to
Eq. (3.48) and where randomization may need to be performed if Λ(z) = T to achieve
the desired α.
Λ(z) =
p(z;H1)
p(z;H0)
H1
>
<
H0
T (3.47)
PFA =
∑
z:Λ(z)>T
p(z;H0) d z ≤ α (3.48)
For the case of n binary sensors, the data vector z consists of Bernoulli random
variables from a distribution which is Bern(p) (hypothesis H0) or a distribution
Bern(r) (hypothesis H1) as given by Eq. (3.49). By applying Eq. (3.47) it can easily
be shown that the NP detector for this case is given by Eq. (3.50), where w(z) is the
weight (the number of 1s) in the data vector z.
H0 : normal operation,Z ∼ Bern(p) (3.49)
H1 : attacked operation,Z ∼ Bern(r)
Λ(z) =
rw(z)(1− r)n−w(z)
pw(z)(1− p)n−w(z)
H1
>
<
H0
T (3.50)
∑
z:Λ(z)>T
pw(z)(1− p)n−w(z) ≤ α (3.51)
61
The threshold T is chosen to satisfy a desired α based on Eq. (3.51), where the
summation is over all the possible data vectors z such that Λ(z) exceeds T . However
this is equivalent to summing over all possible weights w for w ∈ [0, n] as shown in
Eq. (3.52). The notation IP denotes the indicator function which is equal to 1 if P
is true and is equal to 0 otherwise. Finally, the probability of detection β resulting
from the use of the Λ(z) detector is given by Eq. (3.53).
n∑
w=0
(nw)p
w(z)(1− p)n−w(z) I Λ(z)>T ≤ α (3.52)
β =
n∑
w=0
(nw)r
w(z)(1− r)n−w(z) I Λ(z)>T (3.53)
To distinguish between normal operation and an attack/fault, the cluster head
must therefore employ the detection statistic (likelihood ratio Λ) of Eq. (3.50) and
compare it to the threshold T that is set based on Eq. (3.52) with the resulting prob-
ability of detection given by Eq. (3.53). Importantly, the detection statistic Λ(p, r)
depends on the value of p and r. Hence in the case of an attack with unpredictable
probability, the detection statistic depends on the unknown underlying parameter q
since r = p + q − 2pq. The detection statistic’s dependence on q also translates into
diﬃculties in determining the probability of false alarm and detection based on the
dependence of Eqs. (3.52) and (3.53) on Λ.
Thus although we have determined an optimal attack detector for the cluster
head, it is not implementable in its current form unless the parameter q is known.
Fortunately we can re-arrange the likelihood ratio Λ as shown in Eq. (3.54) where
(1 − r)n/(1 − p)n is equal to a positive constant k > 0 for all values of 0 ≤ r ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p < 1 and n. Let us for the moment assume that r > p in Eq. (3.54). Then it
can easily be seen that Λ(w) = k(r/p)w((1− p)/(1− r))w is monotonically increasing
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in w where we have written Λ in terms of w to simplify the notation and emphasize
the role of the “aggregate” statistic (the weight w) in lieu of the original data vector
z.
Λ(z) =
rw(z)(1− r)n−w(z)
pw(z)(1− p)n−w(z) =
( r
1−r )
w(z)
( p
1−p)
w(z)
(1− r)n
(1− p)n = k
(
r
p
)w(z)(
1− p
1− r
)w(z)
(3.54)
Based on the monotonicity of Λ, we may now invoke the Karlin-Rubin theorem
[96] to obtain an alternative form for the cluster head detector with the same PD-
PFA performance. The alternative form for the cluster head detector is given by
Eqs. (3.55), (3.56) and (3.57) where p′ is a probability of mixing between the two
hypotheses if w is precisely equal to T (the mixing probability p′ is set based on
Eq. (3.56) for a desired α). As shown in Eq. (3.58), based on the assumption that
r > p, these equations are valid for the interval where p < 1/2. When p ∈ [1/2, 1],
the hypotheses in Eq. (3.55) are switched.
w
H1
>
<
H0
T (3.55)
if w = T then declare H1 w.p p′
α =
n∑
w>T
(nw)(
p
1− p)
w(1− p)n + p′(nT )(
p
1− p)
T (1− p)n (3.56)
β =
n∑
w>T
(nw)(
r
1− r )
w(1− r)n + p′(nT )(
r
1− r )
T (1− r)n (3.57)
r > p⇒ p + q − 2pq > p ⇒ p < 1
2
(3.58)
We observe that the detection statistic w and the comparison threshold T in
Eq. (3.55) no longer require the cluster head to know the value of q and thus the
detector is implementable at the cluster head. We note however that in order to
determine the resulting probability of detection PD, the value of r (and thus q) is
still required in Eq. (3.57). Thus for the case of an attack, analysis of the optimal
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attack q as addressed in Section C is required in order to determine the detector’s
performance.
We also note that the detection statistic is now a simple weight and thus the
cluster head must merely count the number of 1’s that it has received from the n
sensors and compare this count to a threshold. The optimal NP detector at the cluster
head is thus identical in form to the detectors often used in practical implementations
as discussed in Section B (in such implementations the comparison threshold may be
set based on experimental trials or based on an expected average count of c± 3) [7],
[3], [16]. The optimal NP detector however makes use of a threshold T that is set
based on a desired probability of false alarm α and based on the probability p of
an event. Setting the threshold based on Eq. (3.56) thus provides a greater level of
control and ﬂexibility to meet the PFA requirements of the application. Furthermore,
this detector is guaranteed to provide the best probability of detection PD for a chosen
PFA = α (a property of Neyman-Pearson detectors). In Section 2 we examine the
actual performance of this cluster head detector and compare it to the performance
of a detector based on the expected average c± .
2. Defense Performance
Based on the model of Section B, a detector for attack identiﬁcation at the cluster
head may be based on the Neyman-Pearson design or on an average expected count
c where c ≈ np±  for a cluster size of n sensors with probability of event p. In this
section we wish to compare the performance of these two approaches and also obtain
some general insights into the PD-PFA performance curve for diﬀerent values of p and
n and for various attack probabilities q.
3This  should not be confused with the  relaxation factor in the modiﬁed stealth
condition S ′.
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Fig. 19. (a) n = 50, p = 0.01 and q = 0.1. (b) n = 50, p = 0.1 and q = 0.1.
In Figures 19a and 19b, as well as in Figure 20, the PD-PFA performance of
the NP and c ±  detectors are depicted for n = 50 sensors, various (p, q) pairs and
various values of  “slack” in the c detector. As can be seen from these ﬁgures,
the performance of the average expected c detector follows the general trend of the
NP detector although it typically does not achieve the same overall performance.
Nevertheless, by choosing a diﬀerent value of , it is possible to achieve a desired
trade-oﬀ between the probability of detection PD (vertical axis) and the probability
of false alarm PFA (horizontal axis). The average expected c detector may thus be
useful for certain applications, in particular ones where the probability of an event
p is expected to be small (based on the phenomenon of interest and the selection
of the sensor threshold Th) as in Figure 19a. As a side note, we observe that the
performance of the NP detector based on Eqs. (3.50), (3.52) and (3.53) which we
denote by “NP” is the same as the performance of the NP detector based on the
Karlin-Rubin simpliﬁcation of Eqs. (3.55), (3.56) and (3.57) which we denote by
“KR” in Figures 19a and 19b and in Figure 20. Thus we are justiﬁed in utilizing the
simpliﬁed form of the NP detector to obtain the same performance.
Importantly based on Figures 19 and 20, we observe that the NP detector per-
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Fig. 20. n = 50, p = 0.47 and q = 0.47.
forms better for smaller values of probability p for p ∈ [0, 0.5]. By symmetry for
p ∈ [0.5, 1], it performs better for values of p closer to 1. This result is consistent with
the results of Section C where based on analysis of the stealth condition of Eq. (3.23)
we noted that it was best to calibrate the sensors to a small value of p or to a large
value of p. Indeed based on Figures 19 and 20 and the results of Table I, the worst
PD-PFA performance is obtained for values of p closest to p = 0.5. This can be un-
derstood from Eq. (3.58) where r = p+ q− 2pq. When p = 0.5, r = 0.5 and thus the
detector is not able to distinguish between the H0 and H1 hypotheses. At an intu-
itive level, when p = 0.5, the probability of obtaining a decision bit of value 1 is the
same as the probability of obtaining a sensor decision bit of value 0. This situation
corresponds to the largest level of uncertainty that the cluster head can experience
and makes it easier for an attacker to fool the detector.
Based on these results we are able to conﬁrm the previous assertion regarding
the consistency of the stealth condition for the legitimate and hostile networks.
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Fig. 21. The PD-PFA performance curves for various values of n and the optimal value
of q∗ corresponding to that n for (a) p = 0.05 and (b) p = 0.1.
Remark 2 The stealth condition S of Eq. (3.23) is a relative measure of the hos-
tile network’s stealth and is a consistent measure for both the legitimate and hostile
networks in terms of the probability of detecting the attack such as under the Neyman-
Pearson paradigm.
3. Defense Implications
In the previous section we compared the performance of the NP and c detectors
for various values of the probability p with implications for the selection of a local
sensor threshold Th. We now wish to explicitly investigate the performance of the
NP detector for an optimal attack parameter q∗ as obtained from Section C. Figure
21a depicts the PD-PFA performance of the NP detector for p = 0.05 and for various
values of cluster size n ∈ [5, 100]. Crucially, each performance curve is obtained
assuming the value of attack parameter q that is optimal for the given (n, p) pair as
obtained in Table I or directly from the stealth condition S in Eq. (3.23). Figure 21b
is obtained similarly but for a value of p = 0.1.
Based on these two ﬁgures, we make the important observation that the PD-
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PFA performance decreases as the number of sensors n is increased. This somewhat
surprising result is an outcome of the stealth condition of the attacker. That is, if the
attacker is not stealthy, increasing the number of sensors will increase the detection
performance. If however the attacker is stealthy, then he selects an optimal value of
q∗ based on Eq. (3.23) or Table I. As discussed in Section C, this optimal value of q
decreases with increasing cluster size n. Thus the attack becomes more rare in the
sense that the average expected power of the attack E[Pa] = nq|q=q∗ decreases, which
is a desirable property. At the same time however, it becomes more diﬃcult to detect
the attack when it does occur. The implications of these results for attack detection
and mitigation for the legitimate sensor network are summarized via Algorithm 2.
Finally we make a brief but important observation regarding the sensor decision
threshold Th and the role that cryptography plays in the competing networks sce-
nario. As noted in Chapter II Section D-1, encryption mechanisms do not protect the
data against a hostile attack that occurs during the collection process. In this sense,
forward data encryption, that is encryption between the sensors and the sink, does
not protect against the actuation attacks (though this forward encryption is required
to protect the data during its dissemination). Interestingly we note that for the com-
peting networks scenario, it is the backward encryption of data between the sink and
the sensors that plays an important role. As discussed in Section C and summarized
in Algorithm 1, the hostile network beneﬁts from knowledge of the sensor threshold
Th. Consequently the legitimate network beneﬁts from keeping the value of Th secret
in addition to setting its value to a desirable level. If the hostile network estimates (or
otherwise obtains) the value of Th, the sink of the legitimate network beneﬁts from
re-issuing a new value of Th to its sensors. It may also instruct the sensors to set their
thresholds to obtain a probability of event p = 0 or p = 1 in order to “catch” the
hostile network in the midst of attack. Such re-issuing through the backward channel
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must be encrypted in order to be eﬀective.
Algorithm 2 Defense Algorithm for Legitimate Network
Ensure: Max attack detection and power of defense given competing hostile network.
1: Given the probability density function (pdf) of the phenomenon, set the local
sensor threshold Th:
2: if events are expected to be common then
3: Set Th such that p (area under the pdf to the left of Th) is close to 1.
4: else
5: Set Th such that p is close to 0.
6: end if
7: Select a value of cluster size n.
8: Find attacker’s q∗ based on (n, p) pair and Eq. (3.23).
9: Find the defense’s PD-PFA based on q
∗ from Eqs. (3.55), (3.56) and (3.57).
10: Find the defense’s expected power of defense E[Pd] = 1− nq∗.
11: if PD-PFA and E[Pd] are appropriate for the application then
12: cluster size n and decision threshold Th have been determined.
13: else
14: Return to step 7 and select a higher value of n.
15: end if
E. Stealthy Direct Attack Comparisons
In the previous sections we have derived the stealth condition S for the case of a
direct stealthy attack. We determined that this condition is consistent for both the
legitimate and hostile networks such that it can be utilized to obtain the optimal
defense and attack strategies. In this section we wish to compare the stealthy direct
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Fig. 22. Two hostile nodes deployed against two legitimate nodes. Each hostile node
may actuate with a diﬀerent probability qi.
attack to a stealthy attack where the hostile nodes must actively communicate with
each other. We also compare the direct stealthy attack to the case of an uncoordinated
stealthy attack where each hostile node may select a diﬀerent attack strategy. We
show interesting properties of these attacks and demonstrate that the direct stealthy
attack achieves a favorable stealth S performance and a good power-communication-
detection PCD performance compared with the other two stealthy attacks. These
results carry important implications for the design of attack and defense strategies.
1. Comparison with Uncoordinated Attack
In the direct stealthy attack, each hostile node optimizes its attack parameter based
on the knowledge that every other hostile node is utilizing the same attack parameter.
That is, qi = q ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} which enables each hostile node to solve for q∗ in the
stealth condition S of Eq. (3.23). To assess the direct stealthy attack, we compare
it with the uncoordinated stealthy attack [97]. In the uncoordinated attack, each
hostile node may utilize a diﬀerent attack parameter qi as shown in Figure 22.
Speciﬁcally we consider the scenario where n = 2 hostile nodes are actuating
against two legitimate sensors as shown in Figure 22. We employ the same data
acquisition and attack models as in Section B. That is, we assume that the case
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where a legitimate sensor i witnesses an event of interest when the attack is absent
is denoted by xi = 1, and that this event occurs with Bernoulli probability p such
that Pr(Xi = 1) = p. Conversely xi = 0 denotes the condition where no event of
interest is recorded by sensor node i when actuation is absent and this event carries
probability Pr(Xi = 0) = 1−p. The action of a hostile node i is denoted by Yi where
the realization yi = 1 denotes attack and yi = 0 denotes no attack. We assume that
the Bernoulli probability that a hostile node yi actuates is given by Pr(Yi = 1) = qi.
Let x = [x1x2], y = [y1y2] and z = [z1z2]. We examine the case where the stealth
relaxation parameter is  = 0 and thus in order to evade detection, each node i in
the hostile network wishes to maximize it’s utility function πi given by Eq. (3.59)
which depends on the parameter qi that it chooses, as well as on the parameter qj
that the other hostile node chooses independently. Importantly πi from Eq. (3.59)
still depends on the probability of an event p as was the case in the direct stealthy
attack, though this is not emphasized in Eq. (3.59) where qi is the focus.
πi(q1, q2) = Pr{w(X) = w(Z)} = Pr{w(X) = w(X⊕Y)} (3.59)
The probability of Eq. (3.59) can be expressed and simpliﬁed as shown in Eqs. (3.60)
to (3.63). The ﬁnal simpliﬁed utility function πi(q1, q2) is given by Eq. (3.64) which
has been written to emphasize the form of the interaction between q1 and q2.
Pr{w(X) = w(Z)} = Pr{w(X) = w(Z)|X = 00} · Pr{X = 00}
+Pr{w(X) = w(Z)|X = 01} · Pr{X = 01}
+Pr{w(X) = w(Z)|X = 10} · Pr{X = 10}
+Pr{w(X) = w(Z)|X = 11} · Pr{X = 11} (3.60)
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Pr{w(X) = w(Z)} = Pr{(w(Y1) = 0 ∧ w(Y2) = 0)} · (1− p)2 +
Pr{(w(Y1) = 0 ∧ w(Y2) = 0) ∨ (w(Y1) = 1 ∧ w(Y2) = 1)} · 2p(1− p) +
Pr{(w(Y1) = 0 ∧ w(Y2) = 0)}p2 (3.61)
Pr{w(X) = w(Z)} = Pr{[w(Y1) = 0 ∧ w(Y2) = 0]} · (1− p)2 +
2 · [Pr{(w(Y1) = 0 ∧ w(Y2) = 0) ∨ (w(Y1) = 1 ∧ w(Y2) = 1)} · p(1− p)] +
Pr{[w(Y1) = 0 ∧ w(Y2) = 0]} · p2 (3.62)
Pr{w(X) = w(Z)} = (1− q1)(1− q2)(1− p)2 +
((1− q1)(1− q2) + q1q2) · 2p(1− p) + (1− q1)(1− q2) · p2 (3.63)
Πi(q1, q2) = α · (q1 + q2) + βp · (q1 · q2) + γ i = {1, 2}
α = −1
βp = −2p2 + 2p + 1 (3.64)
γ = 1
Based on the utility of Eq. (3.64), it can be shown (Appendix A) that the best
response Bi(qj) of node i to a strategy qj of node j is given by Eq. (3.65), where Tp
is a threshold point that depends on βp from Eq. (3.64) (and hence on parameter
p, that is, the probability of an event under no attack). The intersection(s) of the
best response functions of the players (if any) provide the set of Nash equilibria of
the game. It can be shown based on Eqs. (3.64) and (3.65) that there are two pure
action Nash equilibria (q1,N , q2,N) for this game as given by Eq. (3.66), and that the
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resulting utility πi(q1,N , q2,N) for node i at each equilibrium is given by Eq. (3.67).
Bi(qj) = 0 if qj < Tp
Bi(qj) = 1 if qj > Tp
Tp =
1
βp
βp ∈ [1, 1.5] (3.65)
(q1,N , q2,N) = {(0, 0), (1, 1)} (3.66)
πi(0, 0) = 1 πi(1, 1) = βp − 1 (3.67)
To better illustrate the interaction of the hostile nodes and the consequences of
the game, Figure 23 depicts the stealth S utility manifold πi(q1, q2) between the two
hostile nodes over the entire domain of q1 and q2. The two Nash equilibria occur
at (q1,N , q2,N) = (0, 0) and (q1,N , q2,N) = (1, 1) as predicted via Eq. (3.66) and as
conﬁrmed by examining the best response intersections shown in Figure 24. We note
two salient features of this result which we will examine further:
1. In contrast with the direct stealthy attack, when each hostile node i is permitted
to choose its own attack parameter qi more than one pure Nash equilibrium
emerges. Speciﬁcally, for the n = 2 case in the direct stealthy attack, the
unique optimal value of q is q∗ = 0.999 ≈ 1 (for all values of p). However for
the n = 2 and independent qi’s case, two extreme optimal values of qi emerge.
One such value occurs at qi = 0 and the other at qi = 1, thus directing each
hostile node to attack either with probability 0 or with probability 1.
2. The threshold or dividing point Tp between the two equilibria depends solely on
the parameter βp and thus on the underlying probability of an event p which is
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Fig. 23. Stealth utility manifold for a hostile node i versus the full set of actions q1
and q2 for the case where p = 0.5. The two Nash equilibria for this game
occur at (0, 0) and (1, 1) and the Tp threshold is the saddle point.
not controlled by the hostile nodes and may not be known due to its dependence
on the legitimate node’s threshold Th.
We now expand upon the signiﬁcance of these two points. The emergence of a
second equilibrium and the dependence of a hostile node’s decision threshold Tp on p
raises two new questions. Namely we are presented with the question of how a hostile
node will select its action and with the question of which equilibrium will actually
occur. If the two hostile nodes have a means of direct communication, it suﬃces for
the two nodes to agree upon a common action where both nodes pick q = 0 or both
nodes pick q = 1. This type of attack with dynamic communication is examined in
the next section.4 Importantly, agreement between the two nodes may be reached
4We note that communication among the hostile nodes must also remain “stealthy”
(in a sense relevant to the given application) for the attack to go unnoticed overall.
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equilibria at the intersection points.
instead by means of strategy mixing. To describe the process of strategy mixing,
we assume for the moment that both hostile nodes can determine the probability
density function of the phenomenon (such as through observations over time) and
with an approximation of the threshold Th can thus obtain the approximate value of
the probability p. Despite this information, each hostile node still needs to know if
the other hostile node will choose a value of probability q below or above Tp to choose
its best q (Eq. (3.65)) given no communication.
In the absence of such knowledge, each hostile node may mix between its pure
optimal actions of q = 0 and q = 1 with some probability as shown in Figure 25. We
assume that Player 1 (hostile node 1) chooses action q1 = 0 with some probability x
and that it chooses q1 = 1 with probability 1 − x. Similarly, Player 2 (hostile node
2) chooses action q2 = 0 with probability y and q2 = 1 with probability 1 − y. The
new utility πi(x, y) obtained by node i based on its mixing variable x and the mixing
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Fig. 25. A mixed-action game with mixing probabilities x and y. The (u1, u2) numbers
inside each cell represent the utility of player 1 and 2 respectively.
variable of the other node y is given by Eq. (3.68). It can thus be shown that a third
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium emerges, where the optimal Nash x and y mixes are
given by Eq. (3.69) along with the corresponding utility πi(xN , yN) at equilibrium
given by Eq. (3.70).
πi(x, y) = xy + (1− x)(1− y)(βp − 1) (3.68)
(xN , yN) = (
1
βp
,
1
βp
) (3.69)
πi(xN , yN) =
1
βp
(3.70)
We make three key observations regarding this result. First we observe that the
mixing probabilities only depend on βp (and thus on the probability p) and do not
require the nodes to know each other’s actions. The second observation regarding
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the new mixed equilibrium reveals an interpretation for the Tp threshold dividing the
two pure action equilibria. We examine Eq. (3.64) and suppose that hostile node 1
plays with q1 set to Tp, that is, q1 = 1/βp. We observe that the resulting utility π2
for hostile node 2 is given by π2(q1 = Tp, q2) = 1 − 1/βp. Thus the utility of node 2
is independent of its own q2 selection or in other words, node 2 is indiﬀerent in its
q2. Furthermore, the achieved utility of 1 − 1/βp is equal to the utility achieved at
mixed equilibrium shown in Eq. (3.70). By the properties of mixed equilibria [56],
these two observations imply that the Tp threshold (saddle point in Figure 23) is
the mixed strategy equilibrium. Finally the third observation is that the range and
maximum value of the new utility πi(xN , yN) ∈ [0, 0.5] is generally smaller than the
range and maximum of the previous utility πi(q1,N , q2,N) ∈ [0, 1]. Eliminating direct
communication and eliminating implicit coordination (implemented via the qi = q
∀i condition) thus comes at the price of a decrease in the utility (i.e. stealth of the
attack) and can be understood as the associated cost.
Based on these three observations we obtain the following comparison between
the uncoordinated attack and the direct stealthy attack. The stealth S beneﬁt of
coordination via the qi = q ∀i condition is captured analytically through Eq. (3.70)
and can be seen directly in Figure 23 for the case of n = 2 hostile nodes. In Fig-
ure 23, the (q1, q2) = (1, 1) point results in the maximal (relative stealth measure)
S and corresponds to the coordinated attack. In the same ﬁgure, the saddle point
(q1, q2) = (1/βp, 1/βp) yields the lowest S and corresponds to the case of no coordi-
nation. Intuitively this loss in stealth performance stems from the uncertainty that
arises due to the existence of two possible pure Nash equilibria. For the hostile net-
work, this result captures the tradeoﬀ between coordination via the qi = q∀i condition
and between the achieved stealth S. For the legitimate network, this result signiﬁes
that hostile nodes do not need to communicate directly with each other to carry out
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a stealthy attack (where communication may presumably reveal the attack). In the
next section we explicitly examine the case of active hostile node communication.
2. Comparison with Active Communication Attack
We consider the situation where hostile nodes are able to communicate with each
other directly prior to an attack to select the optimal attack strategy to achieve a
power of attack while maintaining stealth. For this comparison we employ the power-
communication-detection PCD metric given in Eq. (3.71) which takes into account
the number of communications required for the attack. In the context of a stealthy
attack, the signiﬁcance of communication is that each use of it among the hostile
nodes may potentially reveal the attack to the legitimate network and thus requires
special methodologies (such as the use of spread spectrum covert communications).
PCD =
No. attacked nodes
(1 + No. communications) · (1 + PD) (3.71)
As in the case of the uncoordinated attack, for the comparison we assume that the
hostile nodes are able to estimate the probability density function of the phenomenon
and the local decision threshold Th of the legitimate nodes. Based on such knowledge
and based on its own local readings of the source O, each hostile node is able to decide
if its neighboring legitimate node will produce a decision bit of value 1 or 0 as given
in Eq. (3.1). Thus as a group, the hostile network is able to determine the weight w
that the legitimate nodes wish to report to the cluster head prior to the attack. We
denote this pristine weight prior to the attack by wx (in relation to the notation x
which denotes the pristine sensor decisions).
Importantly based on such group knowledge, H is able to achieve the maximal
power of attack Pa which is still stealthy (where Pa is the number of sensor decisions
that are altered). That is, each sensor decision may be ﬂipped from 1 to 0 or vice
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versa provided that the overall weight wx is maintained. As an example, if there are
ten sensors and three of them would report a 1 (i.e. n = 10 and wx = 3), then the
hostile network can ﬂip all three 1s to a value of 0 and ﬁnd three 0s to ﬂip to a 1.
Thus Pa = 3. If n = 10 and wx = 7, the hostile network can still only ﬂip three 1s to
a 0 and ﬁnd three 0s to ﬂip to a 1. The hostile network cannot ﬂip all seven 1’s to
0’s because of the “lack of zeros” to ﬂip back to ones. The power of the attack in the
second example is thus still Pa = 3. More generally, subject to the stealth constraint
S, H achieves the maximal power of attack Pa in the active communications case
which is given by Eq. (3.72).
Pa = min(wx, n− wx) (3.72)
This result however can only be achieved if the hostile nodes are able to commu-
nicate actively with each other, that is, they are able to exchange information on the
actual conditions that each hostile node encounters prior to the attack. We consider
a simpliﬁed communication algorithm to achieve this goal with the aim of obtaining
the minimum number of communications that are required for this process. The min-
imum is used mainly for simplicity of analysis and represents the best case scenario
for the active communications attack. In this communication algorithm, each hostile
node that has a bit of value 1 broadcasts its desire to do a “ﬂip” process. Each hostile
node with a value of 0 responds to one such broadcasting hostile node. If collisions
occur, any eﬃcient resolution process may be utilized. For instance, a broadcasting
node accepts the ﬁrst received bid, conﬁrms it and ends the broadcast. An example
of such a communication process is summarized in Algorithm 3 for each hostile node.
To estimate the minimum number of required communications however, we as-
sume that no collisions occur. Based on the assumption of no collisions, no acknowl-
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Algorithm 3 Example of a Communication Algorithm for each Hostile Node
Ensure: Power of the attack Pa must satisfy Pa = min(wx, n− wx)
1: Determine if the legitimate sensor will report a bit of value 1 or 0.
2: if legitimate sensor will report a bit of value 1 then
3: Broadcast to other hostile nodes that you have a 1, until bids are received.
4: Accept a bid (such as the ﬁrst bid) and end the broadcast.
5: else
6: Listen for broadcasts and issue bid (such as to closest broadcasting node).
7: if conﬁrmation from broadcasting node is received: then
8: Accept the match-up.
9: else
10: Return to step 6.
11: end if
12: end if
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edgements of the receipt of a bid are required. The communications are thus due
to the original broadcast calls from each node that has a bit 1. Thus the minimum
number of required communications under this paradigm is easily determined to be
min(wx, n− wx). Thus the PCD metric for the active communications attack which
we denote by PCDc is given by Eq. (3.73). The corresponding PCD metric for the
direct stealthy attack which we denote by PCDd is given by Eq. (3.74). As can be
seen, the direct stealthy attack does not incur any communication costs (it relies on
coordination instead). However it generally does not achieve the same maximal power
of attack Pa as the active communications attack. Indeed each hostile node attacks
with an optimal probability q∗ and the overall number of altered sensor decisions is
min(wy, n− wy) which may approximately equal min(nq∗, n− nq∗) on average for n
hostile nodes.
PCDc =
min(wx, n− wx)
(1 + min(wx, n− wx)) · (1 + PD) (3.73)
PCDd =
min(wy, n− wy)
1 · (1 + PD) (3.74)
The average power of the attack Pa for the active communications attack and the
direct stealthy attack are compared for various cluster sizes n and diﬀerent probabili-
ties p in Figure 26. We make some important observations regarding this result. First
we recall that the active communications attack achieves the maximal Pa that main-
tains perfect stealth S. The direct stealthy attack relies only on stealth coordination
and does not always satisfy S perfectly. Interestingly, the latter coordination tactic
actually translates into a higher power of attack Pa for smaller clusters n. Speciﬁ-
cally, the stealthy direct attack achieves a higher Pa than the active communications
attack for n ≤ 20 for p = 0.1 and for n ≤ 40 for p = 0.05. For higher values of
n, the stealth condition S dictates that a smaller probability of attack q∗ must be
utilized as shown in Section C. Thus the Pa of the direct stealthy attack tapers oﬀ
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Fig. 26. Comparison of the power of the attack Pa for various cluster sizes n and
probabilities p for the direct stealth attack (no communications) and the active
communications attack.
in tandem with increasing n. Interestingly, this gives rise to the phenomenon of an
almost constant level of Pa over n. Thus if examined by the legitimate network, this
constant “background” level of “error” could be mistaken for an inherent probability
of a fault associated with the sensor technology. The direct stealthy attack thus ex-
hibits stealth over the size of the cluster n. In contrast, the active communications
attack allows the entire hostile network to organize itself to meet the stealth condition
perfectly. Thus in the active communications attack, the hostile network is able to
keep increasing the power of the attack as the cluster size n increases. Finally we note
that as predicted in the analysis of Sections C and D, smaller values of probability
p favor the legitimate network by restricting the power of the attack that maintains
stealth.
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for the direct stealth attack (no communications) and the active communica-
tions attack.
Based on Figure 26 we conclude that the direct stealthy attack achieves a higher
Pa for smaller clusters n and that the active communications attack achieves higher
values of Pa for larger clusters n. The former attack may not always achieve perfect
stealth since it relies on coordination alone while the latter attack requires active com-
munication. We thus compare the two attacks in terms of their power-communication-
detection PCD metrics as shown in Figure 27.
As can be seen from Figure 27, once the number of required communications
and the probability of attack detection PD at the cluster head are also factored into
the comparison, the direct stealthy attack achieves a superior PCD performance for
n ≥ 2 for all values of probability p. This result is predominantly due to the increasing
number of required communications which grow in an aﬃne manner with increasing n.
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This outcome is signiﬁcant since the minimum number of required communications
was utilized for the comparison thus presenting a best case scenario for the active
communications attack. We thus conclude that for very small clusters, the active
communications attack produces a very small PCD advantage over the direct stealthy
attack. For larger clusters the communication overhead may be prohibitive and thus
favors the direct stealthy attack. Overall we conclude that the appeal of the direct
stealthy attack stems from three properties as compared with active communication:
1- it achieves a higher Pa for n ≤ 20, 2- it achieves a higher PCD over almost the
entire range of n and 3- it exhibits a constancy in Pa over n that may be mistaken
for inherent sensor faults.
Finally we make a brief but important observation regarding the implementabil-
ity of a stealthy hostile attack under the active communications paradigm. Namely,
we note that based on the stealth condition S, the active communication attack is
indeed implementable for the hostile nodes from a game theoretic perspective without
the need for special enforcement. We demonstrate this point through a leader-follower
example. In this example, the hostile node that communicates ﬁrst is called the leader
and it announces to the follower its choice of attack parameter. As shown in Figure 28,
the second node’s (the follower’s) optimal action is to always match the action of the
ﬁrst node in order to maximize its stealth utility. Thus the attack is implementable
in the sense that given an announcement from a subset of nodes, the remaining nodes
have no incentive to deviate from the strategy dictated by the leaders.
F. Chapter Summary
In this chapter we investigated the competing networks scenario for the case of a direct
stealthy attack perpetrated by a distributed hostile network. In the direct stealthy
84
Player 1
q2 =1 q2 =0q2 =1 q2 =0
Player 2
0 1 *1* 0
q1 =1 q1 =0
Fig. 28. To maintain stealth, the follower must match the leader.
attack each hostile node may attack a legitimate node with some probability chosen
such that the overall stealth of the hostile network is maintained. The persistence and
pervasiveness of the attack throughout the cluster causes incorrect individual sensor
decisions as well as errors in the collective decision at the cluster head. Attack detec-
tion and mitigation are made challenging by the distributed nature of the attacker,
the occurrence of the attack at the physical sensing layer and the lack of knowledge
concerning the speciﬁc actions of the attacker a priori.
The competitive interaction between the two networks is modeled as a game G
where we derive a stealth condition S and show its consistency and relevance for both
the hostile and the legitimate network in terms of attack detection and mitigation. For
the hostile network H we show how the stealth condition can be utilized to select the
optimal attack parameter for cases where the cluster size n and the sensor threshold
Th of the legitimate network L may not be known. For the legitimate network L we
show how the stealth condition yields the optimal defense parameters in terms of n
and Th and how this analysis enables the use of established detection tools such as the
Neyman-Pearson paradigm. In general, the optimal attack parameter decreases with
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increasing cluster size n and with decreasing probability of an event p. While this
improves attack mitigation by restricting the power of the attack Pa, it also makes
the attack less detectable at the cluster head and thus presents a detection-mitigation
trade-oﬀ for the legitimate network.
The direct stealthy attack does not require active communication among the
hostile nodes during the attack but rather depends on a level of coordination which we
quantify. Compared with the active communications case, we show that the stealthy
direct attack achieves a higher power of attack Pa for n ≤ 20 and a higher power-
communication-detection PCD metric for n ≥ 2. Importantly, the direct stealthy
attack exhibits a constancy in Pa over n that may be mistaken for inherent sensor
faults and is thus highly desirable for stealth.
Finally we note the role that encryption plays in the competing networks scenario.
Forward encryption between the sensors and the sink cannot protect against a hostile
attack due to its occurrence during data collection. Based on the role of the sensor
threshold Th in the stealth game, it is the backward encryption between the sink and
the sensors that plays a role in attack mitigation and discovery.
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CHAPTER IV
STEALTHY CROSS COMPETITION∗
A. Introduction and Motivation
In this chapter we investigate the competing sensor networks scenario for the case of
a stealthy cross attack. In a stealthy cross attack, each hostile node may attack one
or more legitimate nodes with some probability, causing an incorrect decision at the
sensor. Unlike in the direct stealthy attack however, based on hostile node deployment
and goals, two hostile nodes may both attack the same legitimate node. The cross
attack can cause errors in both the local sensor decisions and in the collective sensor
decision at the cluster head with ramiﬁcations for data acquisition. It is not clear
however if the cross attack is more beneﬁcial to the hostile network in terms of attack
power and stealth than the direct attack, or if the cross attack creates a form of
interference among the attackers that beneﬁts the legitimate network by lowering the
attacker’s performance.
To examine the ramiﬁcations of the cross attack for both the hostile and the
legitimate network, we model the interaction between the hostile nodes as a static
non-cooperative game. We derive the stealth utility for this scenario and show that
it is consistent for both the hostile and the legitimate networks. Based on the stealth
utility, the optimal attack and defense strategies are obtained for each network. For
the hostile network, we show that surprisingly there exist strategies for the cross
attack that achieve superior stealth for H than the direct stealthy attack without the
*Part of the material in this chapter is reprinted with permission from A. Czarlin-
ska and D. Kundur, “Reliable Scalar-Visual Event-Detection in Wireless Visual Sen-
sor Networks,” in Proc. IEEE Consumer Communications & Networking Conference
Special Session on Image/Video Processing & Wireless Sensor Networks, Las Vegas,
Nevada, January 2008, pp. 660–664. c© 2008 IEEE.
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need for communication. Furthermore there exists a unique attack strategy in the
cross attack which results in a superior power-communication-detection metric than
the direct attack.
For the legitimate network, we employ the derived stealth condition to obtain
the best defense strategies. We show how the cross attack presents a greater challenge
for L than the direct attack in terms of attack detection for both the optimal and
sub-optimal versions of the detector in the Neyman-Pearson paradigm. We demon-
strate however how analysis of the attack enables use of these established detection
techniques and produces a detection performance that agrees with the predictions of
the stealth condition.
B. System Model
We consider two competing sensor networks deployed in a common environment.
Based on deployment and goals, each hostile node may attack one or more legitimate
sensors with some probability. For analytical tractability of the cross attack, we focus
on a subset of the cluster’s nodes. That is we focus on the case of two hostile nodes
h1 and h2 deployed in the vicinity of two legitimate sensors l1 and l2 as shown in
Figure 29.
As in the case of the direct stealthy attack, the data acquisition model of each
sensor is given by Eq. (4.1) and the resulting sensors decisions xi are modeled as
Bernoulli random variables with distribution Xi ∼ Bern(p). In this context, x de-
notes the decision vector received from the sensors by the cluster head as given in
Eq. (4.2).
xi = γ(oi) = I{oi≥Th} s.t p =
∫ ∞
Th
f0(α)dα (4.1)
Each hostile node hi may attack one or both of the legitimate sensors l1 and l2
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Fig. 29. Stealthy cross attack model.
with some probability. The realization of the attack of hostile node hi is denoted by
yi = [yi,1, yi,2] where yi,1 denotes the attack of hi on the legitimate sensor l1 and where
yi,2 denotes hi’s attack on the legitimate sensor l2 as given in Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4).
x = [x1, x2] xi ∈ {0, 1} (4.2)
y1 = [y1,1, y1,2] y1,i ∈ {0, 1} (4.3)
y2 = [y2,1, y2,2] y2,i ∈ {0, 1} (4.4)
More speciﬁcally, the cross attack enables each hostile node to choose one of four
possible attack vectors yi. That is, each hostile node hi may attack neither l1 nor l2,
attack l1 but not l2, attack l2 but not l1 or attack both l1 and l2. For each hostile
node hi, each of these four attack vectors is deﬁned as shown in Eqs. (4.5) to (4.8).
a  [y1,1, y1,2] = [0, 0], a˜  [y2,1, y2,2] = [0, 0] (4.5)
b  [y1,1, y1,2] = [0, 1], b˜  [y2,1, y2,2] = [0, 1] (4.6)
c  [y1,1, y1,2] = [1, 0], c˜  [y2,1, y2,2] = [1, 0] (4.7)
d  [y1,1, y1,2] = [1, 1], d˜  [y2,1, y2,2] = [1, 1] (4.8)
To perpetrate a stealthy attack based on the possible attack vectors, each hostile
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node must thus assign an optimal attack probability to each possible attack vector
as shown in Eqs. (4.9) to (4.12). Thus the action set of hostile node h1 consists of
an assignment of attack probabilities q = [q1, q2, q3, q4] where Σ
4
i=1qi = 1 as shown in
Eq. (4.14). Similarly, the action set of hostile node h2 consists of an assignment of
probabilities q˜ = [q˜1, q˜2, q˜3, q˜4] where Σ
4
i=1q˜i = 1 as shown in Eq. (4.15).
Pr{a}  q1 Pr{a˜}  q˜1 (4.9)
Pr{b}  q2 Pr{b˜}  q˜2 (4.10)
Pr{c}  q3 Pr{c˜}  q˜3 (4.11)
Pr{d}  q4 Pr{d˜}  q˜4 (4.12)
Σ4i=1qi = 1 Σ
4
i=1q˜i = 1 (4.13)
q = [q1, q2, q3, q4] (4.14)
q˜ = [q˜1, q˜2, q˜3, q˜4] (4.15)
The eﬀect of the attack upon the decisions of the sensor nodes is modeled via
Eq. (4.16). In Eq. (4.16), X is the pristine data vector when the cross attack is not
present, Y1 is the attack vector of hostile node h1, Y2 is the attack vector of hostile
node h2 and ⊕ is modulo 2 addition.
Z = X⊕Y1 ⊕Y2 (4.16)
Based on the attack model of Eq. (4.16) and the goal of the hostile network to
misguide the legitimate network while minimizing the chance of attack detection, we
obtain the requirement for stealth as given by deﬁnition 4. Importantly, the stealth
condition Sc for the cross attack deﬁned in Eq. (4.17) depends on the probability p
of an event (which depends on the underlying threshold Th selection at the sensors),
as well as on the attack selections q and q˜ of each hostile nodes.
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Definition 4 The stealth condition Sc of the hostile sensor network H for the cross
attack is given by Eq. (4.17) where w is the weight of a vector and is deﬁned as
w(ξ)
.
=
∑n
i=1 ξi for a vector ξ of length n.
Sc = Pr{w(Zp,q,q˜) = w(Xp)} (4.17)
The interactions between the two hostile nodes h1 and h2 with consequences
for the legitimate network L are modeled as a static non-cooperative game Gc as
given by deﬁnition 5. Importantly, the interaction between the hostile nodes in Gc is
non-cooperative in the game theoretic sense signifying that the hostile nodes do not
utilize any form of binding or enforceable contract between them in order to reach
the common stealth goal. Rather, each hostile node hi selects an action from its
action set Ai to achieve maximal stealth utility ui(p,q, q˜) while choosing this action
independently of the other hostile node.
Definition 5 The stealthy cross game is given by:
Gc = 〈Γ, A, U〉 = 〈{h1, h2}, {A1, A2}, {u1, u2}〉 (4.18)
A1 = {q : Σ4i=1qi = 1} A2 = {q˜ : Σ4i=1q˜i = 1} (4.19)
u1(p,q, q˜) = u2(p,q, q˜) = Pr{w(Zp,q,q˜) = w(Xp)} (4.20)
To solve the cross attack game and obtain the optimal actions of each hostile
node, we are looking for best response functions B1(q˜
∗) and B2(q∗) where the notation
Ba(b) denotes the best response B of player a to the opponents best strategy b as
given by Eqs. (4.21) and (4.22) respectively.
B1(q˜
∗) = arg max q:Σ4i=1qi=1 Pr{w(Zp,q,q˜) = w(Xp)} (4.21)
B2(q
∗) = arg max q˜:Σ4i=1q˜i=1 Pr{w(Zp,q,q˜) = w(Xp)} (4.22)
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C. Stealthy Attack Results
In this section we analyze and solve the cross stealthy attack game Gc from deﬁnition
5. We begin by obtaining the stealth condition Sc from Eq. (4.17) and by deﬁning the
notion of pure and mixed actions of the hostile nodes in the game Gc as they pertain
to the solution of the cross stealthy attack problem.
Definition 6 An action q of hostile node h1 where q = [q1, q2, q3, q4] is an assignment
of probabilities q1, q2, q3 and q4 such that Σ
4
i=1qi = 1 and q1, q2, q3, q4 > 0. Similarly
an action q˜ of hostile node h2 is an assignment of probabilities q˜1, q˜2, q˜3 and q˜4 such
that Σ4i=1q˜i = 1 and q˜1, q˜2, q˜3, q˜4 > 0.
Definition 7 A pure action qPk (or q˜Pk) is an assignment of probabilities q1, ..., q4
(or q˜1, ..., q˜4) such that the kth element carries probability 1 and the remaining ele-
ments carry probability 0. For instance, qP1 is the pure action vector [q1, q2, q3, q4] =
[1, 0, 0, 0] and q˜P3 is the pure action vector [q˜1, q˜2, q˜3, q˜4] = [0, 0, 1, 0].
Definition 8 A mixed action qM = [q1, q2, q3, q4] (or q˜M = [q˜1, q˜2, q˜3, q˜4]) is an as-
signment of probabilities that is not a pure action. For example, [q1, q2, q3, q4] =
[0.5, 0, 0.5, 0] is a mixed action as is [q˜1, q˜2, q˜3, q˜4] = [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25].
Example 1 An action q = [0.25, 0.75, 0, 0] signiﬁes that hostile node h1 will actuate
according to strategy a as deﬁned in Eq. (4.5) with probability 0.25 and according to
strategy b as deﬁned in Eq. (4.6) with probability 0.75. This is thus a mixed strategy
on the part of h1.
We proceed to obtain the stealth condition Sc for the cross attack by expressing
it in terms of the underlying probabilities as shown in Eqs. (4.23) and (4.24) with the
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result of the simpliﬁcation shown via Eq. (4.25) to Eq. (4.29).
Sc = Pr{w(Zp,q,q˜) = w(Xp)} = Pr{w(Xp) = w(Zp,q,q˜)|X = 00} · Pr{X = 00}
+Pr{w(Xp) = w(Zp,q,q˜)|X = 01} · Pr{X = 01}
+Pr{w(Xp) = w(Zp,q,q˜)|X = 10} · Pr{X = 10}
+Pr{w(Xp) = w(Zp,q,q˜)|X = 11} · Pr{X = 11}(4.23)
Sc = (q1q˜1 + q2q˜2 + q3q˜3 + q4q˜4) · (1− p)2 + 2p(1− p) ·
(q1q˜1 + q2q˜2 + q3q˜3 + q4q˜4 + q2q˜3 + q3q˜2 + q4q˜1 + q1q˜4) +
p2 · (q1q˜1 + q2q˜2 + q3q˜3 + q4q˜4) (4.24)
Sc = αβp + δp(α + γ) (4.25)
α = q1q˜1 + q2q˜2 + q3q˜3 + q4q˜4 (4.26)
γ = q2q˜3 + q3q˜2 + q4q˜1 + q1q˜4 (4.27)
βp = 1− 2p + 2p2 (4.28)
δp = 2p(1− p) (4.29)
We note however that that the terms βp and δp obey the relationship βp + δp = 1
thus leading to the simpliﬁcation shown in Eq. (4.30) where ui is the stealth utility
of each hostile node hi.
Sc = ui(p,q, q˜) = α + γ · δp δp ∈ [0, 0.5], i ∈ {1, 2} (4.30)
1. Attack Analysis
Based on the stealth condition Sc from Eq. (4.30) we set out to identify the optimal
actions of each hostile node that result in the maximization of the stealth condition.
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Proposition 1 The best response of a hostile node hi to a pure action of hostile node
hj in the stealthy cross attack game Gc is a matching pure action. That is,
B1(q˜Pk) = qPk
B2(qPk) = q˜Pk (4.31)
The four resulting pure action Nash equilibria are thus given by Eq. (4.32) where
the subscript N denotes a Nash equilibrium.
(qN, q˜N) = (qPk, q˜Pk) k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (4.32)
The resulting utility ui for hostile node hi ∈ {1, 2} is given by Eq. (4.33)
ui(qN, q˜N) = 1 (4.33)
Proof 11 We note that the utilities for hostile nodes h1 and h2 given by u1 and
u2 from Eq. (4.30) can be re-written as shown in Eq. (4.34) and (4.35) where the
dependence on probability p is not emphasized explicitly in the notation.
u1(q, q˜) = q1(q˜1 + δpq˜4)
+ q2(q˜2 + δpq˜3)
+ q3(q˜3 + δpq˜2)
+ q4(q˜4 + δpq˜1) (4.34)
u2(q, q˜) = q˜1(q1 + δpq4)
+ q˜2(q2 + δpq3)
+ q˜3(q3 + δpq2)
+ q˜4(q4 + δpq1) (4.35)
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Based on Eq. (4.34), a pure strategy qPk by h1 results in utility u2 = q˜k+δpq˜m for
hostile node h2 where m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} excludes k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The proof is completed
by noticing that δp ∈ [0, 0.5]. Therefore given any pure action qPk, the best response
of node h2 is to match with a pure strategy of the same value of k. This results in a
utility of 1 for each player. Similarly based on Eq. (4.35), given any pure action q˜Pk,
node h1 faces a utility u1 = qk + δpqm where m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} excludes k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Thus the best response of node h1 is to match the pure action with the same k.
Example 2 Suppose that node h1 plays with pure action qP2 = [0, 1, 0, 0]. Hostile
node h2 thus faces the following utility u2 = q˜1(0 + δp0) + q˜2(1 + δp0) + q˜3(0 + δp1) +
q˜4(0 + δp0) = q˜2 + δpq˜3. Since δp ∈ [0, 0.5], the unique best response choice is to set
q˜2 = 1. Given the choice of q˜2 = 1, hostile node h1 has no incentive to deviate from
its original strategy of q2 = 1 since it faces the utility u1 = q1(0+ δp0)+ q2(1+ δp0)+
q3(0 + δp1) + q4(0 + δp0) = q2 + δpq3.
In general we can conclude that a choice of a pure strategy by one of the hostile
nodes induces a matching pure strategy in the second hostile node.
Proposition 2 A mixed strategy equilibrium exists in the stealthy cross attack game
Gc iﬀ the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
1. Player 1 assigns equal probabilities qi = k to the non-zero components of his
action vector.
2. Player 2 assigns the same equal probabilities to his action vector as player 1.
This leads to the existence of multiple mixed equilibria with varying utilities ui < 1
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof 12 Let I = {i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} : qi = 0} and let k = 1/|I| where | · | denotes the
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cardinality of the set. Without loss of generality, assume that player 1 is hostile node
h1 and that player 2 is hostile node h2.
We begin by considering the case where |I| = 4, that is, there are no elements with
assigned probability of 0 in the action vector. In this case, the equal probability assign-
ment (requirement 1) results in the action vector of h1 given by qM = [q1, q2, q3, q4] =
[k, k, k, k] where k = 1/4. This assignment results in a utility for h2 given by
u2 = q˜1(k+ δpk)+ q˜2(k+ δpk)+ q˜3(k+ δpk)+ q˜5(k+ δpk) = k(1+ δp)(q˜1 + q˜2 + q˜3 + q˜4).
Since Σ41=1q˜i = 1, we note that any distribution of probabilities among the q˜i’s results
in a utility u2 = k(1+ δp) = 1/4 · (1+ δp). Thus h2 is indiﬀerent between his/her mix
of probability assignments q˜M.
However we observe that only the mix q˜M = [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4] results in a
mixed Nash equilibrium. To see this, assume that at least one of the q˜i assignments
is larger than the others. For example, q˜1 is larger than the other components, say
q˜M = [1/2, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6]. Then by examining Eq. (4.34), it is easy to see that h1’s
best response is to alter its mix, setting q1 = 1 and q2 = 0, q3 = 0 and q4 = 0. This
action in turn induces h2’s best response q˜1 = 1. The only stable situation leading
to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is the one where player 2 matches the equal
distribution of player 1. If these conditions are not met, the situation degenerates to
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The proof for |I| = 3, 2 and 1 follows the same
methodology though the case of |I| = 3 deserves further mention due the interesting
role of δp.
For the |I| = 3 case, assume without loss of generality that q1 = q2 = q3 = 1/3
and that q4 = 0. The resulting utility u1 faced by node h1 is thus u2 = 1/3 · q˜1 + 1/3 ·
(1 + δp)q˜2 + 1/3 · (1 + δp)q˜3 + 1/3 · δpq˜4. If δp = 0, u2 = 1/3 · q˜1 + 1/3 · q˜2 + 1/3 · q˜3.
Thus player h2 is indiﬀerent between allocations to q˜1, q˜2 and q˜3. An allocation of
q˜1 = q˜2 = q˜3 results in a mixed equilibrium. An allocation of q˜1 > q˜2 > q˜3 results in
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a degeneration to a pure strategy involving q1 and q˜1. An allocation of q˜1 = q˜2 > q˜3
results in a degeneration to a mixed equilibrium involving equal mixing between q1
and q2 for h1 and q˜1 and q˜2 for h2. However an interesting development occurs when
δp = 0 in u2 = 1/3 · q˜1 + 1/3 · (1 + δp)q˜2 + 1/3 · (1 + δp)q˜3 + 1/3 · δpq˜4. For any value
of δp ∈ [0, 0.5], 1/3 · (1 + δp)q˜i ≥ 1/3 · q˜i > 1/3 · δpq˜i. Therefore the node is only
indiﬀerent between two and not three of the strategies. In this case h2 is indiﬀerent
between q˜2 and q˜3. If h2 mixes among these actions with equal probability then this
case degenerates to |I| = 2, otherwise it degenerates to |I| = 1.
Summary of Results:
• Case |I| = 4. There is a unique mixed Nash strategy equilibrium at (qP, q˜P)
where qP = q˜P = [k, k, k, k] with k = 1/4. The associated relative stealth
utility ui = 1/4 · (1 + δp) for all i ∈ [1, 2].
• Case |I| = 3. If δp = 0 (which corresponds to the case of p = 0 or p = 1), there
are four mixed Nash strategy equilibria for this case where there is a single zero
component in an action vector. These are given by: qP = q˜P = [0, k, k, k],
qP = q˜P = [k, 0, k, k], qP = q˜P = [k, k, 0, k] and qP = q˜P = [k, k, k, 0] for
k = 1/3. If however δp = 0, no mixed equilibria exist in this case. Indeed in
the presence of δp, the pure equilibria reduce to those for the case of |I| = 2.
In the case where the triplet does exist, the associated relative stealth utility
ui = 1/3 · (1 + 2/3 · δp) for all i ∈ [1, 2].
• Case |I| = 2. There are six mixed Nash strategy equilibria for this case with
two zero components in an action vector. These are given by qP = q˜P =
[k, 0, 0, k], qP = q˜P = [0, k, k, 0], qP = q˜P = [k, k, 0, 0], qP = q˜P = [0, 0, k, k],
qP = q˜P = [k, 0, k, 0] and qP = q˜P = [0, k, 0, k] with k = 1/2. Based on
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the structure of the stealth condition, the ﬁrst two doublets result in a relative
stealth utility ui = 1/2 · (1+ δp) for all i ∈ [1, 2]. The remaining doublets result
in a relative stealth utility ui = 1/2 for all i ∈ [1, 2]. Thus the average utility
experienced by the hostile nodes while carrying out a doublet attack is given
by u¯i = 1/2 · (1 + 1/3 · δp) for all i ∈ [1, 2].
• Case |I| = 1. This case is the pure strategy case. There are four pure strategy
Nash equilibria for this case of three zero components in an action vector. These
are given by qP = q˜P = [k, 0, 0, 0], qP = q˜P = [0, k, 0, 0], qP = q˜P = [0, 0, k, 0]
and qP = q˜P = [0, 0, 0, k] where k = 1. The associated relative stealth utility
ui = 1 for all i ∈ [1, 2].
Thus based on analysis of the stealth condition Sc we have obtained the optimal
actions of each hostile node which are chosen independently of the other hostile node.
In the next section we investigate the signiﬁcance of these results for the hostile
network.
2. Attack Performance
In this section we investigate the performance implications of the optimal attack
strategies of each hostile node with special emphasis on the role of pure and mixed
actions and their eﬀect on the stealth and power of the attack.
We begin by observing that unlike in the direct stealthy attack, the optimal choice
of each hostile node is not unique even if each node is restricted to the selection of only
pure equilibria. That is, based on the results of proposition 1, there are four possible
pure Nash equilibria given by (qN, q˜N) = (qPk, q˜Pk) for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Based on
these pure equilibria, to maximize the stealth utility Sc the hostile nodes must attack
with the same attack vector. For the k = 1 pure equilibrium attack for instance, both
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Fig. 30. (a) Best response functions of h1 and h2 showing the emergence of two (out
of the possible four) pure equilibria. (b) Comparison of stealth Sc for various
strategy types.
hostile nodes must not attack l1 or l2. For the k = 4 pure equilibrium attack, both
hostile nodes must attack l1 and l2. This result is illustrated in Figure 30a which
depicts a sample case of the best response functions of hostile nodes h1 and h2. In
Figure 30a, the actions of hostile node h1 are set to q3 = q4 = 0, q1 = g and q2 = 1−g.
Thus h1 must select a parameter g ∈ [0, 1] to achieve the best stealth utility. Hostile
node h2 is utilizing actions q˜3 = q˜4 = 0, q˜1 = h and q˜2 = 1− h. Thus h2 must select
a parameter h ∈ [0, 1] to maximize its stealth utility. As shown in Figure 30a, if h1
chooses g = 0, then h2’s optimal choice is to select h = 0 and if h1 chooses g = 1
then h2’s optimal choice is to select h = 1. These two cases of optimal selection lead
to the emergence of two of the four pure action Nash equilibria, namely the (q, q˜)
equilibrium where q = [1, 0, 0, 0] and q˜ = [1, 0, 0, 0] and the (q, q˜) equilibrium where
q = [0, 1, 0, 0] and q˜ = [0, 1, 0, 0].
This matching actions result stems directly from the requirement of maximizing
the stealth of the hostile network during the attack. However this result carries signif-
icant implications for the power of the attack Pa under the pure actions equilibrium
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which we state in remark 3.
Remark 3 The set of pure action equilibria given by (qN, q˜N) = (qPk, q˜Pk) for
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} between hostile nodes h1 and h2 maximize the stealth Sc of the attack
achieving the maximal stealth of ui = 1 for i ∈ {1, 2}. However the resulting power
of the attack Pa stemming from the pure action equilibria yields Pa = 0. The pure
action equilibria of the hostile nodes in the cross stealthy attack thus correspond to the
case of interference for the hostile nodes and as such, they are an undesirable attack
condition.
To understand remark 3 we recall that each hostile node actuates in the vicinity
of a legitimate node to distort and alter the observation oi of sensor i regarding the
source O. In the case of the direct stealthy attack, each hostile node performs the
attack in the vicinity of a unique legitimate sensor. However in the cross stealthy
attack with pure action equilibria, two hostile nodes are both attacking the same
legitimate sensor(s). Each hostile node i thus not only senses the source O but also
the actuation created by the other hostile node j. Since the goal of each hostile
node is to ﬂip the decision of the legitimate sensor (from 1 to 0 and vice versa),
each hostile node performs actuation designed to reverse xi based on the perceived
conditions. Thus while hostile node i attempts to ﬂip the decision from a to b, hostile
node j attempts to ﬂip the decision from b to a resulting in interference and a power
of attack Pa = 0. The resulting stealth utility of ui = 1 can thus be understood
as achieving stealth in the attack by eﬀectively not attacking the decisions of the
legitimate network due to interference. From the perspective of the hostile network
H, the pure action equilibria should thus be avoided. The general trade-oﬀ between
stealth Sc and the power of the attack Pa will be further detailed in this section.
Next we wish to consider the role of mixed Nash equilibria in attaining stealth
100
and a power of attack. As shown in Section C-1, mixed strategy equilibria are also
not unique. Indeed there are three categories or “types” of mixed equilibria: the
doublet, the triplet and the quadruplet (the fourth type of equilibrium is the pure
equilibrium but it is not a mixed equilibrium). The doublet category for instance
includes all the mixed equilibria where each hostile node mixes among two pure
actions. Importantly we note that in order to reach a mixed equilibrium of the doublet
type, each hostile node must utilize the same probability mix for its actions as shown
in proposition 2. As a counterexample, q = [1/2, 1/2, 0, 0] and q˜ = [1/2, 0, 1/2, 0]
is not a doublet equilibrium since each node is mixing among diﬀerent pure actions
(although with equal probability). As a second counterexample, q = [1/2, 1/2, 0, 0]
and q˜ = [3/4, 1/4, 0, 0] is also not an equilibrium since the two nodes are not using the
same probability assignment although they are mixing among the same pure actions.
The stealth condition Sc of Eq. (4.30) predicts the relative level of stealth for
all mixed equilibria by equilibrium type as shown in Table II where the heading
“Strategy” shows a sample action of hostile node h1 that ﬁts into the given “Strategy
Type”. We make an important observation regarding the levels of relative stealth
shown in Table II. We note that mixing among fewer strategies produces a higher
relative level of stealth Sc. Speciﬁcally, mixing among two strategies is better for
the attacker than mixing among three strategies. Mixing among three strategies is
in turn better than mixing among four strategies. We note that “mixing” with only
one strategy (i.e. employing a pure action) performs best in terms of stealth but
corresponds to Pa = 0 as discussed in remark 3. This result is depicted in Figure 30b
where the stealth Sc utilities are shown over the entire range of probability p of an
event. As can be seen from Figure 30b, the stealth utility improves with a decreased
level of mixing and this pattern is maintained over the entire range of probability p.
Next we wish to make an important observation regarding the role of the prob-
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Table II. Comparison of Stealth Condition for Strategy Types
Strategy Type Strategy Stealth
pure q1 = 1 1
doublet q1 = q2 = 1/2 (1/2)(1 + (1/3)δp)
triplet q1 = q2 = q3 = 1/3 (1/3)(1 + (2/3)δp)
quadruplet q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 = 1/4 (1/4)(1 + δp)
ability p of an event based on the probability density function of the underlying
phenomenon and based on the local sensor threshold Th. We observe that as shown
in Table II and in Figure 30b, the stealth Sc utility of each hostile node depends on
the parameter δp where δp = 2p(1− p) from Eq. (4.29) and where δp ∈ [0, 0.5]. Since
δp achieves its maximal value of δp = 0.5 at p = 0.5, this is the best case scenario
for the hostile H network in terms of relative stealth and conversely the worst case
scenario for the legitimate L network. On the other hand, values of probability p that
are closest to p = 0 or p = 1 constitute the best case for the legitimate network. This
result is consistent with the direct stealthy attack where the local sensor threshold
Th was set so as to result in a small or large probability p as given in Algorithm 2.
Thus we note that the stealth condition Sc for the cross stealthy attack is consistent
for both the legitimate and the hostile network.
Finally we wish to determine the overall performance of the cross stealthy attack
in terms of both the resulting stealth Sc and in terms of the power of attack Pa for
the various strategy types. We begin by noting that under the cross attack model
of Eq. (4.16), legitimate sensor l1 makes a decision Z1 as given by Eq. (4.36) while
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legitimate sensor l2 makes a decision Z2 as given by Eq. (4.37).
Z1 = X1 ⊕ Y11 ⊕ Y21 = X1 ⊕ Y¯1 (4.36)
Z2 = X2 ⊕ Y22 ⊕ Y12 = X2 ⊕ Y¯2 (4.37)
To analyze the power of the attack Pa we wish to determine the resulting proba-
bility mass functions for Y¯1 and Y¯2 in Eqs. (4.36) and (4.37). We proceed by writing
Y¯1 in terms of the probabilities of the underlying events as shown in Eq. (4.38) to
(4.41). The ﬁnal probability mass function is given by Eqs. (4.42) and (4.43).
Pr{Y¯1 = 1} = Pr{(a and c˜) or (a and d˜)
or (b and c˜) or (b and d˜)
or (c and a˜) or (c and b˜)
or (d and a˜) or (d and b˜)} (4.38)
Pr{Y¯1 = 1} = Pr{(a and (c˜ or d˜))
or (b and (c˜ or d˜))
or (c and (a˜ or b˜))
or (d and (a˜ or b˜)) (4.39)
Pr{Y¯1 = 1} = Pr{(a ∪ b) ∩ (c˜ ∪ d˜)}+ Pr{(c ∪ d) ∩ (a˜ ∪ b˜)} (4.40)
Pr{Y¯1 = 1} = Pr{a ∪ b} · Pr{c˜ ∪ d˜}+ Pr{c ∪ d} · Pr{a˜ ∪ b˜} (4.41)
Pr{Y¯1 = 1}  Q1 = (q1 + q2) · (q˜3 + q˜4) + (q3 + q4) · (q˜1 + q˜2) (4.42)
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Y¯1 =


1 w.p Q1
0 w.p 1−Q1
(4.43)
A similar analysis may be performed to obtain the probability mass function for
Y¯2 which we show here in its entirety for completeness:
Pr{Y¯2 = 1} = Pr{(a and b˜) or (a and d˜)
or (b and a˜) or (b and c˜)
or (c and b˜) or (c and d˜)
or (d and a˜) or (d and c˜)} (4.44)
Pr{Y¯2 = 1} = Pr{(a and (b˜ or d˜))
or (b and (a˜ or c˜))
or (c and (b˜ or d˜))
or (d and (a˜ or c˜)) (4.45)
Pr{Y¯2 = 1} = Pr{(a ∪ c) ∩ (b˜ ∪ d˜)}+ Pr{(b ∪ d) ∩ (a˜ ∪ c˜)} (4.46)
Pr{Y¯2 = 1} = Pr{a ∪ c} · Pr{b˜ ∪ d˜}+ Pr{b ∪ d} · Pr{a˜ ∪ c˜} (4.47)
Pr{Y¯2 = 1}  Q2 = (q1 + q3) · (q˜2 + q˜4) + (q2 + q4) · (q˜1 + q˜3) (4.48)
Y¯2 =


1 w.p Q2
0 w.p 1−Q2
(4.49)
The power of the cross stealthy attack based on these results is thus given by
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Table III. Comparison of the Expected Power of Attack E[Pa] for Strategy Types
Strategy Type Strategy E[Pa]
pure q1 = 1 0
doublet q1 = q2 = 1/2 1/3
triplet q1 = q2 = q3 = 1/3 2/5
quadruplet q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 = 1/4 1/2
Eqs. (4.50) and (4.51) where Pa(li) denotes the power of the attack by the hostile
network upon legitimate node li.
Pa(l1) = Q1 (4.50)
Pa(l2) = Q2 (4.51)
Based on Eqs. (4.50) and (4.51) and the list of all pure, doublet, triplet and
quadruplet equilibria as given in proposition 2, the average expected power of the
attack E[Pa] for each strategy type can be determined. The results are shown in
Table III where we observe that unlike in the case of the stealth Sc, the average
power of the attack increases with an increase in the mixing that the hostile nodes
perform. Thus by increasing the level of mixing, the hostile nodes are decreasing their
stealth while simultaneously increasing the power of the attack. It is thus not clear a
priori which alternative produces the better overall result for the hostile network.
To investigate this trade-oﬀ between the level of stealth Sc and the power of the
attack Pa, we employ the joint power-communication-detection PCD metric shown
in Eq. (4.52). We note that in the stealthy cross attack the hostile nodes do not
explicitly communicate with each other and hence the number of communications
utilized is zero. We also note that the probability of attack detection PD is related
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various strategy types over the range of probability p of an event for the cross
attack.
to the stealth condition Sc via the relationship PD = 1 − Sc where we recall that
the stealth condition is a relative measure of avoiding detection. We thus obtain the
PCD as experienced by legitimate sensors l1 and l2 as given in Eqs. (4.53) and (4.54).
PCD =
No. attacked nodes
(1 + No. communications) · (1 + PD) (4.52)
PCDL1 =
Q1
1 · (1 + PD) (4.53)
PCDL2 =
Q2
1 · (1 + PD) (4.54)
The results of the PCD comparison are displayed in Figure 31 where the average
power-communication-detection metric is shown over the range of probability p for
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the various strategy types. As seen in Figure 31, when both the stealth and the power
of the attack are taken into account, the quadruplet strategy performs better than all
the other strategies over the entire range of probability p, followed by the triplets, the
doublets and ﬁnally the pure strategies. This result is very signiﬁcant for the hostile
network in terms of optimal attack selection. As noted in proposition 2, the equilibria
for both the pure actions case and the mixed actions case are not unique. However
when the overall performance is considered via the PCD metric, the optimal choice
is that of a quadruplet. This is signiﬁcant since there exists only one quadruplet
equilibrium, namely the (q, q˜) equilibrium where q = [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4] and where
q˜ = [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4]. Thus there exists a unique optimal solution that each hostile
node hi can implement to achieve the optimal stealth and power of attack trade-oﬀ.
This result is summarized in remark 4.
Remark 4 For the stealthy cross attack game, the unique optimal action of each hos-
tile node hi is to attack according to the quadruplet mix given by q = [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4]
for h1 and by q˜ = [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4] for h2 in order to achieve the best stealth Sc and
power of attack Pa trade-oﬀ.
3. Attack Implications
Analysis of the stealthy cross attack demonstrates that there exist multiple pure
and mixed strategy Nash equilibria for the hostile network and that these equilibria
achieve diﬀerent levels of performance in terms of the stealth Sc, in terms of the power
of attack Pa and in terms of the joint power-communication-detection PCD metric.
Based on its deployment and goals, the hostile network may thus generate a strategy
priority list for the equilibria that it wishes to implement in order to achieve a desired
performance based on a given metric. To achieve the optimal PCD performance for
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instance, the hostile network prefers to implement the following equilibria listed in
order of decreasing PCD performance and thus decreasing attack preference: 1− the
unique quadruplet equilibrium, 2− a triplet equilibrium, 3− a doublet equilibrium
and 4− a pure equilibrium. Importantly, the order of the preference list changes
depending on the performance metric of interest.
In this section we wish to consider the coordination ramiﬁcations of a strategy
preference list (such as the PCD preference list) for hostile nodes that are deployed
in an environment for the purposes of a stealthy cross attack where each hostile node
makes decisions that are independent of the other hostile node. To facilitate the
exposition, we discuss the ramiﬁcations with respect to a 2D grid-based world and
discuss the implications for general deployments. Speciﬁcally, we initially interpret
the 2D world as being comprised of a grid where nodes (hostile or legitimate) are
placed at the nodes of the grid and where mobility occurs along the edges of the
grid. A sample scenario is illustrated in Figure 32 where two hostile nodes h1 and
h2 (marked by squares) are deployed in the vicinity of two legitimate nodes l1 and
l2 (marked by circles). In this context, the goal of the hostile nodes is to achieve a
stealthy cross attack at the next time step irrespective of the current conﬁguration
(the current conﬁguration of the four nodes may not be an equilibrium point for the
hostile network in terms of attack stealth or attack PCD). To simplify the exposition
we employ the following deﬁnitions and assumptions.
1. The actuation radius a.r of each hostile node hi is normalized to a.r = 1.
2. The sensing radius s.r of each legitimate sensor li is normalized to s.r = 1.
3. Each edge of a grid joining two node points is of normalized grid length g.l = 1.
4. Within a single time step, each hostile node hi traverses a distance equal to one
108
h2
h1
(a) (b)
h1
h21/3
1/3
1/3
1/3 1/4
1/4
1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4
1/4
1/61/6
1/4
1/6
1/6
l2
l1
l1 l2
Fig. 32. (a) Implementation of triplet (a, b, c) and (a˜, b˜, c˜). (b) Implementation of
quadruplet (a, b, c, d) and (a˜, b˜, c˜, d˜).
grid length, that is, a grid distance of g.l = 1.
These simplifying assumptions can be understood in relation to the scenarios
depicted in Figures 32a and 32b. In both Figures 32a and 32b, neither of the hostile
nodes h1 or h2 is currently in a location from which it can perpetrate an attack on
either of l1 or l2 based on the assumption that a.r = 1 and s.r = 1. Thus if none
of the hostile or legitimate nodes move, the hostile nodes are eﬀectively in a position
to implement attack strategy a and a˜ from Eq. (4.9), that is, q = [1, 0, 0, 0] and
q˜ = [1, 0, 0, 0]. For the general case of legitimate and hostile node deployment in the
2D grid world, the hostile nodes require a mechanism for implementing the attack
equilibria on the priority list. We wish to investigate the implications stemming from
this need in terms of the required coordination among the hostile nodes.
Example 3 This example illustrates the representative coordination approach that
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Table IV. Output of Algorithm 4 for Example 3
Direction h1 h2
up b b
down c none
left b none
right c c
stay a a
Table V. Output of Algorithm 5 for Example 3
Action from Priority List h1 h2
quadruplet (a,b,c,d) not possible for h1 or h2 not possible for h2 or h1
quadruplet (a,b,c,d) move to next action move to next action
triplet (a,b,c) possible for h1 and h2 possible for h2 and h1
triplet (a,b,c) ﬁnd prob assignment ﬁnd prob assignment
may be utilized by the hostile nodes to enact a stealthy cross attack without active
communication during the attack. The example corresponds to the scenario depicted
in Figure 32a. Tables IV and V correspond to the outputs of Algorithms 4 and 5.
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Table VI. Output of Algorithm 6 for Example 3
h1 count h1 prob h2 count h2 prob
count(a) = 1 (stay), w.p 1/3 count(a) = 1 (stay) w.p 1/3
count(b) = 2 (up, right), w.p 1/6 each count(b) = 1 (up) w.p 1/3
count(c) = 2 (down, left), w.p 1/6 each count(c) = 1 (left) w.p 1/3
Table VII. Sample Priority List for PCD Metric
Preferred Category Preferred Action
quadruplet (a,b,c,d)
triplet (a,b,c), (a,b,d), (a,c,d), (b,c,d)
doublet (a,d), (b,c), (a,b), (a,c), (b,d), (c,d)
pure (a), (b), (c), (d)
To illustrate the key coordination issues for the hostile network H, we consider
a representative attack methodology for each hostile node hi which is summarized in
Algorithms 4, 6 and 5 and through Example 3 which explores the scenario of Figure
32a in terms of Algorithms 4, 6 and 5. In Algorithm 4, each hostile node hi associates
each direction of travel (up, down, left, right and stay at its current location) with a
resulting strategy. For instance in Figure 32a, traveling to the left enables hostile node
h1 to attack legitimate sensor l1 but not legitimate sensor l2, thus enacting attack
strategy c where q = [0, 0, 1, 0]. Importantly we note that use of Algorithm 4 allows
a hostile node hi to determine its own possible attack actions and that it requires
knowledge of the positions of the legitimate sensors l1 and l2. We observe that to
carry out an attack without explicit inter-node communication, each hostile node hi
must also know the position of the other hostile node hj . Such position knowledge
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allows the determination of the strategy set of the other hostile node by re-running
Algorithm 4 based on the location of the other hostile node. Thus after running
Algorithm 4, each hostile node possesses a list of associations between each direction
of movement and the resulting attack strategy for both h1 and h2 as shown in Table
V in Example 3.
Algorithm 4 should thus be applied by each hostile node to ﬁnd its own actions
as well as the actions of the other hostile node and this procedure requires infor-
mation regarding the position of all four nodes. To plan an attack without explicit
communications, Algorithm 5 is applied by each hostile node following Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 5 enables each node to identify which of the equilibria from the priority
list can be implemented by both hostile nodes. This is illustrated in Table V as the
algorithm pertains to Example 3. Finally, each node runs Algorithm 6 to assign
a probability of moving in each of the ﬁve directions (up, down, left, right, stay).
Importantly, this assignment of probabilities implements the desired equilibrium as
shown in Table VI and Figure 32a. For the case of Example 3 of Figure 32a, the hos-
tile nodes are not both able to implement the quadruplet that is at the top of their
priority list from Table VII. They are both able to implement the second equilibrium
from the priority list, namely the triplet a, b, c and a˜, b˜, c˜. Based on the analysis and
results from proposition 2, a mixed Nash equilibrium requires that each hostile node
hi mixes with equal probability of 1/3 among actions a, b and c in order to imple-
ment this triplet. Based on their current locations, each hostile node must thus move
with the probabilities prescribed in Table VI and Figure 32a. For comparison, Figure
32b depicts a sample scenario and an assignment of probabilities that enable H to
implement the quadruplet.
We now summarize the implications for hostile node coordination for the case of
a cross stealthy attack. First we conclude that it is indeed possible in principle for
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the hostile nodes to achieve a stealthy cross attack without explicit inter-node com-
munication. Such an attack can be achieved through node cooperation as illustrated
through the example Algorithms 4, 5 and 6. We note two important requirements
to achieve the attack under this scenario. First, each hostile node must know the
position of all the other nodes in the vicinity that either participate in the attack or
are aﬀected by the attack (in this case the two legitimate nodes and the other hostile
node). Although we have assumed a grid-like world in the example, this position-
knowledge requirement also applies to non-grid models. Indeed this information is
required in order for each hostile node to compute its next position based on the po-
sitions of the other nodes and based on the attack radius and sensing radius models
(assumed here to be normalized to 1). The second observation is that to avoid com-
munication, the hostile nodes must share the same priority list (such as pre-loaded
in memory). Together with the location information, the priority list enables each
hostile node to determine which attack is implementable and which attack will ac-
tually be carried out based on the priority. We thus conclude that stealthy cross
attacks that do not require active inter-node communications are possible but that
they require knowledge of all node positions and the possession of priority lists.
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Algorithm 4 Find Possible Actions for Hostile Node hi
Require: Input.
hi knows the location of all other nodes including itself.
{List of Possible Directions: Dir = [up, down, left, right, stay]. Indexed by k.}
{List of Possible Actions: Act = [a, b, c, d, empty]. Indexed by m.}
Ensure: This algorithm associates each possible direction Dir(k) with the action
Act(m) resulting from that direction.
1: for Each member of the list Dir do
2: Compute new location of Hi
3: if No overlap with L1 and L2 and not outside world then
4: Classify action at new location
5: if Aﬀect L1 and L2 then
6: Assign Dir(k)= Act(4) (action d)
7: else if Aﬀect not L1 and L2 then
8: Assign Dir(k) = Act(3) (action c)
9: else if Aﬀect L1 and not L2 then
10: Assign Dir(k) = Act(2) (action b)
11: else
12: Assign Dir(k) = Act(1) (action a)
13: end if
14: else
15: Direction results in overlap or outside world: Dir(k) = 5 (empty)
16: end if
17: end for
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Algorithm 5 Find Implementable Cross Stealthy Equilibrium for H
Require: Input:
1 - Strategy to implement (from Strategy Priority List)
2 - Direction-Action association list for h1 and h2 (Output of Algorithm 4).
Ensure: Achieve a deployment for H at the next time step that implements a stealthy
cross attack on L based on the Priority List without inter-node communication.
1: for each action k in the priority list do
2: if h1 and h2 can both implement action k then
3: Find assignment of probabilities for each direction of travel to implement
action k by running Algorithm 6. Deployment is complete.
4: else
5: Move to the next item k + 1 in the priority list
6: end if
7: end for
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Algorithm 6 Assign Probabilities to Actions of hi
Require: Input:
1- Implementable action for H (output of Algorithm 5)
2- Direction-Action association list for h1 and h2 (output of Algorithm 4).
Ensure: This algorithm assigns a probability of moving to each of the possible di-
rections Dir = [up, down, left, right, stay] such that an equilibrium is achieved.
1: For the equilibrium to be implemented (output of Algorithm 5):
2: for all non-empty directions in the list Dir do
3: Count number of directions that correspond to each Action j
4: if Dir(k) == Actionj then
5: countj = countj + 1
6: end if
7: end for
8: ProbDirk = 1/(No. Actions · countj) {Each action is assigned equal probability
to achieve equilibrium and all directions that implement each action are assigned
equal probability.}
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D. Secure Data Acquisition Results
In this section we investigate defense strategies for the legitimate sensor network L for
the case of a stealthy cross attack by the hostile network H. As modeled in Section B,
the cluster head receives decisions regarding an event from legitimate sensors that
may be attacked by hostile nodes deployed in the area. We show how game theoretic
analysis of the optimal attack and defense strategies from Section C enables the use
of established detection techniques to uncover the attack at the cluster head and to
mitigate the attack at the legitimate sensors.
1. Defense Analysis
Based on the model of Section B for the stealthy cross attack, the cluster head receives
decisions z1 and z2 regarding an event of interest in the environment from legitimate
sensors l1 and l2 where the random variables Z1 and Z2 are given in Eqs. (4.55) and
(4.56).
Z1 = X1 ⊕ Y11 ⊕ Y21 = X1 ⊕ Y¯1 (4.55)
Z2 = X2 ⊕ Y22 ⊕ Y12 = X2 ⊕ Y¯2 (4.56)
In Section C the probability mass functions for Y¯1 and Y¯2 were determined as
summarized in Eqs. (4.57) through (4.60).
Y¯1 =


1 w.p Q1
0 w.p 1−Q1
(4.57)
Q1 = (q1 + q2) · (q˜3 + q˜4) + (q3 + q4) · (q˜1 + q˜2) (4.58)
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Y¯2 =


1 w.p Q2
0 w.p 1−Q2
(4.59)
Q2 = (q1 + q3) · (q˜2 + q˜4) + (q2 + q4) · (q˜1 + q˜3) (4.60)
The cluster head thus receives a realization of the decision vector z = [z1z2] and
based on this information attempts to decide whether or not an attack has occurred.
The cluster head thus wishes to distinguish between hypothesis H0 and hypothesis
H1 given in Eqs. (4.61), (4.62) and (4.63).
H0 : normal operation,Zi ∼ Bern(p) (4.61)
H1 : attacked operation,Zi ∼ Bern(ri) (4.62)
ri = p + Qi − 2p ·Qi for i ∈ [1, 2] (4.63)
The optimal detector to distinguish between these two hypotheses based on
the Neyman-Pearson (NP) paradigm utilizes the likelihood ratio Λ(z1z2) given in
Eq. (4.64) where p is the probability of an event and f(z1, z2) is the probability mass
function of z1 and z2 given in Eqs. (4.65) and (4.66). The threshold T in Eq. (4.64)
is chosen based on Eq. (4.67) such that a desired probability of false alarm PFA = α
is achieved. Based on the chosen α in the NP paradigm, the maximal probability of
detection PD = β is obtained via Eq. (4.68).
Λ(z1z2) =
f(z1, z2)
pz1+z2(1− p)2−z1−z2
H1
>
<
H0
T (4.64)
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f(z1, z2) =


r1r2 z1 = 1 z2 = 1
r1(1− r2) z1 = 1 z2 = 0
(1− r1)r2 z1 = 0 z2 = 1
(1− r1)(1− r2) z1 = 0 z2 = 0
(4.65)
f(z1, z2) = r1r2 · Iz1=1Iz2=1 + r1(1− r2) · Iz1=1Iz2=0 +
(1− r1)r2 · Iz1=0Iz2=1 + (1− r1)(1− r2)Iz1=0Iz2=0+ (4.66)
α = Pr{Λ(z1z2) > T |pz1+z2(1− p)2−z1−z2}
=
∑
z1z2:Λ(z1z2)>T
pz1+z2(1− p)2−z1−z2 (4.67)
β = Pr{Λ(z1z2) > T |f(z1, z2)}
=
∑
z1z2:Λ(z1z2)>T
f(z1, z2) (4.68)
Though optimal with respect to the NP paradigm, the detector of Eq. (4.64) is
not truly implementable for the legitimate network L without game theoretic analysis
of the opponent H due to missing information. Speciﬁcally, the detection statistic
Λ(z1z2) requires knowledge of the parameters r1 and r2 which in turn depend on
knowledge of Q1 and Q2 from Eqs. (4.58) and (4.60). Since Q1 and Q2 depend on
the attack actions q and q˜ of hostile nodes h1 and h2, they are generally unknown
without analysis. We also note that in certain applications, the cluster head may not
be able to distinguish among the two legitimate sensors l1 and l2. That is, the cluster
head may simply be aware of the total weight w ∈ {0, 1, 2} received from both sensors
but not distinguish which sensor sent which decision and thus not have access to z1
and z2 itself but rather have access to an overall weight w.
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Motivated by these considerations, we examine a sub-optimal version of the
Neyman-Pearson detector which relies on the overall weight w instead of the indi-
vidual sensor decisions z1 and z2. We note that the transition from the use of the
detailed z1 and z2 information to the aggregate weight w information constitutes a
loss of information and results in a sub-optimal version of the NP detector. The
sub-optimal NP detector is given by Eq. (4.69) and is based on the detection statistic
Λ(w) where the probability mass function f(w) is given in Eqs. (4.70) and (4.71).
The threshold T in Eq. (4.69) is set based on a desired probability of false alarm α
from Eq. (4.72) and the resulting probability of detection is given by Eq. (4.73).
Λ(w) =
f(w)(
2
w
)
pw(1− p)2−w
H1
>
<
H0
T (4.69)
f(w) =


r1r2 w = 2
r1(1− r2) w = 1
(1− r1)r2 w = 1
(1− r1)(1− r2) w = 0
(4.70)
f(w) = r1r2 · Iw=2 + r1(1− r2) · Iw=1 +
(1− r1)r2 · Iw=1 + (1− r1)(1− r2)Iw=0 (4.71)
α = Pr{Λ(w) > T |
(
2
w
)
pw(1− p)2−w}
=
∑
w:Λ(w)>T
(
2
w
)
pw(1− p)2−w (4.72)
β = Pr{Λ(w) > T |f(w)}
=
2∑
w=0
w:Λ(w)>T
f(w) (4.73)
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We make a key observation regarding the sub-optimal detector of Eq. (4.69).
Although the detection statistic Λ(w) no longer requires knowledge of the individual z1
and z2 sensor decisions, the underlying probability mass function f(w) still depends on
parameters r1 and r2 and thus on the attackers’ actions q and q˜. Thus analysis of the
attackers’ optimal attack strategies is required for attack detection. This is in contrast
with the case of the stealthy direct attack. In the stealthy direct attack, simpliﬁcation
of the NP detector eliminates the need for the attack parameters though importantly,
the attack parameters are still required in order to determine the detector’s PFA-PD
performance. Thus we conclude that in the case of the stealthy cross attack, the
legitimate network L faces a more challenging detection scenario.
In the analysis of Section C, we showed that multiple optimal pure and mixed
equilibria exist for the hostile network H under the stealth Sc metric. However
we showed that the optimal attack strategies to maximize Sc are restricted to the
doublet class of mixed equilibria. Furthermore we showed that when the overall
power-communication-detection PCD metric is considered, there exists a unique op-
timal equilibrium for the attacker, namely the unique quadruplet equilibrium where
q = [1/4, 1/4, 1/4/, 1/4] and where q˜ = [1/4, 1/4, 1/4/, 1/4]. Such analysis thus en-
ables the legitimate network to predict the actions of the hostile network and to
utilize both the optimal and sub-optimal Neyman-Pearson detectors of Eqs. 4.64 and
4.69 for attack detection. Furthermore, based on the results of Section C, in order
to perform attack mitigation at the individual sensors, the legitimate network should
select a local sensor threshold Th that yields either a small or large probability p of
an event. This result is thus consistent with the mitigation strategies obtained for
the case of the stealthy direct attack.
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Table VIII. Ordering of Stealth Condition by Strategy Type
Strategy Type Relative Stealth Sc
pure 1
doublet (1/2)(1 + (1/3)δp)
triplet (1/3)(1 + (2/3)δp)
quadruplet (1/4)(1 + δp)
2. Defense Performance
In this section we wish to examine the performance of the defense strategies of the
legitimate sensor network L in the case of the stealthy cross attack by the hostile
network H. We show that the stealth condition Sc is consistent for both the legitimate
and the hostile networks in terms of attack detection at the cluster head. We also show
that as in the case of the stealthy direct attack, the legitimate network L may mitigate
the stealth of the attack through proper choice of the sensor decision threshold Th.
The analysis and results of Section C indicate that the hostile network H may
achieve several pure or mixed attack equilibria that can be classiﬁed into diﬀerent
strategy types with varying (relative) levels of stealth Sc. Speciﬁcally as discussed in
Section C and recapped in Table VIII, the hostile network achieves a higher relative
level of stealth by implementing the pure equilibrium strategies. Second in terms of
achieving a maximal level of stealth are the doublet equilibria followed by the triplet
equilibria and ﬁnally the quadruplet equilibrium.
To assess the eﬀectiveness of the stealth condition in selecting attack and de-
fense strategies, we wish to investigate the (absolute) stealth of the attack for the
various types of equilibria by considering the attack detection performance at the
cluster head. Figures 33a and 33b present a comparison of the PD-PFA probability
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Fig. 33. Comparison of the PD-PFA performance among pure strategies, doublets,
triplets and quadruplets for (a) p = 0.01. (b) p = 0.1.
of detection and false alarm performance between pure strategies, doublets, triplets
and quadruplets for the case of p = 0.01 and p = 0.1 respectively. As seen in these
ﬁgures, the performance of the optimal detector does indeed follow the predictions of
the stealth condition. That is, mixing with a quadruplet strategy produces a PD-PFA
performance which is best for detecting the attack and worst for maintaining stealth
as predicted by the stealth condition for both networks. Mixing among triplets pro-
duces a better PD-PFA performance than mixing among doublets. Mixing among
doublets in turn produces a better PD-PFA performance than playing with a pure
strategy. As in Section C we note however that playing with a pure strategy results
in a power of attack Pa = 0 and is thus undesirable for the hostile network based on
those grounds. The PD-PFA performance at the cluster head is thus consistent with
the predictions of the stealth condition Sc for both networks. These results thus also
indicate that the best strategy for the hostile network in terms of maximizing stealth
is the worst strategy for the legitimate network for attack detection and vice versa.
Similar detection results are displayed in Figures 34a and 34b where the PD-
PFA performance among strategies is displayed for the case of p = 0.3 and p = 0.4.
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Fig. 34. Comparison of the PD-PFA performance among pure strategies, doublets,
triplets and quadruplets for (a) p = 0.03. (b) p = 0.4.
We make two salient observations regarding these results. First we note that the
relative relationship among the various strategy types is preserved over the entire
range of probability p of an event. This is important since this relative relationship is
predicted by the stealth condition Sc as shown in the results of Figure 30b and Table
VIII. The second important observation stems from a comparison of the PD-PFA
curves in Figures 33a, 33b, 34a and 34b. We note that as the value of probability p
of an event increases from p ≈ 0 to p ≈ 0.5, the overall PD-PFA performance at the
cluster head decreases. This is consistent with the prediction of the stealth condition
from Section C and Table VIII. It is also consistent with the results obtained for the
case of the stealthy direct attack. Importantly we note that due to the symmetry
of the stealth condition with respect to p, we show the results corresponding to the
[0, 0.5] interval with the same results for 1− p corresponding to the [0.5, 1] interval.
We also wish to examine the PD-PFA performance of the attack for diﬀerent
equilibria that fall within the same strategy type. Figure 35a depicts the PD-PFA
performance of the four possible pure strategies for both the case of p = 0.01 and the
case of p = 0.4. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, all pure strategy equilibria result
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Fig. 35. Comparison of the PD-PFA performance for p = 0.01 and p = 0.4 for (a)
diﬀerent pure strategies. (b) diﬀerent triplets strategies.
in the same PD-PFA performance at the cluster head and furthermore achieve the
same performance irrespective of the probability p. This result is consistent with the
prediction of the stealth condition from proposition 2 and Table VIII where the same
relative level of stealth Sc is assigned to all equilibria within the pure class. Figure
35b also illustrates this scenario for the case of triplets for p = 0.01 and p = 0.4
indicating that the predictive relationship is maintained. Finally we summarize the
stealth condition results for the stealthy cross attack in remark 5.
Remark 5 The stealth condition Sc of Eq. (4.17) is a relative measure of the hostile
network’s stealth in the cross attack and is a consistent measure for both the legitimate
and hostile networks in terms of the probability of detecting the attack such as under
the Neyman-Pearson paradigm.
3. Defense Implications
In this section we wish to investigate the implications of the stealthy cross attack
for the defending legitimate L network. We show that the performance of the sub-
optimal Neyman-Pearson detector follows closely that of the optimal Neyman-Pearson
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Fig. 36. Optimal vs. sub-optimal detectors for representative doublet mix (a) p = 0.1.
(b) p = 0.3.
detector and that either form of the detector may be utilized based on the needs of
the application. The legitimate network thus has at its disposal the necessary tools
to detect and mitigate the attack.
As discussed in Section D-1, in certain applications the cluster head of the legiti-
mate network may not be able to distinguish between the individual sensor decisions
z1 and z2 but may instead have access to the aggregate weight w of the decision
vector z = [z1z2]. In such cases the cluster head may need to utilize a sub-optimal
version of the detector as given in Eq. (4.69). Figures 36a and 36b depict the PD-PFA
performance of both the optimal and sub-optimal detectors based on the Neyman-
Pearson paradigm as given in Eqs. (4.64) and 4.69 for the case of doublet equilibria
for probabilities p = 0.1 and p = 0.3. As can be seen from the comparison, although
sub-optimal, the detector based on the aggregate w follows the performance of the
optimal detector closely. Figures 36a and 36b depict this comparison for the case of
a representative triplet equilibrium and for the case of the unique quadruplet equi-
librium for probability p = 0.3. As can be seen from these results, the sub-optimal
detector achieves the PD-PFA performance of the optimal detector for these cases.
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Fig. 37. Optimal vs. sub-optimal detectors for p = 0.3 and (a) triplet mix (b, c, d). (b)
quadruplet mix (a, b, c, d).
This result is also obtained for diﬀerent equilibria within the triplet strategy type
and within the quadruplet strategy type over the range of probability p as shown in
Figures 38a and 38b. Based on these results we make the interesting observation
that not only are the doublet equilibria better for the hostile network H in terms
of higher (relative and absolute) stealth, they are also better for H in terms of a
discrepancy between the optimal and suboptimal detectors. That is, although the
sub-optimal detector follows the performance of the optimal detector closely for the
doublet equilibria, it occasionally deviates from the optimal performance. This is
generally not the case for the triplet and quadruplet equilibria where the sub-optimal
detector achieves the performance of the optimal detector.
Based on these results we observe that the optimal defense strategies of the legit-
imate network for the case of the cross attack parallel the optimal defense strategies
obtained for the direct attack. Speciﬁcally, it is optimal for the legitimate network L
to select the local sensor decision threshold Th such as to render the probability p of
an event small or large. This procedure for L in the case of the stealthy cross attack
is summarized in Algorithm 7 which is directly parallel to the defense Algorithm 2
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Fig. 38. Optimal vs. sub-optimal detectors for p = 0.1 and (a) triplet mix (a, b, c). (b)
quadruplet mix (a, b, c, d).
for the case of the direct attack.
E. Comparisons
In the previous sections we have derived the stealth condition Sc for the case of
the stealthy cross attack. We determined that this condition is consistent for both
the legitimate and hostile networks such that it can be utilized to obtain the opti-
mal defense and attack strategies. In this section we wish to compare the stealthy
cross attack to the case of the stealthy direct attack where each hostile node attacks
only one legitimate sensor directly and we wish to make this comparison for both
the case of inter-node communication and no communication. We show interesting
properties of these attacks and demonstrate that in terms of the stealth utility Sc,
the cross attack achieves a superior level of relative and absolute stealth than the
direct attack. We also demonstrate that for the case of a small subset of nodes,
the stealthy cross attack without active communication achieves a superior overall
power-communication-detection PCD metric compared with the direct attack and
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Algorithm 7 Defense Algorithm for Legitimate Network
Ensure: Max attack detection and power of defense given competing hostile network.
1: Given the probability density function (pdf) of the phenomenon, set the local
sensor threshold Th:
2: if events are expected to be common then
3: Set Th such that p (area under the pdf to the left of Th) is close to 1.
4: else
5: Set Th such that p is close to 0.
6: end if
7: Given information available to the cluster head:
8: Find optimal attack parameters q∗ and q˜∗ from Eq. (4.30).
9: if cluster head receives distinct z1, z2 sensor decisions then
10: Utilize detector of Eq. (4.64)
11: else
12: Utilize detector of Eq. (4.69)
13: end if
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compared with communication. Next we compare the stealthy cross attack to the
case of an uncoordinated attack where each hostile node may select a diﬀerent attack
strategy which does not necessarily result in the optimal stealth equilibrium. These
results carry important implications for the design of attack and defense strategies.
1. Comparison with Stealthy Direct Attack and Communication
The direct and cross attack models for the hostile network diﬀer in that the cross
attack model allows each hostile node to attack more than one legitimate sensor.
Conversely as a result of the cross attack, a single legitimate sensor may be attacked
by more than one hostile node. Given these two attack models, we wish to determine
if allowing cross attacks changes the existing equilibria of the game and if such changes
are advantageous or disadvantageous for the hostile network H. Speciﬁcally we wish
to understand if the cross attack improves the stealth of the attack or causes the
attack to be revealed with greater probability.
We begin our comparison with an examination of the stealthy cross attack Gc and
its resulting equilibria. We examine a representative case of a doublet equilibrium via
Eq. (4.74) which shows the stealth utility Sc in terms of a subset of actions of hostile
nodes h1 and h2. As shown in Eq. (4.74), we consider the case where hostile node
h1 must assign probabilities to its actions b and c while hostile node h2 must assign
probabilities to its actions b˜ and c˜. Eqs. (4.75) and (4.76) show the resulting stealth
utility for either of the hostile nodes if they choose to match their actions. That
is, Eq. (4.75) shows the utility resulting from both hostile nodes choosing matching
actions c and c˜ while Eq. (4.76) shows the utility resulting from both hostile nodes
choosing matching actions b and b˜. In both cases each hostile node achieves the
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Fig. 39. (a) Cross attack non-equilibrium: h1 plays c and h2 plays b. (b) Possible
locations of h2 to enact strategy c to match h1’s strategy c.
maximal (relative) stealth utility measure of Sc = 1.
Sc = u2(q2, q3, q˜2, q˜3) = q˜2(q2 + δpq3) + q˜3(q3 + δpq2) (4.74)
Sc = u2(q2 = 1, q3 = 0, q˜2 = 1, q˜3 = 0) = 1 ∀p (4.75)
Sc = u2(q2 = 0, q3 = 1, q˜2 = 0, q˜3 = 1) = 1 ∀p (4.76)
Next we examine this situation for the case of a mismatch between the actions
of the hostile nodes. As shown in Eqs. (4.77) and (4.78), if hostile node h1 chooses
action b while hostile node h2 chooses action c or vice versa, the stealth utility of
both nodes is decreased from 1 to δp ∈ [0, 1/2] where probability p depends on the
actions of the legitimate network L. Importantly we observe that this disadvantageous
mismatch in actions actually corresponds to the direct attack. As illustrated in Figure
39a, when each hostile node attacks only one legitimate node the action mismatch
is created. Thus we make two important conclusions. The ﬁrst conclusion is that
actions that constituted an equilibrium in the direct attack may no longer constitute
an equilibrium in the cross attack. The second conclusion is that the cross attack
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Fig. 40. Comparison of the direct and cross attacks for doublet (b, c) for (a) p = 0.1.
(b) p = 0.45.
achieves a superior level of relative stealth than the direct attack.
Sc = u2(q2 = 1, q3 = 0, q˜2 = 0, q˜3 = 1) = δp ∈ [0, 1/2] (4.77)
Sc = u2(q2 = 0, q3 = 1, q˜2 = 1, q˜3 = 0) = δp ∈ [0, 1/2] (4.78)
Next we proceed to examine the stealth utility for the doublet case when both
hostile nodes mix their actions with equal probability based on Proposition 2. As
shown in Eq. (4.79), such a mix is an equilibrium for the hostile nodes in the case
of a cross attack and gives rise to a relative stealth of 1/2(1 + 1/3 · δp) ∈ [1/2, 7/12].
We note that this equilibrium point did not exist in the case of the direct attack.
The overall set of best response actions for hostile nodes h1 and h2 for this doublet
scenario is shown in Eq. (4.80).
Sc = u2(q2 = 1/2, q3 = 1/2, q˜2 = 1/2, q˜3 = 1/2) = 1/2(1 + 1/3 · δp) ∈ [1/2, 7/12]
(4.79)
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B1(q˜2, q˜3) =


q2 = q3 = 1/2 if q˜2 = q˜3 = 1/2
q2 = 1 if q˜2 = 1/2 +  for  > 0
q3 = 1 if q˜3 = 1/2 +  for  > 0
(4.80)
To further illustrate the diﬀerence between the stealthy direct and cross attacks
we obtain the absolute stealth of each attack at the cluster head in terms of the
PD-PFA performance. Figures 40a and 40b illustrate the results for the doublet pair
(b, c) and (b˜, c˜) for both the optimal and sub-optimal detectors at the cluster head.
As seen from these results, the cross attack achieves a worst PD-PFA performance
signifying that it is a better strategy for the attacker and is thus in agreement with
the prediction of the stealth condition Sc. Figure 41 illustrates this result for the case
of a triplet cross attack as compared to a direct one-to-one attack. We summarize
these results in remark 6.
Remark 6 The cross attack achieves a superior level of relative and absolute stealth
compared to the direct attack for hostile network H.
Importantly we observe that the above discussion encompassed only considera-
tions of stealth and that the power of the attack Pa was not jointly considered. To
consider both metrics, we employ the power-communication-detection PCD metric
shown in Eqs. (4.81) and (4.82) and recall that communication among the hostile
nodes may be accomplished via relatively simple algorithms such as Algorithm 3.
Thus based on the PCD metric we wish to compare the direct attack with the cross
attack for both the case of communication and for the case of no communication
among the hostile nodes.
PCD =
No. attacked nodes
(1 + No. communications) · (1 + PD) (4.81)
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Fig. 41. Comparison of the direct and cross attacks for triplet (a, b, c) for p = 0.3.
PCDLi =
Qi
1 · (1 + PD) (4.82)
The results of this comparison are shown in Table IX for the case of n = 2
nodes corresponding to the cross attack model where the results have been arranged
in order of decreasing PCD performance. As can be seen from the table, for the
case of very small node subsets, the direct attack beneﬁts from the use of inter-node
communications as shown previously in Chapter III and Figure 27. As seen from the
table however, the cross attack quadruplet strategy achieves a higher PCD metric
without the use of communications. Thus we obtain the result that for very small
node subsets where two hostile nodes attack two legitimate nodes, it is advantageous
for the hostile network to employ the cross attack quadruplet and that the hostile
network does not need to employ inter-node communications to achieve this result.
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Table IX. PCD Metric for Direct vs. Cross and Comm. vs. No Comm. for n = 2
Attack Comm. PCD
direct no 0
direct yes 0.1
cross yes 0.195
cross no 0.39
2. Comparison with Uncoordinated Attacks
In the previous section we compared the stealthy cross attack with the stealthy direct
attack for the case of inter-node communication and for the case of no inter-node
communication. We observed that the cross attack results in advantageous levels of
stealth and power-communication-detection without the need for active communica-
tion. As noted in Section D-3 however, to achieve Nash equilibria in the cross attack
without communication, the hostile nodes require knowledge of common priority lists
as well as knowledge of all the nodes’ positions. In this section we wish to investigate
the implications of a mis-coordination on the part of the hostile nodes in achieving
the Nash equilibria.
The case of mis-coordination among the hostile nodes is illustrated in Figure 42a
in terms of the PD-PFA performance at the cluster head for p = 0.1. Speciﬁcally,
Figure 42a shows three types of deviation from the doublet equilibrium (q, q˜) where
q = [1/2, 1/2, 0, 0] and q˜ = [1/2, 1/2, 0, 0] corresponding to actions (a, b) and (a˜, b˜).
As can be seen from Figure 42a, the worst PD-PFA performance from among the four
curves is achieved precisely by the doublet equilibrium and thus constitutes the best
case for H. When only one of the hostile nodes (h2 in this example) deviates from this
equilibrium by mixing with q˜ = [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4], the result is a loss of stealth for
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Fig. 42. PD-PFA when h2 deviates from optimal doublet mixing strategy for (a)
p = 0.1. (b) p = 0.4.
H. Although signiﬁcant, this loss is not maximal since h2 has selected the quadruplet
mixture which is generally advantageous for H.
Next we examine the stealth outcome when hostile node h2 deviates from the
doublet equilibrium mix by mixing among all four alternatives but in a way that does
not correspond to the quadruplet equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, hostile node h2 mixes
using the strategy q˜ = [1/10, 2/10, 3/10, 4/10]. As can be seen from Figure 42a, this
larger deviation from the equilibrium results in a larger loss of stealth for H. Finally
we consider the case when both hostile nodes h1 and h2 deviate from the prescribed
doublet strategy. In this scenario hostile node h1 selects q = [3/4, 1/4, 0, 0] while
hostile node h2 selects q˜ = [1/10, 2/10, 3/10, 4/10] as before. As can be seen from the
ﬁgure, such mismatched selections result in the worst level of stealth for the hostile
network H. Similar results of coordination mismatch are illustrated in Figure 42b
but for the case where p = 0.4. We observe that the relationship between the four
curves is maintained but that the gap in performance among the four is decreased.
This is consistent with the ﬁnding that as the probability of an event p approaches
p ≈ 0.5, the detection performance of the legitimate network decreases. Thus from
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the perspective of the hostile network, all attack strategies are comparable since
the attack cannot be easily detected at the cluster head. Overall we observe that
coordination among the hostile nodes for arbitrary values of probability p is required
and that smaller deviations from the optimal actions produce a smaller loss in stealth.
F. Chapter Summary
In this chapter we investigated the competing sensor networks scenario for the case of
a stealthy cross attack. In a stealthy cross attack, each hostile node may attack one
or more legitimate nodes with some probability, causing an incorrect decision at the
sensor. Unlike in the direct stealthy attack however, based on hostile node deployment
and goals, two hostile nodes may both attack the same legitimate node. To understand
the impact of the cross attack on reliable data collection, we investigated the stealth
and power of the attack with comparisons to the direct attack for both networks.
The stealthy cross attack is modeled via the interaction between the hostile nodes
in a static non-cooperative game. The stealth utility for this scenario is derived and
shown to be consistent for both the hostile and the legitimate networks. Based on
the stealth utility, the optimal attack and defense strategies are obtained for each
network. For the hostile network, we showed that in contrast with the direct attack,
multiple pure and mixed Nash equilibria exist. We showed that the pure equilibria
are not advantageous for the hostile network and indeed may be considered a form of
attack interference among the hostile nodes. We also showed that surprisingly there
exist strategies for the cross attack in terms of mixed equilibria that achieve superior
stealth for H than the direct stealthy attack without the need for communication.
Furthermore there exists a unique attack strategy among the mixed equilibria which
results in a superior power-communication-detection metric than the direct attack.
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Importantly for the hostile network, we also showed that to achieve the desired Nash
equilibrium in the cross attack based on coordination without communication, the
hostile nodes require knowledge of common priority lists as well as knowledge of all
the nodes’ positions. Deviations from the prescribed coordination result in a loss of
stealth.
For the legitimate network, we employed the derived stealth condition to obtain
the best defense strategies. We showed how analysis of the cross attack enables use
of established techniques to detect the attack such as through the Neyman-Pearson
paradigm. We also showed that the optimal detection and mitigation strategies ob-
tained for the stealthy direct attack apply to the stealthy cross attack and are thus
consistent.
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CHAPTER V
STEALTHY IMAGE NETWORK COMPETITION
A. Introduction and Motivation
The general popularity of mobile devices and the lure of innovative applications have
continued to drive research in the area of wireless multimedia. Indeed much focus has
been placed on the design of robust, eﬃcient and secure schemes for delivering mul-
timedia content over error-prone wireless channels [98], [99]. Recent years have also
brought developments in another growing ﬁeld of interest, that of wireless sensor net-
works. Originally envisioned as simple devices for distributed environmental sensing,
sensor networks have continued to evolve in complexity to include autonomous mo-
bility and actuation of elements in their surroundings [100], [101]. Visual-capability
additions are thus but a natural extension of this research [92], [102].
Emerging from these ideas, the nascent ﬁeld of wireless image sensor networks
(WISNs) considers battery-operated wireless (untethered) nodes equipped with cam-
eras [92], [102]. Among other applications, it boasts importance to rapid-deployment
surveillance and monitoring [10]. As all ambitious research ideas, WISNs have many
signiﬁcant challenges to overcome. The energy limitations already encountered in sen-
sor networks collecting scalar data such as temperature are only exacerbated when
nodes are deployed to collect, process and transmit visual data [103], [104]. The in-
creased size of visual data also strains storage buﬀers and places a further burden on
system design through increased transmission delay and bandwidth utilization [16].
Such challenges require innovative solutions tailored to the unique characteristics of
WISNs [92].
Among possible approaches, event driven WISNs have emerged as an intriguing
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design possibility suited for long term deployments in unattended environments. In
the event driven approach, camera nodes may be triggered by scalar sensors only when
the latter detect an event of interest in the surroundings. Alternative event driven
approaches consider cameras that acquire continuous input but which only transmit
an image frame if an event was captured [16], [50]. The event driven paradigm hence
aims to alleviate energy consumption and bandwidth use implicitly, via the local
selection of relevant image frames by the nodes. This approach may be viewed as
complementary to the joint optimization of video encoding and wireless transmission
power [99], [103], or to eﬀorts at providing higher bandwidth channels [10] and allo-
cating their use fairly and eﬃciently [98]. Overall, WISN systems will undoubtedly
beneﬁt from the incorporation of advances from the spectrum of these complementary
strategies.
Event acquisition and frame selection in the event driven paradigm may be ac-
complished through the use of scalar sensor decisions and the use of image processing
techniques at the camera nodes. At the camera nodes, many event driven WISN
paradigms rely on correct frame selection based on the deﬁnition of an event. For
surveillance nodes where unknown objects may or may not enter the camera’s ﬁeld
of view, this deﬁnition may be largely motion-based, though in general the deﬁnition
is application-dependent [105], [106]. Based on the event deﬁnition, a camera node
should ideally achieve a high probability of event detection PD to guarantee that im-
portant frames are acquired and transmitted. The camera nodes should also achieve
an acceptably low probability of false alarm PFA to avoid the wasteful acquisition or
transmission of non-event frames. Event detection in WISNs must thus meet critical
accuracy and reliability requirements while minimizing complexity and energy con-
sumption. Though approaches based solely on image processing at the camera nodes
are possible, they are generally expensive in terms of the computation required to
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achieve an acceptable probability of error [103], [104].
In this work we show how collaborative approaches exploiting available scalar
decisions can be used in conjunction with low complexity image processing algorithms
to achieve reasonable performance despite the potential presence of a hostile network.
Based on the competing sensor networks scenario with stealthy direct or cross attacks,
we examine the event acquisition properties of WISNs deployed in unattended outdoor
environments for the purpose of collecting relevant surveillance data regarding an
event of interest [6], [43].
We consider a heterogeneous WISN comprised of sensors and untethered camera
nodes (battery operated nodes with wireless data transmission to the sink) [3]. The
camera nodes must operate reliably under signiﬁcant resource constraints and may
thus require the use of lightweight image processing (LIP) algorithms to perform
event acquisition [7], [102]. Under the collaboration paradigm, camera nodes may
also receive supporting decisions about the presence or absence of an event from
distributed sensors [102], [16]. We wish to investigate the detection and false alarm
characteristics of such heterogeneous WISNs in uncertain environments where outdoor
conditions may present challenges for the camera LIP algorithms while occasional
faults and deliberate stealthy attacks may present a challenge for the supporting
sensors. In particular we wish to study the relative merits and limitations of the
following cases:
1. Lightweight Image Processing (LIP) approach: preliminary results from real-
world testbeds of low-power low-computation wireless camera nodes suggest
that LIP algorithms may achieve a probability of detection and false alarm
(PD-PFA) that may be acceptable for certain applications [7], [102]. Though we
do not set out to improve any particular LIP algorithm, in this work we wish to
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understand the underlying analytical properties of simple threshold based LIP
algorithms and examine their PD-PFA performance for a variety of real world
surveillance sequences. The overarching goal is thus to understand the limits
and suitability of LIP algorithms and to provide a framework for enhancing
their performance with sensors if required for a given application.
2. Sensor Decisions Approach: in unattended outdoor settings, sensors may be
prone to occasional errors due to faults or may experience stealthy direct or
cross attacks designed to avoid detection [6], [31], [43]. Although quality test-
ing may provide an estimate for the probability of a fault, an estimate for the
probability of an attack may not be generally available a priori. Without ver-
iﬁcation mechanisms, the reliability of the sensor decisions may thus not be
adequate for some applications despite node redundancy. We study and com-
pare the PD-PFA performance of diﬀerent fault/attack veriﬁcation mechanisms
at the cluster head for the case of occasional errors, attacks and stealthy at-
tacks. We also comment on the level of node redundancy (cluster size) required
to achieve a desired event acquisition performance under each scenario.
3. Combined Decisions Approach: camera nodes may rely on a combination of
decisions from the sensors and the LIP algorithm for event acquisition [7], [102],
[3]. We wish to study the characteristics of such combined decisions for various
levels of node redundancy to exploit the desirable qualities of both approaches
and avoid the degradation in performance that each method may experience in
certain settings.
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B. Literature and Recent Advances
For many applications, the viability of wireless image sensor networks (WISNs) de-
pends on the resolution of signiﬁcant design issues centered around network reliabil-
ity [49], [107] longevity [22], [103] and security [108], [109]. The speciﬁc issues in-
clude energy-eﬃcient capture of images as well as their processing and routing [110],
[102], [111], [112], economical network design relying on node heterogeneity with
sleep/wake-up cycles [113], [3], and the network’s robustness to attack and compro-
mise of privacy [114]. WISNs thus present a very wide range of timely challenges. In
this section we wish to brieﬂy outline some recent advances most salient to the focus
of our work.
In [3] He et. al describe VigilNet, a prototype implementation of a heterogeneous
image sensor network for energy eﬃcient surveillance missions. In the experimental
setup, 70 Mica2 motes are deployed to detect and track the passing of a vehicle while
triggering cameras. The authors demonstrate how a multi-tier sleep/wake-up system
consisting of motes and mote leaders called sentries can extend the lifetime of the
network. Importantly, a sentry decides whether an event of interest is occurring in the
environment by counting the number of “yes” votes it receives from the motes which
are utilizing magnetometer sensors. To accurately capture events, the probabilities
of false positives and false negatives are balanced by carefully selecting the detection
threshold (i.e. the number of “yes” votes required to declare that an event has
occurred, referred to by the authors as the Degree of Aggregation DoA). Importantly,
the DoA is selected experimentally and as the authors suggest, a framework with
adjustable sensitivity for this selection could largely improve the system’s detection
performance. In comparison, in our work we study a framework that enables the
cluster head (i.e. the sentry) to make optimal decisions based on sensor inputs with
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a ﬂexible level of sensitivity.
Although heterogeneous multi-tier systems greatly improve the longevity of the
overall image network, practical designs must account for the substantial power con-
sumption of individual image-capture devices and of their image processing algorithms
which handle the acquired frames. Recent advances in CMOS imaging technology
have produced a new breed of low-power camera devices. Unfortunately these de-
vices are generally intended for higher-power hosts and are thus not suitable for
sensor networks. To address this issue, Rahimi et. al [7] present a seminal camera
device named Cyclops. Cyclops provides an electronic interface between a low-power
low-computation camera module based on CMOS imagers and a lightweight camera
host such as a mote. While providing a critical bridge and enabling use in visual
sensor networks, Cyclops still suﬀers from extreme constraints in its computational
power and processing delay, necessitating judicious use of its resources. For instance,
Cyclops’s complex programmable logic device (CPLD) can perform simple operations
on the frames at capture time, such as background subtraction and frame diﬀerenti-
ation. Performing such simple operations at capture time instead of post-processing
the frames greatly reduces the energy consumption and delay of the device. In our
work, we study how lightweight image processing (LIP) compatible with these ideas
can improve event detection performed by the cluster head and its associated sensors.
Importantly cyclops indeed possesses an asynchronous trigger input that can be con-
nected to sensors (such as a passive IR detector, microphone or magnetometer) to
trigger the camera and improve the overall system’s performance.
Upon deployment, the goal of a typical image network is to capture relevant
visual surveillance pertaining to an event of interest and to forward this surveillance
to a sink where further analysis might be performed. To capture relevant surveillance,
the network should generally exhibit a high probability of event detection PD (true
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positive) and a low probability of false alarm PFA (false positive). These probabilities
not only aﬀect the relevance of the collected materials to the surveillance task, but
also have an impact on the network’s energy consumption and thus on its longevity.
Speciﬁcally, the erroneous identiﬁcation of “non-event” frames as “signiﬁcant” and
their subsequent processing and transmission through a (wireless) medium needlessly
drains the nodes’ battery resources and burdens the sink with non-content. On the
other hand, the omission of “event” frames may signiﬁcantly compromise the quality
of the surveillance mission. The PD-PFA characteristics of the image network should
also ideally exhibit the highly desirable property of being adjustable based on the
requirements of the application (such as its surveillance or energy requirements).
The detection performance should also ideally exhibit some optimality in the sense
of being “the best” achievable performance given the practical challenges of WISNs.
Event acquisition challenges experiences by nodes in a WISN generally stem from
more than one source. The ﬁrst such source originates from the hardware and energy
limitations of the camera nodes themselves [7]. Speciﬁcally, the camera nodes may
not have the capability of applying advanced image processing to the captured frames.
The processing delay (per frame) as well as the energy and memory utilization gen-
erally render such processing infeasible even when it is available at the camera nodes.
However lightweight image processing (LIP) is often feasible on such devices and pro-
vides very basic in situ analysis of the frames’ content. Unfortunately the practical
PD-PFA performance of LIP varies widely depending on the speciﬁc environmental
conditions (for example, lighting, size and speed of the moving object(s) and move-
ment of “background” objects such as trees). The performance of LIP for any given
arbitrary image sequence is consequently not truly predictable or controllable, and
thus not inherently “adjustable” to meet application requirements. Nevertheless,
real-world experiments with Cyclops based on a LIP algorithm have demonstrated
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an average PD ≈ 78% and a PFA ≈ 22% [7]. While this level of PD-PFA performance
may potentially be acceptable for certain applications, it is important to investigate
whether this performance can be improved through the use of collaborating sensors.
Exploiting the information collected by sensors might generally improve the PD-
PFA performance of heterogeneous WISNs. The use of sensors however introduces
two new sources of error that must be considered. The ﬁrst such source comes from
occasional sensor faults or errors that occur with some small but non-zero probability
at each sensor. Aside from quality testing prior to deployment (which might be selec-
tive or altogether absent due to the large number of sensors), the general approach is
to employ sensor redundancy to reduce the chance of false reporting. Nevertheless it
is not always clear what level of redundancy (number of sensors) is required to achieve
a given PD-PFA performance, especially if the camera nodes are already performing
a basic level of detection via a LIP algorithm. The issue of redundancy becomes even
more salient when we consider the second possible source of sensor error, that is, er-
ror due to a persistent and distributed attack. In particular, WISNs are intended for
deployment in unattended and possibly hostile regions. In such scenarios, an oppo-
nent can clearly gain physical access to the sensors with the possibility of destroying
them, capturing them for reprograming purposes, or interfering with their readings
via actuator devices [49], [6]. Despite the possibility of tampering or error, the use
of sensors to achieve reliable and energy eﬃcient image networks is highly enticing if
these issues can be resolved [92], [7].
C. System Model
We investigate the WISN event acquisition problem in uncertain environments where
the sensors are prone to either occasional faults or stealthy hostile attacks and where
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the camera devices perform very basic event detection using lightweight image pro-
cessing (LIP) algorithms with unpredictable performance due to varying conditions.
Speciﬁcally we wish to understand how the role of sensor redundancy changes if un-
certainty in the environment shifts from mere faults to hostile attacks. For instance
we wish to understand if LIP algorithms alone are suﬃcient in certain cases (such as
the case of a severe sensor attack) or if their performance should be augmented with
that of sensors.
In this section we wish to detail the speciﬁc system setup analyzed in this work.
As shown in Figure 43, a camera node has the capability of performing lightweight
image processing (detailed in Section D) to perform event acquisition. The camera
node may however also rely on input from one or more (error or attack-prone) sensors
regarding the presence or absence of an event of interest (shown in Figure 43 as binary
“yes/no” decisions). Information from the sensor(s) may be directly fed into the
camera or it may ﬁrst pass through a cluster head (CH) where a form of attack/error
detection is performed. In that case, the camera node receives a decision about the
presence or absence of an event from the cluster head instead of directly from the
sensor(s).
Based on this setup, a camera node may receive information about the presence
or absence of an event from more than one source (i.e. from the sensor(s)/cluster head
and from its own frame processing). Since it is not known a priori which source will
be more reliable under a given setting, the camera node faces several possible meth-
ods of utilizing the received information. Speciﬁcally, the camera node must decide
which source to trust when the sources are in disagreement (i.e. one source reports an
event of interest while the other reports no event). As shown in Table X, one possible
approach to resolve a disagreement is for the camera to trust its lightweight image
processing (LIP) as the more “reliable” element which is not prone to attack. Indeed
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Fig. 43. Each camera node may employ lightweight image processing (LIP) to deter-
mine if an event of interest has occurred in a collected frame or it may rely
on decisions from the sensor(s)/cluster head (CH) or a combination of both
(CH & LIP).
such a strategy might be fruitful in favorable lighting and background-motion condi-
tions. Another obvious approach is for the camera node to trust the sensor/cluster
head decision (CH in Table X) and treat the LIP as the more volatile element. Fi-
nally the third approach listed in Table X instructs the camera to mark a frame as
an “event” if either of the two sources reports an event. This approach may prevent
the missed detection of certain events but could produce many false reports if at least
one of the sources experiences signiﬁcant errors. Thus under arbitrary environmental
conditions, it is not clear which of the techniques will produce a better overall PD-
PFA performance (with PD as close to 1 as possible and PFA as close to 0 as possible)
and how sensor redundancy will aﬀect this performance.
Based on the model of Table X and based on the sensor and optimal attack
Table X. Methods for Marking a Frame As an “Event” at Camera Node
Method Action for Marking Frame as an Event
LIP Mark based on Lightweight Image Processing (LIP)
CH Mark based on sensor(s) with/without Cluster Head (CH) detection
CH & LIP Mark if either LIP or CH detects an event
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models from Chapters III and IV, the competition between the two networks for
the case of visual event acquisition in unattended envrionments is summarized in
deﬁnition 9.
Definition 9 The stealthy competition between networks H and L for the case of
image networks is deﬁned by the following network goals:
• H network: perpetrate stealthy (direct or cross) attack so as to misguide the
visual event acquisition of the legitimate network’s camera nodes.
• L network: achieve a desired PD-PFA visual event acquisition performance at
the camera nodes given lightweight image processing and the potential presence
of stealthy attacks on the sensors.
Finally we make an important note regarding the use of notation for the case of
attacks in competing image networks. In the case of image networks, we employ the
notation q in a very broad sense to denote the probability of a scalar sensor error.
This sensor error may be caused by occasional faults, attacks or stealthy direct or
cross attacks. In comparison, we previously employed the notation q to denote the
stealthy direct attack exclusively. In the broader case currently considered, the sensor
error could be the result of a variety of sources. We employ the familiar q notation
for simplicity and convenience while keeping in mind its broadened meaning.
D. Analysis for Event Acquisition
In this section we wish to examine the visual event acquisition process at the camera
nodes. We begin with an examination of the characteristics of real-world surveillance
sequences and proceed to analyze the properties of a representative threshold-based
visual detector. Finally we obtain the practical PD-PFA performance of the detector
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Fig. 44. Frame Seq. 1: indoor test conditions with constant lighting and no back-
ground changes.
and compare it with existing results from practical implementations of image sensor
networks.
1. Image Sequence Characteristics
In the spirit of lightweight image processing (LIP) [7], [115], [116], we consider a
relatively simple and general event acquisition algorithm (i.e. the approach is not
tailored to the detection of any speciﬁc type of object). Examination of the proposed
algorithm is intended to provide more insights into the properties of simple visual
algorithms and serve as an illustration of their performance in the context of energy
and computation-limited camera nodes. To assess this generic algorithm for WISNs
we consider its properties in analytic form and obtain the algorithm’s PD-PFA per-
formance for surveillance sequences under varying conditions. The real-world image
sequences used in our testing are shown in Figures 44, 45, 46, and 47. The characteris-
tics of these sequences are important in understanding the suitability of the proposed
algorithm for event acquisition in WISNs. We thus describe the test sequences prior
to outlining the visual event acquisition algorithm.
The sequence of Figure 44 is an idealized indoor test where the lighting and
background conditions do not change appreciably over time. The only signiﬁcant
change comes from the event of interest in the form of a test subject entering the
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Fig. 45. Frame Seq. 2: outdoor variable lighting due to clouds. The light intensity
changes by 70% between frames. Additional background movement due to
shrub.
Fig. 46. Frame Seq. 3: changing outdoor light and background (swaying trees). The
subject temporarily disappears behind a tree.
camera’s ﬁeld of view. The dominant source of noise in this case is internal camera
noise and ﬂicker. The sequence of Figure 45 shows outdoor parking-lot surveillance
on a windy day, where the event of interest is the passing of an unidentiﬁed car. The
event acquisition task in this sequence is complicated by the presence of a nearby
shrub which experiences signiﬁcant swaying of its branches over time. Furthermore
the background lighting changes visibly with cloud movement. The sequence of Figure
46 also experiences changes due to swaying trees and variable light conditions. The
event of interest is the appearance and movement of a test subject which temporarily
disappears behind a tree in frames 4c and 4e. Finally Figure 47 shows a truncation
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Fig. 47. (a) Frame Seq. 4a showing Seq. 2 modiﬁed to remove the shrub. (b) Frame
Seq. 4b showing Seq. 3 modiﬁed to remove the swaying trees.
of the sequences of Figures 45 and 46 where the camera’s ﬁeld of view now excludes
the shrub and trees.
Statistical analysis of the image sequences in Figures 45 and 46 (such as Levine’s
Test and the t-test) reveal that the mean and standard deviation are not reliable
indicators of an event of interest occurring even after various (DCT domain) ﬁltering
mechanisms are employed. This can be seen intuitively from the fact that the subjects
of interest (person walking and car driving-by) do not occupy a much larger percent
of a frame’s pixels than the other randomly moving objects (shrub and trees). Hence
the mean and variance of the frames do change based on the appearance of the
subject, but these diﬀerences are not statistically distinguishable. In essence, the
pixels corresponding to the person and car are getting dwarfed by the presence of
many shrub and tree pixels which are also changing over time. Truncating the frames
as shown in Figure 47 to exclude the vegetation does indeed improve the statistical
diﬀerence between an event and non-event frame. However for the general WISN
deployment case (with cameras facing in various directions), we do not wish to select
an event acquisition technique which relies on the truncated assumption. Based on the
observed statistical similarity of event and non-event frames, we wish to determine
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an event detector suitable for WISNs. In addition to its generality (detection not
tailored to a speciﬁc type of object) and good detection performance, the chosen
event detector should be implementable in the simple WISN devices. In addition to
their hardware and general processing limitations, WISNs process a large volume of
surveillance frames which must in turn be transmitted wirelessly to the sink if they
contain an event of interest. Analysis of frames at the small block or pixel level may
consequently not always be suitable or possible.
Instead we seek a simple form for the detector where a single frame statistic is
compared to a threshold in order to determine the presence or absence of an event.
However as discussed, event and non-event frames from real-world surveillance se-
quences have similar statistics. Furthermore it can be shown (Appendix B) that a
diﬀerence image D = B − A computed from two consecutive frames A and B is
not perfectly Gaussian but rather contains signiﬁcant outliers (this is shown for both
event and non-event frames). An optimal non-parametric (robust) detector is thus
more appropriate for this case of statistical similarity and presence of outliers. How-
ever we show that a simple chi-squared detector (relying on a comparison of a frame
statistic to a threshold) is equivalent in form to the robust detector and can thus
be used in WISNs. Furthermore, through the use of composite hypothesis testing,
we show that the chi-squared detector can be made uniformly most powerful (UMP)
through proper threshold selection. The UMP property signiﬁes that the detector
achieves a probability of detection PD higher or equal to the detection of all other
detectors given the worst-case scenario probability of false alarm PFA. In other words,
no detector performs better given the same probability of false alarm.
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2. Lightweight Image Processing for Event Acquisition
The simple algorithm we selected is based on diﬀerence images, similar to the tech-
niques found in the image change detection literature [117]. We describe this detector,
which we refer to as the “chi-squared” detector, as an adaptation of the detector pro-
posed by Aach and Kaup [105], [118], where we use entire diﬀerence frames instead
of blocks. We now overview the basics of the technique. In essence, a diﬀerence
image D = B−A between two consecutive frames A and B reveals all the pixels that
have changed between these frames containing both relevant and irrelevant changes
(such as the tree swaying). The Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the diﬀerence image
is computed as the relevant statistic, and it is compared to a theoretically-obtained
robust threshold T . We now present the speciﬁc details of this detector.
In Aach and Kaup [105], [118] (and in Radke et al. [117]), the diﬀerence image D
is computed and divided into smaller blocks. Importantly, each pixel of the diﬀerence
image is modeled as a Gaussian random variable with 0 mean and variance σ2i , where
i = 0 corresponds to a non-event frame and i = 1 corresponds to an event frame.
In order to conserve computational energy, in this work we use the entire diﬀerence
image instead of parsing the image to determine salient blocks. The resulting detector
hypothesis test can be summarized as:
H0 : no event, Dk ∼ N (0, σ20) ∀k (5.1)
H1 : event, Dk ∼ N (0, σ21) ∀k (5.2)
with σ20 < σ
2
1 and where Dk is the k
th diﬀerence pixel in D = B−A. Since the entire
diﬀerence image is utilized in the detection, instead of considering individual pixels
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we may consider a new random variable deﬁned as:
X =
n∑
k=1
D2k = σ
2
j
n∑
k=1
D2k
σ2j
= σ2jY, for j ∈ {0, 1} (5.3)
where Y has distribution chi-squared with n degrees of freedom and where n is the
total number of pixels in the diﬀerence frame. The new detection hypothesis test is
thus given by:
H0 : X ∼ 1
σ20
fχ2,n
(
x
σ20
)
(5.4)
H1 : X ∼ 1
σ21
fχ2,n
(
x
σ21
)
(5.5)
where fχ2,n(x) is the probability density function (pdf) of the chi-squared distribution
with n degrees of freedom. Signiﬁcantly, the hypothesis test to distinguish between an
event and non-event is given by the comparison of a single statistic (x) to a threshold
T as shown in Eqs. (5.6) and (5.7), where σ20 is the variance of a null frame, f
−1
χ2,n is
the inverse chi-squared distribution and α is the desired probability of false alarm.
x
H1
>
<
H0
T (5.6)
T = σ20f
−1
χ2,n(1− α) (5.7)
3. Lightweight Event Acquisition Properties
In this section we wish to analyze some of the properties of the simple chi-squared
detector of Eqs. (5.6) and (5.7) and examine its practical performance on the surveil-
lance test sequences. We begin by showing that the simple chi-squared detector can
be made uniformly most powerful (UMP) [96]. To achieve this we show that if there
exists a real positive number γ, such that σ20 < γ and σ
2
1 > γ, where the actual σ
2
0 , σ
2
1
are unknown, then there exists a UMP detector where a realization x from Eq. (5.3)
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is compared to a threshold T , such that the probability of false alarm PFA = α is
given by:
α = sup
σ20<γ
∫ ∞
T
1
σ20
fχ2,n
(
x
σ20
)
dx (5.8)
Suppose there exists a γ > 0, such that σ20 < γ and σ
2
1 > γ in Eqs. (5.4) and
(5.5). Then there exists a UMP test of the form
x
H1
>
<
H0
γf−1χ2,n(1− α) (5.9)
for false alarm rate not exceeding α. This is a composite hypothesis test in which
the parameters for the null and alternate hypotheses are unknown, but the regions
for these parameters are divided by a threshold γ. The proposition says that if
the parameter space is divided as thus, then a test that compares the actual x in
Eq. (5.3) to a threshold, achieves optimal detection when the worst case false alarm
is considered (the use of sup in Eq. (5.8)).
If we can show that the likelihood ratio is monotonically increasing in x for
σ21 > σ
2
0 , then the UMP test of the form in Eq. (5.9) follows from a theorem on
composite hypothesis testing [96]. It can easily be shown that the log-likelihood ratio
is given by
1
2
(
1
σ20
− 1
σ21
)
x +
n
2
ln
(
σ20
σ21
)
.
Since σ21 > σ
2
0 , this ratio is strictly increasing in x. To show that T is as given
on the left side of Eq. (5.9), we note that the probability of false alarm is given by
1− fχ2,n(T/σ20) by applying an integration change of variable in Eq. (5.8). To get the
sup in Eq. (5.8), it suﬃces to set σ20 = γ.
Having established that the simple detector of Eq. (5.6) and (5.7) can be made
uniformly most powerful, we next show that the form of the detector is equivalent to
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that of a robust (non-parametric) detector. This is an important property given that
the statistical similarity of event and non-event frames along with diﬀerence-frame
distributions that are not quite Gaussian render H1 and H0 almost indistinguishable
when the entire frame is used. Thus we would like to maximize the event detection
assuming that σ21 ≈ σ20 rather than assuming that the statistics are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent. This can be re-phrased as
max
∂β
∂σ21
|σ21=σ20 (5.10)
where β = Pr{declare H1 | H1 occurs} is the probability of detection.
The test
x
H1
>
<
H0
T (5.11)
maximizes Eq. (5.10) for a false alarm rate not exceeding α, i.e. T is chosen so that
α >
∫ ∞
T
1
σ20
fχ2,n
(
x
σ20
)
dx. (5.12)
By the proof of the Neyman-Pearson lemma [96], the optimal test can be shown
to be of the form
∂ 1
σ2
1
fχ2,n
(
x
σ2
1
)
∂σ21
∣∣∣
σ21=σ
2
0
1
σ20
fχ2,n
(
x
σ20
) H1><
H0
T˜ , (5.13)
which is equivalent to
x− nσ20
2σ40
H1
>
<
H0
T˜ . (5.14)
Letting T = 2σ40T˜ + nσ
2
0 ﬁnishes the proof.
In summary, given the actual statistics of the diﬀerence image, a non-parametric
(robust) detector is appropriate to perform event detection. However the simple
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chi-squared detector is equivalent in form to the robust detector and can be made
uniformly most powerful through threshold selection. The simple image diﬀerence
test may thus be used at the camera nodes with acceptable performance within its
class of algorithm complexity.
4. Lightweight Event Acquisition Performance
Given these desirable properties, we would like to examine how the visual event acqui-
sition algorithm performs on the real-world surveillance sequences described in Sec-
tion 1. Table XI shows the performance results obtained for these sequences arranged
in order of decreasing performance. We make several key observations regarding these
results. The ﬁrst observation is that the median performance result (corresponding
to Seq. 2 is quite similar to the results obtained in [7] despite diﬀerences in the form
of the exact LIP algorithm that is utilized (in [7] the average reported PD = 0.78
compared with our PD = 0.87 and the average reported PFA = 0.22 compared with
our PFA = 0.26). This result is encouraging in that Seq 2 corresponds to an unknown
object moving in diﬃcult outdoor conditions with signiﬁcant lighting changes and
the presence of extraneous motion. Thus despite their simple nature, LIP algorithms
for event acquisition do hold some promise. The second observation from Table XI is
that the actual PD-PFA performance varies greatly depending on the speciﬁc image
sequence. It is thus very diﬃcult to guarantee a given level of performance in the
camera node for an arbitrary sequence.
If we classify the image sequences into broad categories based on their char-
acteristics, a coarse level of performance prediction may be possible. For instance,
sequences with minimal levels of extraneous motion achieve a better overall perfor-
mance than sequences aﬄicted with such motion. Sequences where an object occupies
a larger portion of the overall frame (such as a car rather than a person) also show
158
Table XI. Event Detection Based on Lightweight Image Processing (LIP) Organized
in Order of Decreasing Detection Performance PD
Image Sequence Description PD PFA
Seq. 1 Indoor walking 1.0 0.13
Seq. 4a Outdoor car (no trees) 0.98 0.17
Seq. 2 Outdoor car (with trees) 0.87 0.26
Seq. 4b Outdoor walking (no trees) 0.50 0.03
Seq. 3 Outdoor walking (with trees) 0.05 0.23
improved PD-PFA performance
1. Though intuitive, these observations do not pro-
vide much assistance for the general WISN case where camera nodes may encounter
conditions that vary appreciably over time. We thus seek a collaborative approach
between camera nodes equipped with LIP algorithms and sensors to help capture the
value of visual detection while addressing the large variability in its performance.
E. Performance and Comparisons
As discussed in Section D, lightweight image processing (LIP) may oﬀer a suitable PD-
PFA performance for event acquisition in WISNs. This performance however exhibits
signiﬁcant variability depending on the conditions experienced during image capture.
To exploit the potential of LIP algorithms while reducing their variability, we wish
to augment the event acquisition process with sensors. Sensors however are prone to
occasional faults or deliberate stealthy attacks as studied in Chapters III and IV. We
may thus consider a variety of methods at the camera nodes for exploiting the sensor
1This conclusion extends to real-world sequences with multiple moving objects.
Indeed the presence of multiple moving objects tends to improve motion-based de-
tection. The single moving object may thus be viewed as a worst-case scenario in
certain cases.
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decisions and the LIP algorithm to improve reliability as discussed in Section C. In
this section we wish to explore the implications of utilizing a cluster head fault/attack
detector mechanism before making the sensor decisions available to the camera nodes.
Based on this input, the camera nodes may trust the sensor decisions, the LIP decision
or rely on a combination of both. For perspective, we wish to compare this scenario
with the case where sensor decisions are made available directly to the camera nodes
without a cluster head fault/attack detection mechanisms.
1. Direct Sensor Decisions Approach
In this section we focus on the PD-PFA performance of a camera node augmented with
a single sensor decision that is made directly available to the camera node as depicted
in Figure 48. Thus to perform event acquisition under this scenario, a camera node
has access to two sources of information regarding the possible occurrence of an event.
As shown in Figure 48, if there is disagreement between the two sources regarding
the presence of an event, the camera node may trust the lightweight image processing
(LIP) over the potentially faulty or attack-prone sensor. Alternatively, the camera
node may trust the sensor decision (SN) in lieu of the variability-prone LIP algorithm
or may take the “safe” strategy of declaring an event if either of the sources reports
an event.
PD =
No.(event|event frame)
No.(total frames)
(5.15)
PFA =
No.(event|non-event frame)
No.(total frames)
(5.16)
Figures 49 and 50 show the simulation results obtained for this scenario where
we use the notation IM to denote (lightweight) image processing, SN to denote the
sensor decisions and “sensor & IM” to denote use of the combination. Figure 49a
depicts the results obtained for the image sequence of Figure 46 where an unidentiﬁed
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LIP
sensor (SN)
SN
SN & LIP
camera node
attack
fault
PD
PFA
Fig. 48. For event acquisition, each camera node may utilize lightweight image process-
ing (LIP), a sensor decision (SN), or rely on both to determine the presence
or absence of an event.
individual walks through an environment with substantial background movement and
is periodically obscured due to the presence of trees. Figure 49b shows the results for
a truncated version of this sequence corresponding to Figure 47b where the camera’s
ﬁeld of view largely excludes the trees. Figure 50a shows the results for the image
sequence of Figure 45 where the passing of an unknown vehicle is captured in the
presence of signiﬁcant background variability. Finally Figure 50b shows the results
obtained for a truncated version of the passing car and corresponds to the image
sequence depicted in Figure 47a. Importantly, the horizontal axes in Figures 49 and
50 correspond to the probability q of sensor error (due to attack or fault) and the
vertical axes correspond to the probability of detection PD. The resulting probability
of false alarm for the sensor αs is also shown in the ﬁgures for each PD segment along
with the probability of false alarm for the LIP algorithm αIM . These probabilities
are obtained experimentally based on Eqs. (5.15) and (5.16) where No. denotes the
number of frames where a certain type of decision was made.
Based on Figures 49 and 50 we conﬁrm that the PD-PFA performance of the
lightweight image processing exhibits great variability from sequence to sequence.
As expected, this performance tends to improve for image sequences with better
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Fig. 49. Probability of detection PD vs. probability of sensor error q for the LIP, SN
and SN & LIP approaches for sequence (a) walk with trees from Figure 46.
(b) walk without trees from Figure 47b.
characteristics (such as less background variability). The level of improvement itself
however experiences variability as can be seen by comparing Figures 49a and 49b with
Figures 50a and 50b. We also note the inherent result that the probability of detection
PD and the probability of false alarm PFA for the image processing algorithm remain
constant over the entire range of q. This is fully expected since the visual algorithm
at the camera node is independent of the sensor readings. The lack of predictability
and control in the LIP algorithm for an arbitrary sequence is a visible disadvantage.
However the constancy of the LIP performance over the range of q is a clear advantage
as can be seen by comparing the SN and SN & LIP curves in Figures 49 and 50.
Speciﬁcally, the PD-PFA performance of the single sensor is excellent for a small
probability of error q. However if this probability of error is caused by an attack, it
may become arbitrarily large and dramatically decrease the event acquisition perfor-
mance (the performance decreases linearly with increasing q). Indeed in this setup the
sensor does not perform a fault/attack detection and therefore an attacker need not
be stealthy in the attack, but rather choose any implementable probability of attack
q. The combined SN & LIP approach however inherits the best of both approaches;
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Fig. 50. Probability of detection PD vs. probability of sensor error q for the LIP, SN
and SN & LIP approaches for sequence (a) car with trees from Figure 45. (b)
car without trees from Figure 47a.
the good performance of the sensor given a small q and the invariance of the LIP
approach over the range of q. Thus we observe that the PD-PFA performance of the
combined approach is always better than or equal to the best performance from among
the other two methods. Speciﬁcally, for a ﬁxed probability of false alarm PFA, the
probability of detection PD of the combined approach is described by Eq. (5.17). It is
important to note that the probability of false alarm of the sensor αs varies depending
on q. Thus for a direct comparison of PD with the LIP, we have to locate the point
on the SN & LIP curve where αs ≈ αIM in order to obtain the result of Eq. (5.17) (as
can be seen from the ﬁgures however, the SN & LIP curves lie above the LIP curve
for all values of q).
PDcombined ≥ max(PDLIP , PDSN) (5.17)
Since combining the LIP with a single sensor decision without cluster head check-
ing improves the performance in uncertain environments, it is important to determine
if including cluster head checking and increasing the number of sensors results in a
justiﬁably improved level of performance. Indeed the performance achieved with the
“direct sensor approach” may be suﬃcient for certain applications.
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Fig. 51. PD v.s. q for walking with trees from Figure 46. (a) ps = 0.01. (b) ps = 0.1.
(c) ps = 0.4.
2. Cluster Head Aided Event Acquisition
In this section we wish to investigate the role of cluster head (CH) checking based on
the detectors presented in Chapters III and IV, as well as the role of sensor redundancy
n in improving the PD-PFA performance in uncertain environments.
We begin by comparing the relative performance of the LIP algorithm with the
performance of the CH detector (based on decisions from n sensors). Figure 51 shows
the event acquisition performance of multiple sensors with cluster head detection and
corresponds to the image sequence of an individual walking with the presence of trees.
As before the horizontal axis represents the probability of attack q while the vertical
axis corresponds to the probability of detection PD. The probability of detection PD
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Fig. 52. PD v.s. q for walking without trees from Figure 47b. (a) ps = 0.01. (b)
ps = 0.1. (c) ps = 0.33.
of the LIP algorithm for each sequence is also shown in the ﬁgures for comparison
and all probabilities are determined experimentally from Eqs. (5.15) and (5.16). As
before, the notation IM denotes the image processing (LIP) based performance. The
number of sensors n reporting their decisions to the cluster head is varied from n = 1
to n = 40.
In assessing the relative performance of the LIP algorithm and the CH detector
with n sensors in Figures 51-52 we maintain the same probability of false alarm α.
That is, we set αs = αIM  α. In contrast, in Section E-1 a single sensor was used
instead of a CH detector. Thus the probability of false alarm αs was not adjustable
but rather varied with the attack parameter q.
Figure 52 corresponds to the image sequence of the individual without the back-
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Fig. 53. PD v.s. q for car with trees from Figure 45 (a) ps = 0.01. (b) ps = 0.1. (c)
ps = 0.44.
ground trees. Furthermore we use the notation ps to denote the probability p of an
event as witnessed by a sensor (the subscript s is used to emphasize that this proba-
bility corresponds to the conditions experienced by the sensor). We use the notation
pIM to denote the probability that a frame in a given image sequence contains an
event. In Section E-1, ps was implicitly set to pIM , however in this section we relax
this constraint to investigate the role of the probability of an event at a sensor ps as
well as the role of cluster size n.
The ﬁrst key point is that use of the CH detector fundamentally changes the
relationship between the probability of detection PD and the probability of sensor
error q. Speciﬁcally, use of the CH detector eliminates the linear decrease in sensor
performance with increasing q. Indeed the sensors achieve a better detection perfor-
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Fig. 54. PD v.s. q for car without trees from Figure 47a (a) ps = 0.01. (b) ps = 0.1.
(c) ps = 0.44.
mance for higher values of q which also results in a relatively good PD over a much
wider range of q. This result is an inherent outcome of the properties of detectors
which perform better when there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the hypotheses (in
this case the values of probabilities ps and q). Use of the detector will thus increase
the detection performance for the case of unstealthy attacks (i.e. attacks with a large
probability q relative to the cluster size n). This is in contrast with the results of
Section E-1 where an increase in q degraded the detection performance.
Figure 53 corresponds to the car sequences with the presence of trees while Figure
54 corresponds to the car sequence without background trees. Unfortunately use of
the detector alone (without LIP) for the case of very small q (such as due to stealthy
attacks or occasional errors) may not be suﬃcient, and as evidenced in the plots of
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Figures 51-54, may necessitate the use of a higher value of n.
The second key observation is that choosing a threshold Th that results in a
smaller probability of event ps results in a better sensor performance (in accordance
with the results of Chapters III and IV). Indeed for a small value of ps, it may
be possible to obtain the desired PD-PFA performance with a smaller number of
sensors n. As can be seen by comparing parts a, b, and c of Figures 51-54, choosing
ps = 0.01 (part a) oﬀers a better performance than setting ps = 0.1 (part b). Thus
in general we do not wish to set ps = pIM (part c) since pIM may be arbitrarily large
depending on the image sequence. Finally we observe that for certain values of ps and
n, the lightweight image processing algorithm (LIP) still achieves a better detection
performance for certain values of q than the CH detector.
Based on these results we now wish to investigate the performance of a camera
decision that is based on combining the CH detector with the LIP algorithm. Figure
55a shows the PD v.s. q performance for the image sequence of an individual walking
in the presence of trees (from Figure 46) while Figure 55b depicts this performance for
the truncated walking sequence (from Figure 47b). Figure 56a shows the performance
for the image sequence of a vehicle in the presence of trees (from Figure 45) while
Figure 56b depicts this performance for the truncated car sequence (from Figure 47a).
In Figures 55a, 55b, 56a and 56b, the dashed lines represent the performance
based on the CH detector alone while the solid lines represent the performance of
the combined decisions. As can be seen from these ﬁgures, the combined decisions
achieve a better (or equal) detection performance PD (for the same probability of
α) than the CH decisions or the LIP decisions alone. This is consistent with the
results obtained in Section E-1 (where a single sensor decision was utilized without
CH detection). However by utilizing the CH detector, we avoid the degradation of
the detection performance for large q while by utilizing the LIP algorithm we avoid
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Fig. 55. (a) PD v.s. q for walking sequence with tree from Figure 46 for ps = 0.01. (b)
PD v.s. q for walking sequence without tree from Figure 47b for ps = 0.33.
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Fig. 56. PD v.s. q for car sequence with tree from Figure 45 for (a) ps = 0.01. (b)
ps = 0.44.
the degradation of detection for small q. Thus based on the selection of a suitably
small ps and/or the selection of a suitably large cluster size n, we are able to adjust
the PD-PFA performance to suit the application requirements over the entire range
of error q due to error or attack.
F. Chapter Summary
Wireless image sensor networks (WISNs) consisting of untethered camera nodes and
sensors may be deployed in a variety of unattended and possibly hostile environments
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to obtain surveillance data. In such settings, the WISN nodes must perform reliable
event acquisition to limit the energy, computation and delay drains associated with
forwarding large volumes of image data wirelessly to a sink node.
In this work we investigated the event acquisition properties of WISNs that em-
ploy various techniques at the camera nodes to distinguish between event and non-
event frames in uncertain environments that may include stealthy attacks. These tech-
niques include lightweight image processing, decisions from n sensors with/without
cluster head fault and attack detection, and a combination approach relying on both
image processing and sensor decisions. In closing, we summarize the resulting prop-
erties and observations for event acquisition in WISNs:
1. Lightweight Image Processing (LIP) Approach in Uncertain Environments:
a. LIP algorithms are generally compatible with low-power, low-complexity
camera nodes [7]. Indeed analysis demonstrates that simple LIP algorithms
(such as based on the comparison of a single frame statistic to a threshold)
have the same form as robust and UMP detectors which motivates their
use.
b. The typical probabilities of detection and false alarm obtained in our ex-
periments were consistent with the average probabilities reported in the
literature with our PD = 0.87 and our PFA = 0.26.
c. While achieving an average PD-PFA performance that may be suitable
for some applications, the LIP algorithm exhibited large variability in its
performance from sequence to sequence depending on environmental con-
ditions. LIP algorithms alone thus may not oﬀer the level of performance
control and ﬂexibility required in many applications.
2. Sensor Decisions Approach in Uncertain Environments:
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a. Sensors deployed in unattended outdoor environments may be prone to
occasional faults or deliberate attacks that may be carried out in a stealthy
manner (i.e. such as to avoid detection). Although quality testing may
provide an estimate for the probability of a fault, an estimate for the
probability of an attack may not be generally available a priori. Without
veriﬁcation mechanisms, the reliability of the sensor decisions may not be
adequate for some applications.
b. An optimal Neyman-Pearson (NP) fault/attack detector based on the com-
parison of a single statistic to a threshold can be implemented at the cluster
head to verify the sensor decisions. Based on the results of Chapter III, a
detector where the comparison threshold is based on the average expected
weight (i.e. the count or degree of aggregation) can also be implemented.
This detector follows the performance of the NP detector closely, especially
for small values of the probability of an event p.
c. For the case of stealthy attacks, use of a cluster head (CH) detector forces
the attacker to select a smaller probability of attack q, especially for a
larger cluster size n. This has the dual eﬀect of rendering attacks more
rare but also harder to detect despite the ability to predict the optimal
attack parameter as given in the analysis of Chapter III. The attacker can
also improve the stealth and power of the attack by applying a stealthy
cross attack strategy as analyzed in Chapter IV. Such strategies by the
attacker necessitate the use of veriﬁcation mechanisms at the cluster head
including the use of LIP algorithms.
3. Combined LIP and Sensor Approach:
a. For the case of no cluster head attack/fault veriﬁcation, combining a single
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sensor decision with a decision based on a LIP algorithm does provide an
improved event acquisition performance. Speciﬁcally, for a ﬁxed probabil-
ity of false alarm, the combined decision achieves a probability of detection
PD higher than or equal to the PD of LIP and SN over the entire range of
the probability of sensor error q. Although better than LIP or SN alone,
the detection performance does decrease with increasing q, which without
cluster head detection, may be arbitrarily large depending on the attacker.
b. Combining decisions from n sensors with cluster head veriﬁcation and LIP
decisions provides the best overall performance over the entire range of
attack probability q. Speciﬁcally, by utilizing the CH detector we avoid
the degradation of the detection performance for large q while by utilizing
the LIP algorithm we avoid degradation of detection for small q.
c. Choosing a sensor threshold Th that results in a smaller probability of
event ps (depending on the underlying sensor technology) results in a better
sensor performance and allows the use of a smaller cluster size n to achieve
the desired PD-PFA performance.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A. Conclusions
In this work we investigate the data collection process in a sensor network at the
physical layer for the case of competing sensor networks. The networks are deployed in
a common environment where one of the networks is hostile and perpetrates the attack
in a distributed manner. In comparison with previous studies, we explicitly model
the attack as an active competition between the two sensor networks. In addressing
the problem we overcome the challenges that arise from the pervasive nature of the
attack, the possibility of tampering during data acquisition prior to encryption and
the lack of prior knowledge regarding the characteristics of the attack. We investigate
the competing networks scenario for both the case of a direct stealthy attack and the
case of a stealthy cross attack in scalar and image sensor networks.
In the direct stealthy attack each hostile node may attack a legitimate node
with some probability chosen such that the overall stealth of the hostile network is
maintained. The persistence and pervasiveness of the attack throughout the cluster
causes incorrect individual sensor decisions as well as errors in the collective decision at
the cluster head. The competitive interaction between the two networks is modeled
as a game G where we derive a stealth condition S and show its consistency and
relevance for both the hostile and the legitimate network in terms of attack detection
and mitigation. For the hostile network H we show how the stealth condition can
be utilized to select the optimal attack parameter for cases where the cluster size n
and the sensor threshold Th of the legitimate network L may not be known. For the
legitimate network L we show how the stealth condition yields the optimal defense
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parameters in terms of n and Th and how this analysis enables the use of established
detection tools such as the Neyman-Pearson paradigm. In general, the optimal attack
parameter decreases with increasing cluster size n and with decreasing probability
of an event p. While this improves attack mitigation by restricting the power of
the attack Pa, it also makes the attack less detectable at the cluster head and thus
presents a detection-mitigation trade-oﬀ for the legitimate network.
Importantly the direct stealthy attack does not require active communication
among the hostile nodes during the attack but rather depends on a level of coordi-
nation which we quantify. Compared with the active communications case, we show
that the stealthy direct attack achieves a higher power of attack Pa and a higher
power-communication-detection PCD metric for certain cases. Importantly, the di-
rect stealthy attack exhibits a constancy in the power of attack Pa with respect to
the cluster size n that may be mistaken for inherent sensor faults and is thus highly
desirable for stealth.
Finally we note the role that encryption plays in the competing networks scenario.
Forward encryption between the sensors and the sink cannot protect against a hostile
attack due to its occurrence during data collection. Based on the role of the sensor
threshold Th in the stealth game, it is the backward encryption between the sink and
the sensors that plays a role in attack mitigation and discovery.
In a stealthy cross attack, each hostile node may attack one or more legitimate
nodes with some probability, causing an incorrect decision at the sensor and an incor-
rect overall decision at the cluster head. Unlike in the direct stealthy attack however,
based on hostile node deployment and goals, two hostile nodes may both attack the
same legitimate node. The stealthy cross attack is modeled via the interaction be-
tween the hostile nodes in a static non-cooperative game Gc. The stealth utility Sc
for this scenario is derived and shown to be consistent for both the hostile and the
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legitimate networks. Based on the stealth utility, the optimal attack and defense
strategies are obtained for each network.
For the hostile network, we show that in contrast with the direct attack, mul-
tiple pure and mixed Nash equilibria exist. The resulting pure equilibria are not
advantageous for the hostile network and indeed may be considered a form of attack
interference among the hostile nodes. Surprisingly, there exist strategies for the cross
attack in terms of mixed equilibria that achieve superior stealth for H than the di-
rect stealthy attack without the need for communication. Furthermore there exists a
unique attack strategy among the mixed equilibria which results in a superior power-
communication-detection PCD metric than the direct attack. Importantly for the
hostile network, to achieve the desired Nash equilibrium in the cross attack based
on coordination without communication, the hostile nodes require knowledge of com-
mon priority lists as well as knowledge of all the nodes’ positions. Deviation from the
prescribed coordination results in a loss of stealth.
For the legitimate network, we employed the derived stealth condition Sc to ob-
tain the best defense strategies. We show how analysis of the cross attack enables use
of established techniques to detect the attack such as through the Neyman-Pearson
paradigm. Importantly, the optimal detection and mitigation strategies obtained for
the stealthy direct attack apply to the stealthy cross attack and are thus consistent.
In addition to scalar data acquisition, sensor networks may be deployed in a
variety of unattended and possibly hostile environments to obtain visual surveillance
data. Such wireless image sensor networks (WISNs) may consist of untethered camera
nodes and sensors where the latter may be prone to stealthy direct or cross attacks.
In such settings, the WISN nodes must perform reliable event acquisition to limit the
energy, computation and delay drains associated with forwarding large volumes of im-
age data wirelessly to a sink node. For the case of such WISNs, we investigate event
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acquisition properties based on various techniques at the camera nodes to distinguish
between event and non-event frames during hostile distributed attacks. These tech-
niques include lightweight image processing (LIP), decisions from n sensors with or
without cluster head attack detection, and a combination approach relying on both
image processing and sensor decisions.
Interestingly we conﬁrm that simple LIP algorithms based on the comparison
of a single frame statistic to a threshold have the same form as robust and UMP
detectors which motivates the use of such LIP algorithms. Importantly, while achiev-
ing an average PD-PFA performance that may be suitable for some applications, LIP
algorithms generally exhibit large variability in their performance from sequence to
sequence depending on environmental conditions. LIP algorithms alone thus may not
oﬀer the level of control and ﬂexibility required in many applications.
On the other hand, sensor decisions (SN) may be prone not only to occasional
errors but rather to pervasive stealthy attacks. In the case of such stealthy attacks,
increasing the cluster size n reduces the power of the attack but renders attack detec-
tion more challenging and thus constitutes a trade-oﬀ for the legitimate network L.
We show that when decisions from the n sensors are combined with attack detection
at the cluster head and with LIP decisions, the complementary characteristics of the
LIP and SN techniques result in a superior event acquisition performance. Speciﬁ-
cally, use of the cluster head detector prevents performance degradation for the case
of a large probability of sensor error while use of the LIP algorithm prevents per-
formance degradation in the regime of a small probability of sensor error. Overall,
cluster head detection along with cluster size n and threshold Th selection allow the
legitimate network L to achieve a desired PD-PFA event acquisition performance in
uncertain environments.
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B. Future Work
In this work we investigate a new and insidious form of attack on sensor network
data at the physical layer of collection. The attack aﬀects a sensor node prior to the
encryption, encoding and veriﬁcation processes. As such it necessitates the study of
attack and defense mechanisms presented in this work. Without suitable detection
and mitigation schemes, the eﬀects of the attack can be particularly detrimental to
rapid-deployment untethered visual sensor networks. For such untethered networks
(battery-operated with wireless-transmission), it may be fruitful to couple the study
of actuation attacks with other known sensor network security attacks. Such a study
might be particularly insightful when actuation attacks are considered jointly with
radio-jamming denial of service attacks. Indeed the stealthy actuation attack might
be considered a form of denial of service, where the attack aﬀects the sensing rather
than the transmission activities. Joint jamming and actuation strategies could be
analyzed to yield trade-oﬀs between the eﬀectiveness of the attack, the utilized energy
and the resulting attack stealth. Such analysis would help to guide future sensor
network architecture and security design to most eﬀectively secure the network given
available resources.
In terms of attack modeling, we note that the current abstraction captures the ef-
fects of the attack upon the decisions of the scalar sensors. The alteration of decisions
through actuation is modeled as a binary symmetric channel where the probability
of altering a decision from 0→ 1 is the same as the probability of altering a decision
from 1 → 0. Such a model is useful in the current study where we do not wish to
restrict the analysis to a speciﬁc type of actuator. Given knowledge of the charac-
teristics of a speciﬁc type of actuator, a binary asymmetric channel model could be
adopted and yield further insights.
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Further extensions of this work may consider an alternative interpretation of the
hostile network. Instead of interpreting the hostile network as a foreign entity, we
may interpret the hostile network as formed from a set of malicious nodes inside
the legitimate network. This is a common scenario investigated by sensor network
security researchers. In such a scenario, a node belonging to the legitimate network
becomes malicious when it is captured and reprogrammed by an outside entity for
nefarious purposes. When several such nodes are captured, they may form a hostile
sub-network within the legitimate network based on their programming. If active
communication among the subverted nodes is not allowed, the hostile nodes may
require a framework for distributed attack coordination without prior knowledge of
the defense systems at the cluster head and without prior knowledge regarding other
hostile nodes. Speciﬁcally, a given malicious node may not know a priori if a given
neighboring node inside the network is also malicious and will participate in the
attack. The framework developed in this work may serve as a starting point in the
analysis of attack and defense strategies for this scenario.
178
REFERENCES
[1] W. Yu, Z. Ji, and K. J. R. Liu, “Securing cooperative ad hoc networks under
noise and imperfect monitoring: Strategies and game theoretic analysis,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 1556–
6013, June 2007.
[2] C. Hua and T.-S. P. Yum, “Asynchronous random sleeping for sensor networks,”
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 15–30, February 2007.
[3] T. He, S. Krishnamurthy, L. Luo, T. Yan, L. Gu, R. Stoleru, G. Zhou, Q. Cao,
P. Vicaire, J. A. Stankovic, and T. F. Abdelzaher, “Vigilnet: An integrated
sensor network system for energy-eﬃcient surveillance,” ACM Transactions on
Sensor Networks, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1–38, February 2006.
[4] A. Czarlinska and D. Kundur, “Reliable event-detection in wireless visual sen-
sor networks through scalar collaboration and game theoretic consideration,”
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia, Special Issue on Multimedia Applications in
Mobile/Wireless Contexts, August 2008, to appear.
[5] C.-Y. Chong and S. P. Kumar, “Sensor networks: Evolution, opportunities and
challenges,” The Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 91, no. 8, pp. 1247–1256, August
2003.
[6] A. Czarlinska, W. Luh, and D. Kundur, “Attacks on sensing in hostile wire-
less sensor-actuator environments,” in Proc. IEEE Globecom, Washington, DC,
November 2007, pp. 1001–1005.
[7] M. Rahimi, R. Baer, O. I. Iroezi, J. C. Garcia, J. Warrior, D. Estrin, and M. Sri-
vastava, “Cyclops: In situ image sensing and interpretation in wireless sensor
179
networks,” in Proc. ACM International Conference on Embedded Networked
Sensor Systems, San Diego, CA, November 2005, pp. 192–204.
[8] A. Czarlinska, W.Luh, and D. Kundur, “G-E-M sensor networks for mission
critical surveillance in hostile environments,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM Work-
shop on Mission Critical Networks, Phoenix, AZ, April 2008, pp. 1–6.
[9] W. Luh and D. Kundur, “Distributed privacy for visual sensor networks via
Markov shares,” in Proc. IEEE Workshop on Dependability and Security in
Sensor Networks and Systems, Columbia, MD, April 2006, pp. 23–34.
[10] D. Kundur, W. Luh, U. N. Okorafor, and T. Zourntos, “Emerging security
paradigms for vision-rich sensor networks,” The Proceedings of the IEEE Special
Issue on Distributed Multimedia, vol. 96, no. 1, pp. 112–130, January 2008.
[11] W. Luh, D. Kundur, and T. Zourntos, “A novel distributed privacy paradigm
for visual sensor networks based on sharing dynamical systems,” EURASIP
Journal on Applied Signal Processing, no. 1, pp. 218 – 234, January 2007.
[12] R. Wood, “Fly, robot ﬂy,” IEEE Spectrum, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 25–29, March
2008.
[13] L. Girod, N. Ramanathan, J. Elson, T. Stathopoulos, M. Lukac, and D. Es-
trin, “Emstar: A software environment for developing and deploying hetero-
geneous sensor-actuator networks,” ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks,
vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 13–26, October 2007.
[14] I. F. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “A survey on
sensor networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 40, no. 8, pp. 102–114,
August 2002.
180
[15] E. Shi and A. Perrig, “Designing secure sensor networks,” IEEE Wireless Com-
munications, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 38–43, December 2004.
[16] A. Basharat, N. Catbas, and M. Shah, “A framework for intelligent sensor
network with video camera for structural health monitoring of bridges,” in Proc.
IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Workshop, Pisa, Italy, March 2005, pp. 385–389.
[17] J.-F. Chamberland and V. Veeravalli, “Asymptotic results for decentralized
detection in power constrained wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 1007–1015, August 2004.
[18] W. B. Heinzelman, A. P. Chandrakasan, and H. Balakrishnan, “An application-
speciﬁc protocol architecture for wireless microsensor networks,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Wireless Communications, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 660–670, October 2002.
[19] K. Liu and A. Sayeed, “Asymptotically optimal decentralized type-based de-
tection in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference
on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, Hong Kong, China, May 2004, pp.
873–876.
[20] J.-F. Chamberland, “Design of sensor networks for detection applications via
large-deviation theory,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Urbana, IL, June 2004.
[21] A. Czarlinska and D. Kundur, “Wireless image sensor networks: Event acqui-
sition in attack-prone and uncertain environments,” Springer Multidimensional
Systems and Signal Processing, Special Issue on Image and Video Processing in
Wireless Sensor Networks, 2008, submitted.
181
[22] C. Yu, S. Soro, G. Sharma, and W. Heinzelman, “Lifetime-distortion trade-oﬀ
in image sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Image
Processing, San Antonio, TX, September 2007, pp. 129–132.
[23] K. Chakrabarty, S. S. Iyengar, H. Qi, and E. Cho, “Grid coverage for surveil-
lance and target location in distributed sensor networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Computers, vol. 51, no. 12, pp. 1448–1453, December 2002.
[24] K. Chakrabaty and S. Iyengar, “Sensor placement in distributed sensor networks
using a coding theory framework,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium on Information
Theory, Washington, DC, June 2001, pp. 157–158.
[25] H. Yu, J. Iyer, H. Kim, E. J. Kim, K. H. Yum, and P. S. Mah, “K-coverage in the
presence of mobility in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM,
San Francisco, CA, November 2006, pp. 1–5.
[26] L. Benyuan and D. Towsley, “A study of the coverage of large-scale sensor
networks,” in Proc. IEEE Mobile and Ad Hoc Systems, Fort Lauderdale, FL,
October 2004, pp. 475– 483.
[27] Y. Zou and K. Chakrabaty, “Uncertainty-aware and coverage-oriented deploy-
ment for sensor networks,” Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing,
vol. 64, no. 7, pp. 788–798, July 2004.
[28] S. Meguerdichian, F. Koushanfar, G. Qu, and M. Potkonjak, “Exposure in
wireless ad hoc sensor networks,” in Proc. Annual International Conference on
Mobile Computing and Networking, Rome, Italy, July 2001, pp. 139–150.
[29] H. Kim, “Topology management protocols in ad hoc wireless sensor networks,”
Ph.D. dissertation, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, December
182
2007.
[30] S. Capkun and J.-P. Hubaux, “Secure positioning of wireless devices with app-
plication to sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Miami, FL, March
2005, pp. 1917–1928.
[31] D. Raymond and S. Midkiﬀ, “Denial-of-service in wireless sensor networks: At-
tacks and defenses,” IEEE Pervasive Computing, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 74–81, Jan-
uary 2008.
[32] A. D. Wood and J. A. Stankovic, “Denial of service in sensor networks,” IEEE
Computer, vol. 35, no. 10, pp. 54–62, October 2002.
[33] J. McCune, E. Shi, A. Perrig, and M. K. Reiter, “Detection of denial-of-message
attacks on sensor network broadcasts,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 2005, pp. 64–78.
[34] M. Lee, E. J. Kim, and C. W. Lee, “Source identiﬁcation scheme against DDoS
attacks in cluster interconnects,” in Proc. International Workshop on Network
Design and Architecture, Montreal, Quebec, August 2004, pp. 354–362.
[35] A. Czarlinska and D. Kundur, “Distributed actuation attacks in wireless sensor
networks: Implications and countermeasures,” in Proc. IEEE Workshop on
Dependability and Security in Sensor Networks and Systems, Baltimore, MD,
2006, pp. 3–12.
[36] ——, “Towards characterizing the eﬀectiveness of random mobility against ac-
tuation attacks,” Computer Communications Special Issue on Sensor and Ac-
tuator Networks, vol. 30, no. 13, pp. 2546–2559, September 2007.
183
[37] R. Viswanathan and P. Varshney, “Distributed detection with multiple sensors:
Part I - fundamentals,” The Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 85, no. 1, pp. 54–63,
June 1997.
[38] R. Blum, A. S. Kassam, and H. V. Poor, “Distributed detection with multiple
sensors: Part II - advanced topics,” The Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 85, no. 1,
pp. 64–79, June 1997.
[39] A. D‘Costa and A. M. Sayeed, “Data versus decision fusion in wireless sensor
networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Acoustic, Speech and
Signal Processing, Hong Kong, China, April 2003, pp. 832–835.
[40] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1994.
[41] L. Zhou and Z. J. Haas, “Securing ad hoc networks,” IEEE Network, vol. 13,
no. 6, pp. 24–30, November 1999.
[42] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, “A key-management scheme for distributed
sensor networks,” in Proc. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Washingtion, DC, November 2002, pp. 41–47.
[43] L. Buttya`n and J.-P. Hubaux, “Report on a working session on security in wire-
less ad hoc networks,” in Proc. ACM Mobile Computing and Communications
Review, New York, NY, November 2002, pp. 1–17.
[44] B. Przydatek, D. Song, and A. Perrig, “SIA: Secure information aggregation in
sensor networks,” in Proc. ACM International Conference on Embedded Net-
worked Sensor Systems, Los Angeles, CA, November 2003, pp. 255–265.
184
[45] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random key predistribution schemes for
sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland,
CA, May 2003, pp. 197–213.
[46] M. Ramkumar and N. Memon, “On the security of random key pre-distribution
schemes,” in Proc. IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance and Security,
West Point, New York, June 2004, pp. 5–10.
[47] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. Kluwer
Key Distribution Techniques for Sensor Networks, New York, NY, January
2004, pp. 277–303.
[48] A. Czarlinska, W. Luh, and D. Kundur, “On privacy and security in distributed
visual sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Image Pro-
cessing, San Diego, CA, October 2008, to appear.
[49] A. Czarlinska and D. Kundur, “Reliable scalar-visual event-detection in wireless
visual sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE Consumer Communications & Network-
ing Conference Special Session on Image/Video Processing & Wireless Sensor
Networks, Las Vegas, NV, January 2008, pp. 660–664.
[50] ——, “Attack vs. failure detection in event-driven wireless visual sensor net-
works,” in Proc. ACM Multimedia and Security Workshop, Dallas, TX, Septem-
ber 2007, pp. 215–220.
[51] ——, “Event-driven visual sensor networks: Issues in reliability,” in Proc. IEEE
Workshop on Video/Image Sensor Networks, Boulder, CO, January 2008, pp.
1–5.
185
[52] M. J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
[53] J. Huang, “Wireless resource allocation: Auctions, games and optimization,”
Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, December 2005.
[54] R. Johari, “Eﬃcienty loss in market mechanisms for resource allocation,” Ph.D.
dissertation, M.I.T., Cambridge, MA, June 2004.
[55] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. New York, NY: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004.
[56] M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA:
M.I.T Press, 1994.
[57] G. Romp, Game Theory. Introduction and Applications. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
[58] R. Kannan, S. Ray, S. Sarangi, and S. Iyengar, “Minimal sensor integrity: Mea-
suring the vulnerability of sensor grids,” Information Processing Letters, vol. 86,
no. 1, pp. 49–55, April 2003.
[59] D. Mukhopadhyay and S. Roy, “A game based model of security for key predis-
tribution schemes in wireless sensor network,” in Proc. International Conference
on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology, Bhubaneswar, India, De-
cember 2005, pp. 334–347.
[60] C. Cetinkaya and M. Yildirim, “A game theoretical approach to medium ac-
cess control protocol for sensor networks,” in Proc. IIE Annual Conference and
Exhibition, Manchester, England, March 2004, pp. 161–162.
186
[61] P. Nurmi, “Modelling routing in wireless ad hoc networks with dynamic
Bayesian games,” in Proc. IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sen-
sor and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, Reston, VA, September 2004,
pp. 63–70.
[62] R. Kannan, S. Sarangi, L. Ray, and S. Iyengar, “Sensor-centric quality of routing
in sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, San Francisco, CA, April 2003,
pp. 692–701.
[63] T. Wang, Y. Han, P. Varshney, and P. Chen, “Distributed fault-tolerant classi-
ﬁcation in wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Com-
munication, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 724–734, April 2005.
[64] L. Chitnis, A. Dobra, and S. Ranka, “Aggregation methods for large-scale sensor
networks,” ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 1–36,
January 2008.
[65] H. Gupta, V. Navda, S. Das, and V. Chowdhary, “Eﬃcient gathering of corre-
lated data in sensor networks,” ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, vol. 4,
no. 1, pp. 1–31, March 2008.
[66] S. Yoon and C. Shahabi, “The clustered aggregation (CAG) technique leverag-
ing spatial and temporal correlations in wireless sensor networks,” ACM Trans-
actions on Sensor Networks, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 30–43, May 2007.
[67] D. Estrin, R. Govindan, J. Heidemann, and S. Kumar, “Next century chal-
lenges: Scalable coordination in sensor networks,” in Proc. ACM/IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, Washington, DC,
August 1999, pp. 263–270.
187
[68] F. Ye, H. Luo, S. Lu, and L. Zhang, “Statistical en-route detection and ﬁltering
of injected false data in sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Hong
Kong, China, March 2004, pp. 2446 –2457.
[69] S. Zhu, S. Setia, S. Jajodia, and P. Ning, “Interleaved hop-by-hop authentica-
tion against false data injection attacks in sensor networks,” ACM Transactions
on Sensor Networks, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1–14, December 2007.
[70] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, “Leap+: Eﬃcient security mechanisms for
large-scale distributed sensor networks,” ACM Transactions on Sensor Net-
works, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 500–528, April 2006.
[71] S. Madden, M. J. Franklin, J. M. Hellerstein, and W. Hong, “Tag: A tiny aggre-
gation service for ad-hoc sensor networks,” in Proc. Symposium on Operating
Systems Design and Implementation, vol. 36, Boston, MA, December 2002, pp.
131–146.
[72] N. Shrivastava, C. Buragohain, D. Agrawal, and S. Suri, “Medians and beyond:
New aggregation techniques for sensor networks,” in Proc. ACM International
Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, Baltimore, MD, November
2004, pp. 239–249.
[73] D. Wagner, “Resilient aggregation in sensor networks,” in Proc. ACM Workshop
on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, Washington, DC, October 2004,
pp. 78–87.
[74] L. Hu and D. Evans, “Secure aggregation for wireless networks,” in Proc. Sym-
posium on Applications and the Internet Workshops, Orlando, FL, January
2003, pp. 384 – 391.
188
[75] H. Chan, D. Song, and A. Perrig, “Secure hierarchical in-network aggregation in
sensor networks,” in Proc. ACM Conference on Computer and Communication
Security, Alexandria, VA, October 2006, pp. 278–287.
[76] R. Anderson and M. Kuhn, “Tamper resistance - A cautionary note,” in Proc.
USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, Oakland, CA, November 1996,
pp. 3–13.
[77] ——, “Low cost attacks on tamper resistant devices,” in Proc. International
Workshop on Security Protocols, Paris, France, April 1997, pp. 125–136.
[78] O. Komerling and M. G. Kuhn, “Design principles for tamper-resistant smart-
card processors,” in Proc. USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology,
Chicago, IL, March 1999, pp. 1–13.
[79] N. Sastry, U. Shankar, and D. Wagner, “Secure veriﬁcation of location claims,”
in Proc. ACM Wireless Security Workshop, San Diego, CA, September 2003,
pp. 1–10.
[80] L. Hu and D. Evans, “Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole at-
tacks,” in Proc. Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium,
San Diego, CA, February 2004, pp. 2–12.
[81] X. Wang, W. Gu, S. Chellappan, K. Schoseck, and D. Xuan, “Lifetime opti-
mization of sensor networks under physical attacks,” in Proc. IEEE Internationl
Conference on Communications, Seoul, South Korea, May 2005, pp. 3295–3301.
[82] P. Ning, A. Liu, and W. Du, “Mitigating DoS attacks against broadcast authen-
tication in wireless sensor networks,” ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks,
vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1–35, March 2008.
189
[83] A. Agah, S. K. Das, and K. Basu, “A game theory based approach for secu-
rity in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on
Performance, Computing and Communications, Phoenix, AZ, April 2004, pp.
259–263.
[84] K. B. A. Agah and S. K. Das, “Preventing DoS attack in sensor networks: A
game theoretic approach,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Commu-
nications, Seoul, South Korea, May 2005, pp. 3218–3222.
[85] Z. Yan, P. Zhang, and T. Virtanen, “Trust evaluation based security solution
in ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of the Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems,
Gjovik, Norway, October 2003, pp. 121–125.
[86] K. Ren, T. Li, Z. Wan, F. Bao, R. H. Deng, and K. Kim, “Highly reliable trust
establishment scheme in ad hoc networks,” International Journal of Computer
and Telecommunications Networking, vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 687–699, August 2004.
[87] S. Ganeriwal and M. Srivastava, “Reputation-based framework for high integrity
sensor networks,” in Proc. ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor
Networks, Washington, DC, October 2004, pp. 66–77.
[88] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease, “The Byzantine Generals’ problem,”
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, vol. 4, no. 3, pp.
382–401, July 1982.
[89] V. Kulatliumani, A. Arora, Y. Kim, P. Shankar, and R. Yedavalli, “Reliable
control system design despite Byzantine actuators,” in Proc. IEEE International
Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, Denver, CO, April 2005, pp.
2297–2304.
190
[90] D. Huang and D. Medhi, “A Byzantine resilient multi-path key establishment
scheme and its robustness analysis for sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE Interna-
tional Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, Denver, CO, April 2005,
pp. 8–16.
[91] D. Angluin, M. Fischer, and H. Jiang, “Stabilizing consensus in mobile net-
works,” in Proc. IEEE Distributed Computing in Sensor Systems, San Fran-
cisco, CA, June 2006, pp. 37–50.
[92] I. Akyildiz, T. Melodia, and K. Chowdhury, “A survey on wireless multimedia
sensor networks,” Computer Networks, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 921–960, March 2007.
[93] R. J. McEliece, R. B. Ash, and C. Ash, Introduction to Discrete Mathematics.
New York, NY: Random House Inc., 1989.
[94] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell System Tech-
nical Journal, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[95] S. Boyd and C. Barratt, Linear Controller Design: Limits of Performance.
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1991.
[96] H. L. Van Trees, Detection, Estimation, and Modulation Theory Part I. New
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001.
[97] A. Czarlinska and D. Kundur, “Coordination and selﬁshness in attacks on visual
sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking
Conference, Las Vegas, NV, March 2008, pp. 2391–2396.
[98] F. Fu and M. V. D. Schaar, “Noncollaborative resource management for wire-
less multimedia applications using mechanism design,” IEEE Transactions on
Multimedia, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 851–868, June 2007.
191
[99] Z. He and D. Wu, “Resource allocation and performance analysis of wireless
video sensors,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technol-
ogy, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 590–599, May 2006.
[100] I. Akyildiz and I. Kasimoglu, “Wireless sensor and actor networks: Research
challenges,” Ad Hoc Networks Journal, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 3351–3677, 2004.
[101] H. Ma and Y. Liu, “Correlation based video processing in video sensor net-
works,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Wireless Networks, Com-
munications and Mobile Computing, Montreal, Canada, June 2005, pp. 987–992.
[102] K. Veeraraghavan, D. Peng, and H. Sharif, “Energy eﬃcient multi-resolution
visual surveillance on wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Electro Information Technology, Lincoln, NE, May 2005, pp.
6–12.
[103] D. Maniezzo, K. Yao, and G. Mazzini, “Energetic trade-oﬀ between computing
and communication resource in multimedia surveillance sensor network,” in
Proc. IEEE Conference on Mobile and Wireless Communications Networks,
Stockholm, Sweden, September 2002, pp. 373–376.
[104] C. Margi, V. Petkov, K. Obraczka, and R. Manduchi, “Characterizing energy
consumption in a visual sensor network testbed,” in Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Testbeds and Research Infrastructures for the Development of
Networks and Communities, Barcelona, Spain, March 2006, pp. 1–8.
[105] T. Aach and A. Kaup, “Statistical model-based change detection in moving
video,” Signal Processing, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 165–180, March 1993.
192
[106] L. Hongliang, L. Guizhong, Z. Zhongwei, and L. Yongli, “Adaptive scene-
detection algorithm for VBR video stream,” IEEE Transactions on Multimedia,
vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 624–633, August 2004.
[107] M. Eltoweissy, M. Moharrum, and R. Mukkamala, “Dynamic key management
in sensor networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 122–
130, April 2006.
[108] M. Eltoweissy, A. Wadaa, S. Olariu, and L. Wilson, “Scalable cryptographic
key management in wireless sensor networks,” Journal of Ad Hoc Networks
Special issue on Data Communications and Topology Control in Ad Hoc Net-
works, vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 796–802, September 2005.
[109] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random key predistribution schemes for
sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland,
CA, May 2003, pp. 197–213.
[110] K.-Y. Chow, K.-S. Lui, and E. Lam, “Eﬃcient on-demand image transmission in
visual sensor networks,” EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing,
vol. 2007, no. 5, pp. 323–333, February 2007.
[111] ——, “Balancing image quality and energy consumption in visual sensor net-
works,” in Proc. IEEE International Symposium on Wireless Pervasive Com-
puting, Phuket, Thailand, January 2006, pp. 201–205.
[112] V. Rodriguez, “Resource management for scalably encoded information: the
case of image transmission over wireless networks,” in Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Multimedia and Expo, Baltimore, MD, July 2003, pp. 813–816.
[113] S. Bandyopadhyay and E. Coyle, “An energy eﬃcient hierarchical clustering
193
algorithm for wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, San Fran-
cisco, CA, March 2003, pp. 1713–1723.
[114] S. Olariu, M. Eltoweissy, and M. Younis, “ANSWER: Autonomous networked
sensor system,” Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, vol. 67, no. 1,
pp. 111–124, January 2007.
[115] P. L. Rosin, “Thresholding for change detection,” Computer Vision and Image
Understanding, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 79–95, May 2002.
[116] M. Wu and C. Chen, “Collaborative image coding and transmission over wireless
sensor networks,” EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, vol. 1,
no. 70481, pp. 1–9, January 2007.
[117] R. Radke, S. A. O. Al-Kofahi, and B. Roysam, “Image change detection algo-
rithms: A systematic survey,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 14,
no. 3, pp. 294–307, March 2005.
[118] T. Aach and A. Kaup, “Bayesian algorithms for adaptive change detection in
image sequences using Markov random ﬁelds,” Signal Processing Image Com-
munication, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 147–160, August 1995.
[119] K. V. Mardia and I. L. Dryden, “The statistical analysis of shape data,”
Biometrika, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 271–281, January 1989.
[120] S. Ganeriwal, A. Kansal, and M. Srivastava, “Self aware actuation for fault
repair in sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Robotics
and Automation, vol. 5, Barcelona, Spain, April 2004, pp. 5244–5249.
[121] M. Rahimi, H. Shah, G. S. Sukhatme, J. Heideman, and D. Estrin, “Study-
ing the feasibility of energy harvesting in a mobile sensor network,” in Proc.
194
IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Taipei, Taiwan,
September 2003, pp. 19–24.
[122] S. Cˇapkun, J.-P. Hubaux, and L. Buttya`n, “Mobility helps security in ad hoc
networks,” in Proc. ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Network
and Computing, Annapolis, MD, June 2003, pp. 46–56.
[123] M. Laibowitz and J. Paradiso, “Parasitic mobility in dynamically distributed
sensor networks,” in Proc. International Conference on Pervasive Computing,
vol. 3468, Munich, Germany, May 2005, pp. 255–278.
[124] S. Meguerdichian, F. Koushanfar, M. PotKonjak, and M. B. Srivastava, “Cov-
erage problems in wireless ad-hoc sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE Infocom,
Anchorage, AK, April 2001, pp. 1380–1387.
[125] ——, “Worst and best-case coverage in sensor networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Mobile Computing, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 84–92, January 2005.
[126] X. Li, Peng-JunWan, and O. Frieder, “Coverage in wireless ad hoc sensor net-
works,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 753–763, June
2003.
[127] D. Mehta, M. Lopez, and L. Lino, “Optimal coverage paths in ad-hoc sensor
networks,” in IEEE International Conference on Communications, Anchorage,
AK, May 2003, pp. 507–511.
[128] J. Liu, X. Koutsoukos, J. Reich, and F. Zhao, “Sensing ﬁeld: Coverage char-
acterization in distributed sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Con-
ference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, Hong Kong, China, April
2003, pp. 173–176.
195
[129] G. Kesidis, T. Konstantopoulos, and S. Phoha, “Surveillance coverage of sensor
networks under a random mobility strategy,” in Proc. IEEE Sensors, Toronto,
Canada, October 2003, pp. 961–965.
[130] R. Kannan, S. Sarangi, S. Ray, and S. S. Iyengar, “Minimal sensor integrity:
Measuring the vulnerability of sensor deployments,” Information Processing
Letters, vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 49–55, April 2003.
[131] S. Meguerdichian, S. Slijepcevic, V. Karayan, and M. Potkonjak, “Localized
algorithms in wireless ad-hoc networks: Location discovery and sensor expo-
sure,” in Proc. ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking
and Computing, Long Beach, CA, October 2001, pp. 106–116.
[132] A. Tews, M. J. Mataric, and G. Sukhatme, “Avoiding detection in a dynamic
environment,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Robots
and Systems, Sendai, Japan, September 2004, pp. 3773–3778.
[133] A. Howard, J. J. Mataric´, and G. S. Sukhatme, “An incremental self-deployment
algorithm for mobile sensor networks,” Autonomous Robots Special Issue on
Intelligent Embedded Systems, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 113–126, September 2002.
[134] W. Xu, W. Trappe, Y. Zhang, and T. Wood, “The feasibility of launching and
detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks,” in Proc. ACM International
Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, Urbana, IL, May
2005, pp. 46–57.
[135] K. Ma, Y. Zhang, and W. Trappe, “Mobile network management and robust
spatial retreats via network dynamics,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference
on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, Washington, DC, November 2005, pp.
202–209.
196
[136] A. Wood, J. Stankovic, and S. Son, “Jam: A jammed-area mapping service for
sensor networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Real-Time Systems Symposium,
Cancun, Mexico, December 2003, pp. 286–297.
197
APPENDIX A
STEALTHY DIRECT ATTACK ANALYSIS
1. Non-negativity of Terms Outside Log in Proof of Theorem 2
The terms with q solely in the exponent can never be negative. The term (1 −
q)n(1−q) > 0 since q ≤ 1. Now suppose that 2p = min{2p, 2(1 − p)}, which implies
p ≤ 1/2. Then 1− p− q/2 ≥ 1− 2p ≥ 0 since p ≤ 1/2, and p− q/2 ≥ 0 since q ≤ 2p.
On the other hand, supposed that 2(1−p) = min{2p, 2(1−p)}, which implies p ≥ 1/2.
Then 1− p− q/2 ≥ 0 since q ≤ 2(1− p), and p− q/2 ≥ 2p− 1 ≥ 0 since p ≥ 1/2.
2. Non-positivity of Log Term in Proof of Theorem 2
We show that the argument inside ln, α(q) = (4(p−q/2)(1−p−q/2))/((1−q)2) ≤ 1,
in the well-deﬁned interval, hence showing that the ln term is always non-positive.
∂α(q)
∂q
= −2(1− 2p)
2
(1− q)3 (A.1)
Eq. (A.1) is always non-positive, so α(q) is monotonically decreasing. The largest
value α(q) takes is at q = 0, and this value is 4p(1− p) ≤ 1 since p = 0.5 yields the
maximum value of 1.
3. Uncoordinated Attack Analysis
In this appendix we discuss the background analysis for the uncoordinated stealthy
direct attack game. A methodology for determining the Nash equilibria of a game is
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via the best response function shown in Eq. (A.2).
Bi(a−i) = {ai ∈ Ai : ui(ai, a−i) ≥ ui(a′i, a−i)} (A.2)
for all a′i ∈ Ai
The action proﬁle a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game iﬀ every player’s action
is a best response to the other players’ actions, that is, a∗i ∈ Bi(a∗−i) for every player
i. For the case of an uncoordinated stealthy direct game we obtain the following best
response functions.
Bi(qj) = 0 if qj ≤ Tp (A.3)
Bi(qj) = 1 if qj ≥ Tp
Tp = 1/βp (A.4)
βp ∈ [1, 1.5]
Via the intersection of the two best response functions, there are two Nash equilibria
given by:
(q1,N , q2,N) = {(0, 0), (1, 1)} (A.5)
The utilities achievable at these Nash equilibria are given by:
πi(0, 0) = 1 (A.6)
πi(1, 1) = βp − 1 (A.7)
Proof 13
∂πi(q1, q2)
∂qi
= βpqj − 1 (A.8)
qj =
1
βp
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Thus (qi, qj) = (1/βp, 1/βp) is a point of interest since we note that both players
are indiﬀerent among the set of actions available to them. Speciﬁcally, all actions
qi ∈ [0, 1] result in the same utility which is independent of that action and depends
only on the value of βp. By examining Figure 23, we see that this point corresponds to
the saddle point of the manifold. As we will show, this point represents an important
threshold that inﬂuences a node’s optimal response.
π1(q1,
1
βp
) = 1 + βp(
1
βp
)q1 − 1βp − q1
= 1− 1
βp
= π1(
1
βp
) (A.9)
To understand what happens away from this point, we examine the utility π1 for a
ﬁxed p and q2. Let q˜2 = 1/βp +  where  > 0. Then:
π1(q1, q˜2) = 1 + βp(
1
βp
+ )q1 − q1 − ( 1
βp
+ )
= 1− ( 1
βp
+ ) + (βp)q1 (A.10)
It is easy to see that for any qˆ1 > q1, π1(qˆ1) > π1(q1) since βp ∈ [1, 1.5] and  > 0.
Thus the function is strictly increasing in q1 with the maximum occurring at the edge of
the interval [0, 1], namely at q1 = 1, yielding the utility π1(q1 = 1) = 1−(1/βp+)+βp.
Therefore we conclude that B1(q2) = 1 iﬀ q2 > 1/βp.
In summary, the best response of q1 to q˜2 = 1/βp +  for  > 0 is to actuate with
q1 = 1. Now we consider the next iteration and we determine the best response of q˜2
to q1 = 1. Node 2’s utility is given by:
π2(q1, q2) = 1− (q1 + q2) + βpq1q2
π2(1, q˜2) = q˜2(βp − 1) (A.11)
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The maximum of this function is achieved by setting q˜2 = 1, giving a maximal utility
of πi(1, 1) = βp − 1. Thus the pure Nash equilibrium is given by:
(q1,N , q2,N) = (1, 1) (A.12)
ui(1, 1) = βp − 1 (A.13)
Similarly if we let q˜2 = 1/βp −  where  > 0. Then:
π1(q1, q˜2) = 1 + βp(
1
βp
− )q1 − q1 − ( 1
βp
− )
= 1− (βp)q1 − ( 1
βp
− ) (A.14)
This function is strictly decreasing with q1 since βp ∈ [1, 1.5] and since  > 0 with
the minimum occurring at the left end point of the interval [0, 1], namely at q1 = 0.
This results in the maximum utility π1(q1 = 0) = 1− (1/βp − ).
Therefore we have determined that the best response of q1 to q2 = (1/βp)−  for
 > 0 is to set q1 = 0. We now iterate the best response procedure to ﬁnd the optimal
response of q2 to q1 = 0. The utility of node 2 π2 is given by:
π2(q1, q2) = π2(q1, q2) = 1− (q1 + q2) + βpq1q2
π2(0, q˜2) = 1− q2 (A.15)
This utility is maximized by choosing q2 = 0. Therefore (q1,N , q2,N ) = (0, 0) is
another equilibrium point of the game and yield the utility πi = 1 to each of the
players.
In summary we conclude that Bi(qj) = 0 iﬀ qj < 1/βp and that Bi(qj) = 1 iﬀ
qj > 1/βp.
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APPENDIX B
STEALTHY IMAGE SENSOR NETWORK ANALYSIS
In this appendix we analyze in greater detail the statistics of a representative image
sequence, that is Seq. 2 from Figure 45, showing a moving car with trees. As pointed
out in Aach and Kaup [105], [118], the diﬀerence pixels Di generally do not obey a
normal distribution model though this assumption is commonly made. To investigate
the possible distribution of the diﬀerence pixels, we make use of a typical q-q plot as
shown in Figure 57 for the moving car sequence.
The q-q plot is used to test whether a set of samples are empirically Gaussian.
The Gaussian assumption is rejected if the q-q plot returns a set of points that lie
far oﬀ the straight line. As shown in Figures. 57a and 57b, this is indeed the case
for the car sequence under both hypotheses. The points lying oﬀ the main line may
either indicate the presence of massive outliers in the data (the diﬀerence pixels), or
may indicate that the distribution is not Gaussian. We thus call upon the use of
histograms to provide further clues regarding the pixel distribution. The histograms
for the diﬀerence images under the two hypotheses are shown in Figure 58a and 58b.
These histograms show that the distributions are most likely bell-shaped as can
be conﬁrmed through the use of Mardia statistics [119]. Based on the q-q plots and the
histograms, we thus approximate the diﬀerence pixels as Gaussian. We note however
that this assumption tends to fail for event frames (alternative hypothesis) where
regions of interest that undergo change have a diﬀerent distribution than regions of
no change. Hence strictly speaking the Gaussian assumption only holds for certain
non-event frames and certain regions of an event frame. It is nevertheless a helpful
approximation that leads to a non-parametric (robust) detector.
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Fig. 57. Test for normality of diﬀerence images or q-q plot (car sequence) under (a)
H0. (b) H1.
In addition to the distribution assumption, we also consider the assumption that
σ21 > σ
2
0 . Indeed this assumption is imperfect since in order for every diﬀerence
pixel in an event frame to have σ21, the object would have to move across the entire
frame, thus covering all pixels. In Aach and Kaup [105], [118], smaller blocks are
assumed to mitigate this ﬂaw. However through our use of entire diﬀerence frames,
this assumption does not hold. To mitigate this issue we can assume that the eﬀect
of a small movement can be distributed across all pixels by decreasing σ21. This
assumption is more realistic since if we use the entire frame to estimate σ21, then the
estimate of σ21 will mostly be of the non-moving regions. Thus the variance will be
decreased to σ21 ≈ σ20, leading to the use of a robust (non-parametric) detector.
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Fig. 58. Diﬀerence image histogram (car sequence) under (a) H0. (b) H1.
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APPENDIX C
SENSOR AND ACTUATOR TECHNOLOGIES
The functionality and envisioned capabilities of individual sensor nodes and of sensor
networks as a whole continue to broaden with advances in various micro technolo-
gies [100], [92]. Indeed sensor nodes are increasingly acquiring robot-like qualities
through the addition of various actuation functionalities and robotic devices are in-
creasingly shrinking in size to resemble nodes. For instance, tiny ﬂying robots the
size of a penny (3 centimeters wingspan and weighting 60 milligrams not including
the battery [12]) are envisioned for remote aerial surveillance and data acquisition.
Other robotic/sensor-like devices are being tested for aquatic environments and land
applications.
In the scope of this work, actuation in sensor networks is deﬁned broadly as the
ability of a node to act upon, change or inﬂuence its environment using limited energy.
The latter requirement is in contrast with more traditional robotic actuation where
the robot typically has access to a much larger battery or wired source of energy. The
small size (especially height) of the node and of its components further restricts the
type and range of actuation that it may perform, in contrast with much larger robots.
The energy and size limitations imply that sensor nodes should employ distributed
actuation to limit energy use while having a global eﬀect on the environment.
In the context of hostile distributed sensor networks, actuation to perturb the
data acquisition of nearby sensors may include magnetic, acoustic, motion-based,
light-based and particle dispersion-based actuation and may include mobility to tra-
verse a given landscape to re-shape the topology of the environment. Such actuation
may be particularly detrimental to the data acquisition of binary sensors where a
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local decision threshold is utilized. If this threshold can be guess-estimated or cap-
tured from the sensor nodes, it may be utilized to the hostile network’s advantage.
For instance, based on the knowledge of such a threshold and based on its own local
readings, each hostile node can determine if the neighboring sensor should report a 1
or 0 and thus actuate to eﬀectively ﬂip this decision. When several hostile nodes are
acting upon a single sensor, they may utilize a timing protocol to ensure that each
hostile node actuates in the manner that will ﬂip the sensor’s decision.
Although not the central focus of this work, other important forms of actuation in
sensor networks include mobility [35], [36]. We thus brieﬂy overview some interesting
results from the sensor network mobility literature as well as from the related ﬁelds
of sensor network coverage and deployment. Importantly this brief overview of a
large and growing sensor network ﬁeld is not intended to be exhaustive but rather
illustrative. In [120] the authors explore how mobility can be used by a sensor network
as a type of actuation to repair its own coverage (called self-repair). In [121] the
authors examine how mobile nodes can migrate to areas of high energy (solar for
example) to charge themselves and then charge other starving nodes. In [122] and [35]
the authors discuss how mobility can speciﬁcally help sensor network security by
detecting misbehaving nodes. In [123] the authors introduce the idea of parasitic
mobility where nodes are able to catch a ride on any moving object and dislodge
from it using an actuator. Hence adding actuation in the form of mobility to sensor
networks signiﬁcantly expands their autonomy and fault-tolerance.
The exact deﬁnition of sensor network coverage varies depending on the speciﬁc
application and on the toolsets used to address it. Generally speaking however, cov-
erage is a measure of how well the sensor network covers or observes all the points
of a physically distributed phenomenon. In [124], [125], [126] and [127] the authors
formulate the Best and Worst case coverage scenarios by calculating a path of Max-
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imum Support and Maximum Breach for an object moving through the sensor ﬁeld.
References [128], [129], [23], [24] and [130] present other key results in coverage. In
reference [26] the authors use percolation theory to study the sensor network density
required to achieve detection of a target with probability 1 almost surely. In [27]
the authors consider the problem of coverage in the face of uncertainty in the sensor
locations. In [131] the authors provide local algorithms for location discovery and
coverage. This research is critical for understanding how a hostile entity might ﬁnd
a path of least detection through the environment and how a hostile network might
“cover” the legitimate nodes in the face of uncertainty of their locations.
In [28] the authors formulate exposure as a measure of how well an object moving
on an arbitrary path can be observed by the sensor network over a period of time.
The authors present an eﬃcient algorithm for ﬁnding minimal exposure paths for
the object to move along, which also simultaneously provides information about the
worst case coverage of the sensor network. Simulation results show that for generally
sparse ﬁelds with a random uniform spatial deployment, there exist many minimal
exposure paths. The authors also present a generalized sensing model of interest to
the study of actuation.
References [132] and [133] provide an approach that allows a stealthy traverse
through an unknown environment that contains dynamic objects and an observer.
The key is to exploit the dynamic objects in the environment as they become known
and use their shadow as cover to move undetected from an initial location to a target
location. The observer is assumed to have inﬁnite observational range in all direc-
tions. The traversing robots are assumed to also have omni-directional sensing but
for ﬁnite ranges. Simulations and implementation results show that 100% stealth can
be achieved at a tradeoﬀ of taking a route which is 86% eﬃcient compared with a
direct route which is 100% eﬃcient but only 36% stealthy.
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A number of pioneering works have proposed mobility as a type of active defense
against the actuation attack of radio jamming. In [134] the authors study both the
feasibility of launching jamming attacks and the challenges associated with detecting
such attacks. Of particular interest is their observation that a single type of mea-
surement usually does not suﬃce to correctly detect the attack. This correlates with
our ﬁndings that without adequate side information (model of the attack or its pa-
rameters), detection is challenging and that involved protocols may not be most cost
eﬀective for the detection level they produce. In [135] the authors argue that mobil-
ity is advantageous to network operations and show how spatial escape strategies can
prevent a mobile jammer from partitioning the network. Although similar in spirit
to our work from [36], the proposed mobility model requires some computation and
further requires that the operational goals of the network be ﬁrst expressed in terms
of potential functions. Mobility of nodes ensues as a result of these potential forces
and the associated network dynamics. Furthermore [135] focuses on attacking nodes
that are concentrated in a speciﬁc region rather than distributed throughout the en-
tire space as in our studies. In [136] the authors propose a mapping protocol which
uses loose group semantics, eager eavesdropping, supremacy of local information and
robustness to packet loss to detect jammed regions in real-time. This work once again
focuses exclusively on jamming attacks - speciﬁcally on a subset of highly localized
attacking nodes, and requires the use of a protocol to actively detect the attack.
These works suggest that including actuation abilities in sensor networks signif-
icantly expands their functionality, autonomy and fault-tolerance. Importantly these
works also suggest that at the same time, adding actuation abilities to a network that
is hostile poses an increased challenge for security and reliable data acquisition. These
observations motivate the need to study the competing sensor networks scenario for
data acquisition which is the focus of this work.
208
VITA
Aleksandra Czarlinska received her B.A.Sc. degree in engineering science elec-
trical option in 2002 from the University of Toronto, Canada, where she was the
recipient of the National Scholarship Award. During the course of her Ph.D. stud-
ies at Texas A&M University she served as a research assistant, teaching assistant
and as a lecturer in the Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering. She is
a student member of the IEEE and received the P.E.O. Scholarship Award during
her Ph.D. studies. She participated in the Research Experience for Undergraduates
(REU) program at Texas A&M University as a graduate assistant and mentor from
2005-2008. Her current research focuses on the identiﬁcation and prevention of new
security attacks in mobile wireless sensor and actuator networks and on the applica-
tion of game theory to distributed systems. Aleksandra Czarlinska can be reached at
214 Zachry Engineering Center, College Station, TX 77843, Mailstop 156.
The typist for this dissertation was Aleksandra Czarlinska.
